RISING INDIA AND ITS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IMPELMENTS

Guest-edited by

Harsh V. Pant
Rising Powers Quarterly is a peer-reviewed non-profit free-access journal dedicated to the study of the growing role of rising powers in global governance. It aims to explore the political, economic and social processes through which the states regarded as “rising powers” in world politics interact with other states as well as international and transnational organizations. All editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Editors at submissions@risingpowersproject.com

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Introduction

India was one of the most enthusiastic players when the edifice of global governance was laid in the post-World War II period (Bhagavan 2013). It participated in key international negotiations aimed at building the post-war international order, which was marked by the bipolarity of the Cold War era. Its vantage point was equally unique with its lack of material power to shape global processes being somewhat compensated by its moral leadership of the then newly decolonized world. While maintaining a strong interest in global institutions, it remained non-aligned to the two major power blocks in global politics.

Even though India aspired global leadership through Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to redefine global governance agenda, the intensity of Cold War politics and India’s lack of economic strength, realistically reduced it to a regional player in South Asia. For most of the Cold War period, India practiced what can be called the “universalism of the weak” evident in its stand on the Korean crisis, the Non-proliferation Treaty and New International Economic Order to name a few (Mohan 2010). Principles trumped pragmatism often leading to India’s marginalization from global processes of norm making. As a result, India was largely confined to being a rule-taker than rule-maker in global governance (Sidhu et al. 2013, p. 6).

Major changes took place in India’s profile and its conception of national interests in the post-Cold War international politics. Disintegration of the former Soviet Union created a New World Order where Indian interests demanded a more proactive engagement with global institutions not merely as a dissident but as a positive contributor. This also coincided with economic liberalization in India allowing it to break the shackles of the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ (Baru 2016). The role India has played in global governance in last quarter of a century –whether in global trade, climate change or nuclear non-proliferation – attests to both its rise and its importance in global governance. The domestic political scene also underwent changes with non-Congress governments coming to power who were less inclined to follow the precepts of non-alignment. In the last quarter of a
century, India has slowly but surely embraced the liberal global order much more emphatically than ever in its history (Mukherji 2014). India’s resurgence in the post-Cold War period can largely be attributed to the liberal economic order. The liberal security order on the other hand has welcomed its rise largely because India’s democratic credentials gel well with the liberal principles. Not without reason, unlike China, India’s rise has been welcomed by the liberal world. This does not however translate into complete abandonment of its past practices. The vestiges of India’s resistance to some of the global institutions and norms continue to inform its decision-making. This friction between its principled past and its pragmatic present continues to inform contemporary global governance debates in its domestic politics and shape India’s engagement with the wider world.

The Current Turmoil

If the end of the Cold War was a major inflection point in India’s approach to global governance, the current turmoil in international politics is another. The post-Second World War global order, to use the words of Henry Kissinger, is now in a state of ‘crisis’ (Goldberg 2016). The US hegemony, which was primarily responsible for the liberal global order, seems to be in decline. The rise of Chinese power has thrown a challenge to existing norms, rules and institutions which govern global politics (Kagan 2017). Global governance, just like global balance of power, is witnessing the rise of a bipolar system (Xuetong 2011). China’s influence on structures of global governance is likely to create immense problems for India’s rise. This is because of two reasons. First, if the US hegemony is replaced by a Sino-centric world order, the future of global governance may look drastically different from where it stands as of today. Second, if the US approach to global governance at times appeared benevolent, the same cannot be said for China. Its assertiveness in Asia and beyond signals that China would use its growing influence to the detriment of other rising powers and more so, whom she considers her strategic opponents. From India’s perspective, this is already evident in the debate over the expansion of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Lastly, the current disorder in global governance is not entirely driven by systemic factors of power transition. There is growing evidence to suggest a steady rise of internal resistance against globalization (Roach 2016). States, which earlier spearheaded globalization, are now increasingly following neo-mercantilist policies evident in the US President Donald Trump’s policies and the United Kingdom’s decision to get out of the European Union. The future of the liberal order is now at stake.

This poses a formidable challenge for India. New Delhi has immensely benefited from the present structures of global governance; the liberal global order has been to its advantage. While benefiting from the system, it has repeatedly underlined that the current structures of global governance are not representative enough of
its concerns. Such behavior is typical of all rising powers. India finds these existing institutions both enabling and constraining. They have helped her rise but as she rises in the system she also finds some of them out of sync with the changing shifts in global balance of power. Its principle strategy therefore has been to uphold certain venues of the current global order, while assailing others. The current trend of anti-globalization is therefore particularly troublesome. For the liberal order to sustain, India may have to now offer its leadership rather than mere participation (Pant 2017). This would require further commitments and resources on New Delhi’s part. Rather than simply being a beneficiary of global public goods, it will now have to actively generate, sustain and secure them.

This is also reflected in the desire of Indian policy-makers to make India a “leading power.” While delivering the Fullerton lecture in 2015 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on ‘India, the United States and China’, Indian Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar said, “India looks to transforming itself from a balancing power to a leading power” (Jaishankar 2015). After keeping a low profile in the international system for long, India now wants to pro-actively shape global outcomes as there are now growing demands on India to make more contributions to the maintenance of the global order. The shifts in Indian foreign policy in last quarter of a decade have been momentous. From ‘looking east’ to ‘acting east’, India has shed some of its traditional reservations and is increasingly embracing the logic of expanding its influence beyond South Asia. Indian armed forces are now actively engaged globally in defence diplomacy. India is now a major voice on global trade and climate change debates. However, doubts galore over its capability to shoulder this responsibility. Notwithstanding India’s economic strides, poverty remains a major challenge. A substantial proportion of its population still remains unaffected from the growth trajectory it has experienced in the post-Cold War period. Its military focus is still very much defined by the traditional threats posed on its land frontiers by its hostile neighbors. It also lacks the appropriate institutional and bureaucratic apparatus to further its influence across its immediate frontiers. More importantly, it is its willingness to be engaged and contribute to global peace, security and governance which is a topic of major speculation among strategists and political commentators, both in India and abroad.

It is therefore important to understand India’s role and views on the current flux in global governance and its own intentions and motives regarding its future shape. This special edition of Rising Powers Quarterly, titled Rising India and Its Global Governance Imperatives, seeks to understand India’s reaction to the current crisis in global governance, its stake in a liberal world order, its interest in ushering change in existing structures, and its capacity to influence and shape the future of global governance.
Challenges of Global Governance Confronting a Rising India

The present structure of global governance emerged out of a particular mix of power, interests and ideology in the post-Second World War era (Ruggie 2004; Ikenberry 2005). Western hegemony shaped international institutions in its own light. They were first a result of the US military and economic preponderance, with Bretton Woods institutions and global economic governance its most emphatic manifestation. The liberal economic order was a public good only the US could engender and sustain through its economic and military power. If power was one criteria, interests was another. Where one superpower could not do it alone, their complementarity of interests paved way for new norms and rules. Great power consensus therefore was equally responsible for the current structures of global governance. Soviet and American interests in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were largely responsible for the NPT regime in the post-World War period (Krauss 2007: 296). While, on one hand, power was instrumental in creating new norms and rules, on the other, norms and rules were critical for the balance of power to remain concentrated in the hands of the great powers (Mearshiemer 1994: 13). Global governance is thus not only an off-shoot of a particular constellation of power but also an agent to sustain the same. Once created, it helps in preserving the system by making others converge their behavior along pre-defined norms and rules. These norms and rules gain additional legitimacy if they serve the interests of those they seek to govern. It is through this process of internalization of norms and rules that global governance attains its over-arching influence upon state behavior.

For most of the post–Second World War period, two great powers defined the international system and also structures of global governance. For a considerable time after the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity replaced that bipolar distribution of power. Its impact on global governance was palpable in so far as it came to represent closely the neoliberal outlook of successive US administrations. The liberal global order attained its climax in the first decade of US hegemony (Blyth 2007). In last quarter of a century, however, the US unipolarity has paved way for a multipolar global order whose principal agents are a number of rising powers (Kahler 2013). Foundations of this emerging multipolarity lay in the shift of economic power from West to the East (Posen 2009). The engine of global growth has now located itself in Asia, with China and India as the new destinations. Their rising economic prowess has also contributed to their military strength. Their rise however is not restricted to their increasing resource base and capabilities; their presence is also equally consequential for any solution to the world’s most important predicaments (Kliengibiel 2016). From restructuring of global economy to climate change and trade negotiations, these rising powers are both part of the problem and its solution.
This rise of new powers, therefore, poses new challenges to the existing structures of global governance which is largely a vestige of the post-Second World War global distribution of power. From the United Nations Security Council to the International Monetary Fund, global institutions are struggling to accommodate this change in power equation. Rising powers are not only clamoring for a greater role but also aiming for a restructuring these norms, rules and institutions. In other words, these rising powers are transitioning from rule-takers to rule-makers. India's bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, its drive to become a 'normal' nuclear power and its pursuit of greater influence in global economic governance – all these are cases in point. India's intent is not to change the entire edifice of these institutions but only to seek greater participation. Accommodation rather than revolutionary change is its objective (Press Trust of India 2016). Its increasing power base has only made this quest realistic. This in essence makes India both a stakeholder and challenger to the existing structures of global governance.

Yet, there are certain avenues of the liberal global order which invite India's strong reservations, if not its vehement opposition. India's transition from the “universalism of the weak” to ‘exceptionalism of the strong’ is yet not fully over (Mohan 2010; Sidhu et al. 2013). Multiple reasons explain India's reluctance to fully embrace and internalize all of the liberal global governance agenda including that of democracy promotion, the responsibility to protect and neoliberal global trading regimes. For one, India is yet to overcome the stranglehold of its ideological past. Ideas such as sovereignty, non-intervention and strategic autonomy are rooted in its strategic culture but also possess certain domestic political value. Second, even when New Delhi has seen a great transformation in its economic and military prowess in last quarter of a century, the willingness to use its power beyond its immediate neighborhood is yet to be internalized by its political decision-makers. When it comes to the use of military power, India remains extremely conservative. Lastly, Indian decision-makers are acutely sensitive about India's vital interests because of its unique challenges. Unlike great powers in the past, India's focus largely remains inward. The contradiction of India's rise is apparent in its impressive economic growth on one hand and its multitude of poor on the other. India's engagement with the liberal global order therefore varies from issue to issue. Where its ideology, interests and resources dictate otherwise, India is willing to be an outlier notwithstanding increasing global expectations.

Yet, rising powers like India cannot merely be challengers or stakeholders in global governance; they also need to contribute. Legitimacy of their growing power rests on suggesting, devising and implementing new structures of global governance. Given their limited capacities and priorities, their most important contribution for visible future may reside in their own regions. More so, because India's global ambitions can only be realized once it shows leadership in its own backyard.
(Dash 2012). For India, its natural habitat remains South Asia. How India is able to transform the region will be a critical test for its global ambitions. Its increasing footprint in the Indo-Pacific and especially Indian Ocean's maritime space is another venue where its contributions will be keenly witnessed. Despite challenges, India is now attempting to shape the South Asian regional architecture in various domains. It is also actively contributing to maritime governance in the Indian Ocean region. Only by setting an example regionally can India hope to contribute globally.

Both India and the international system are undergoing profound changes, complicating the interplay between India and the international system. With India's rise, there are new demands on India to play a larger role in regional and global governance. While traditionally India always tried to be cautious in carving out a role for itself on issues of global governance, on regional security issues India has, more often than not, been an assertive player (Pant 2016: 197-211). Notwithstanding the challenge posed by China and Pakistan, India is now keen to take the lead in shaping regional governance structures and give its global credentials greater credibility. At a time when the US is seemingly retreating from its global commitments and China's rise is putting pressure on extant institutions and norms, India's leadership role becomes even more crucial.

It is these concerns regarding India's rise and its engagement with global governance that forms the backdrop of this special edition. It addresses India's unique position as a rising power in the contemporary global governance debate by exploring its three dimensions.

**Between a Challenger and a Stakeholder**

This section explores those avenues in global governance where India has increasingly become a mainstream participant from being at the periphery. The second article in this volume examines India's bid to become a full member of the NSG, a process which began with the landmark US-India civil nuclear cooperation pact and underscores “India’s transformative position from a nuclear outlier to be a major stakeholder in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.” Ji Yeon-jung argues that the incremental approach that India has adopted in its NSG bid not only accommodates New Delhi’s own interest in the multilateral nuclear export control regime but is also a manifestation of its rise in the global nuclear order. She suggests that “as a veto player has significant authority to influence policy change, India attempts to establish an adequate agenda and effective coalition-building to ensure its entry into the NSG.”

The following article analyses “the evolution of India’s climate policy over the years through the prism of its broader foreign policy strategy, arguing that only by locating Indian climate policy as a subset of its foreign policy agenda, can India’s
engagement with global climate politics be fully explained.” Aniruddh Mohan argues that “shifts in India’s engagement with global climate politics have been but a part of its overall foreign policy adjustments in favour of greater responsibility in management of the global commons.” Changes in Indian foreign policy goals and objectives in recent years towards greater pragmatism and reimagining India’s global role are therefore critical to understanding the changes in India’s climate policy as well.

The fourth article examines the trajectory of Indian diplomacy to seek a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council by mapping its historical association, its interests, its perspectives, and its strategies. In many ways, UNSC reforms are viewed as key indicators of the accommodation of rising powers in the international system. Manish S Dabhade argues that “the case of India provides one of the best examples of a rising power coming to terms with its increased power, role and expectations of itself and of other powers, great and small, in negotiating its place in the reformed Council.” He goes on to suggest that “only a pragmatic, realpolitik approach that involves hard power bargaining would lead India to achieve its decades old aspiration to sit at the global high table.”

**India and the Liberal Global Order**

This section underlines India’s engagement with those aspects of current global governance it is uncomfortable with and its attempts at managing those differences. Despite being one of the world’s largest democracies, New Delhi’s relationship with democracy promotion has been tentative at best, shaped by its longstanding commitments to non-intervention and non-interference, reinforced by the seemingly negative consequences of western democracy promotion agenda in the post-Cold War period. Ian Hall in his article suggests that “India has come to democracy promotion relatively late and in a context in which its involvement in this area is linked to wider strategic objectives, notably building a more robust partnership with the United States and managing Chinese influence in its own region, in particular.” He argues that “India has chosen to tread softly in this area in order to further its interests and minimise its exposure to potentially negative consequences that could arise from moving beyond carefully calibrated democracy assistance.”

The next article by Kartik Bommakanti focuses on India’s paradoxical attitude towards humanitarian interventions and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Bommakanti underscores this paradox by suggesting that “New Delhi’s interventions within its neighbourhood have been rationalized, by invoking the principle of humanitarianism and altruism, at least partially, without an appeal to formal institutional legitimacy” whereas “the opposite tends to be equally true in New Delhi’s conduct toward humanitarian situations extra-regionally, which it
seeks to legitimize through the formal institutional mechanism of the UNSC.” He argues that India’s support for R2P is likely to be limited at the extra-regional level which has consequences for India’s role in global governance as it restricts the extent to which it would be able to contribute.” Bommakanti concludes that India will look to the UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to global governance even as a rising power.

Analyzing shifts and consistencies in India’s positions at various ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization during the Doha Round, Mihir Sharma and Preety Bhogal seek to examine if Indian concerns were “motivated primarily by Indian domestic interests or by the common stated concerns of the G-33 group of developing countries.” They suggest that at each stage of the negotiating process, Indian policy-makers gave primacy to “Indian national interests and political compulsions as much as to its broader rhetorical positioning on North-South issues.” They go on to argue that given the new political climate in the West which is less enthusiastic about the benefits of globalisation, India will have to “re-define its national interest more broadly, and take up a similar coalition-building role in global trade governance that it has begun to espouse in other international fora.”

**Shaping New Structures of Global Governance**

This section focuses upon India’s efforts to enunciate alternatives to the current structure of global governance through new institutions. The article by K Yhome and Tridivesh Singh Maini assesses India’s changing approach towards regionalism and argues that “unlike the Nehruvian approach that overlooked South Asia in region building efforts, the new regional approach gives equal emphasis to South Asia regionalism and the wider Indo-Pacific regionalism.” The authors argue that India’s new leadership role in region building stems from its own self-interest as well as the interests of the wider region. This implies that as India actively contributes to shaping the regional order, “India’s regionalism and sub-regionalism efforts have paid dividends primarily a result of improvements in bilateral relations with some neighbouring countries.”

Sachin Chaturvedi and Sabyasachi Saha examine India’s role in creating new institutional mechanisms within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) initiative, thereby strengthening governance architecture on global trade, capital and investment. They argue that India’s support for such new institutions was to “collectively influence global financial architecture, create alternate financial institutions based on principles of greater equality, create sector specific collaboration platforms on development and security, and to use such platforms to leverage the BRICS advantage for domestic economic growth.” They go on to suggest that “with collective partnerships, BRICS may clearly be delivering
in terms of consensus on economic, trade and investment issues that may foster growth across economies."

The final article by Prem Mahadevan casts a critical eye on India’s engagement with the global discourse on terrorism. He asserts that “reliance on foreign policy activism to rally moral outrage against a rogue state like Pakistan fails when that state has nuclear weapons, a clear propaganda line that terrorism is a byproduct of territorial disputes, and an economic and military patron in China.” Mahadevan calls for a new approach by New Delhi if a sustainable discourse on marginalizing Pakistani support for terrorism is to be evolved. He suggests that “the thrust of Indian diplomacy, both at the level of government officials interacting with foreign counterparts, and professional groups such as academic and journalistic networks, must be to investigate and expose Pakistan as a rogue state that sponsors cross border terrorism to externalize its domestic failures.”

Together, these articles present an interesting portrait of India’s role in the global governance architecture. With a rise in Indian capabilities, there is not only an expectation from its external interlocutors that New Delhi ought to play a larger global role but Indian policy-makers too are re-defining their engagements in the global policy matrix. In the global nuclear order, environmental debates and at the United Nations, India now views itself at the centre of the emerging dynamic while in areas such a democracy promotion, responsibility to protect discourse and global trade, its approach remains a cautious one even as it is actively seeking to manage its differences with the established powers. More ambitiously, India is also trying to build new structures in certain other areas such as regional governance and engagement with other emerging powers in platforms such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping. In many ways, a rising India’s engagement in global governance has only just begun and it will be some time before its full consequences are revealed. Whatever shape it may take, India’s future in global governance is likely to be significantly different from its past.

Bio

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Abstract

This research provides an empirical analysis of India’s limited, but transformative, position in the global nuclear order. By examining India's bid for a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership, this paper makes three major arguments. First, India’s attempt to acquire veto power status through the NSG challenges classical revisionism in international relations theory. Second, India's rise through the NSG is based on selective coalition-building with its partners. Third, although India's bid for the NSG remains inconclusive, India has succeeded to forge solid partnerships with some member states while presenting shared interests. Consequently, India's bidding process for membership in the NSG witnessed its rise in the global nuclear order.

Keywords

India, Rising Power, Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG Waiver

Introduction

For the last fifteen years, India has steadily built international legitimacy for its nuclear weapons status and its recognition as a nuclear weapon state. During the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008, India succeeded in documenting its clean record on nuclear non-proliferation while gaining a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and an India-specific International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. The deal enabled India to join the mainstream of international nuclear commerce; however, more importantly, it resulted in a political consensus among NSG members that decoupled India from other non-NPT nuclear weapons states like Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Since then, India has undertaken a process to gain full membership of the NSG. While India's NSG bid remains inconclusive, the process which began after the Indo-US nuclear deal is a witness to India's transformation from a nuclear outlier to a major stakeholder in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.
While India’s NSG bid has invited a lot of policy analysis, few attempts have been made to understand how India’s pursuit of NSG membership dovetails with its rise in the global nuclear order. This research aims to understand India’s membership of the NSG by situating it in the larger theoretical literature on the behaviour of rising powers. In the process, it answers the following questions: whether India’s approach to NSG subscribes to the classical understanding of rising powers in international relations literature; how does India leverages its transactional relationship with other major nuclear states to become a major stakeholder in the NPT regime; how have other states read and perceived India’s political and technical claims; is India successfully affecting the institutional and normative structures of the global nuclear order? With these questions, this article examines how the incremental process of India’s NSG bid that accommodates its interest in the multilateral export control regime – the NSG – is a manifestation of its rise in the global nuclear order.

India’s Rise at Crossroads

Recently, the scholarly works to supplement the limitations of realist theories in analysing the behaviour of rising powers have been addressed with several case studies, including on India (Cohen 2002; Mohan 2003; Narlikar 2013; Nayar & Paul 2013; Rajiv 2009). Classical theories of international relations vary in how patterns of state behaviours towards challenging or maintaining the status quo are defined (Buchan 1974). For example, how systemic change induces stability and instability in international relations – such as inciting war to reconstruct the order – is fundamental to study of rising and declining powers. The most pessimistic predictions are made by Offensive Realism which argues that the interaction between a rising challenger (revisionist state) and the declining hegemon (status quo power) often results in global or hegemonic wars (Mearsheimer 2014). Power transition theories also posit that the nature of systemic stability may change with alternation in hegemonic dominance (Organski 1968). Theories which focus on systemic change as a crucial variable in explaining peace and conflict generally employ the proposition that the redistribution of power among rival states may inevitably result in wars (Schweller 1999, pp. 1–2; Kim and Gates 2015, p. 221). Subsequently, post-war reconstruction process between the status quo power and revisionist state is an integral part of the course in changing or maintaining the existing order (Bridoux 2011; Buchan 1974; Lee 1976). In consolidating its power, a great power or hegemonic power ‘hold[s] global or continental interest’ in respect to security goals and is less prone to security interdependence, vulnerability and sensitivity (Mearsheimer 2001; Nayar & Paul 2013).

This structural analysis also conceptualizes rising powers as revisionist states...
which seek to challenge the dominance of the hegemon and hence the status quo. Challenging the status quo may result in the increasing possibility of war (Lemke 2004, pp. 52–75). There is some debate among scholars over who exactly initiates such hegemonic wars. Though most scholarship argues that given the dissatisfaction of the rising power with status quo, most often ‘the rising power will be the initiator’ of wars (Kim and Gates 2015, p. 222), it may be a misconception to believe that all foreign policy behavior aimed at increasing a rising state’s power is a manifestation of revisionism (Morgenthau & Thompson 1948, p. 5).

Contrary to the Offensive Realism, the defensive realists stress that the increase in power of the rising states does not automatically translate into intentions of aggression (Glaser 1994/95). Power transition theory also incorporates the possibility of a peaceful transition of power, such as when the transition occurs over a prolonged period between a declining status quo power and a rising state, or if the transition occurs between democratic states as was case between Britain and the USA during the early 20th century (Doyle 2011; Ray 1995; Huth 2002). Thus, not all rising powers may adhere to the same pattern of revisionism; instead may adopt both coercive and consenting strategies.

In this context, India’s rise continues to attract empirical analyses and observations of state behavior and of the consequential challenges facing status quo powers. Prevailing scholarship on India’s rise largely focus upon its capability and intention to demonstrate its material strength (Nayar & Paul 2013). Bipartisan understanding among political leaders during the secret preparations for nuclear tests in 1998 is one example of India’s adaptation to realism when facing security competition and pressure from the NPT regime during the post-Cold War period (Ghose 2013). As former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh argued after the 1998 nuclear tests, ‘Faced as India was with a legitimization of nuclear weapons by the haves, a global nuclear security paradigm from which it was excluded, trends towards disequilibrium in the Asian balance of power, and a neighbourhood in which two nuclear weapons countries act in concert, India had to protect its future by exercising its nuclear option’ (Singh 1998, p. 49). Although India’s recent shift towards realism was not a clear rejection of a past embedded in moralism, internationalism and the non-alignment principle, it did indicate that India’s rise is not unexceptional; India, like all rising powers, seeks to revise the global order (Raja Mohan 2004, p.7; Pardesi 2015).

This follows Mearsheimer’s argument that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite of being a great power in the nuclear age (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 5). However, both offensive and defensive realism agree with the proposition that “nuclear weapons have little utility for offensive purpose, except where only one side in a conflict has them” (Mearsheimer 2006, p. 76). Thus, it is farfetched to interpret that India’s nuclear weapons development automatically indicates an
intention of aggression toward the status quo powers.

In this context, many still question India’s global approach and its status. According to Miller, there is a wide discrepancy between the expectations and perceptions regarding India’s rise (Miller 2013). The continuing debate on India’s rise posits that India’s power status has received recognition limited to South Asia and neighbouring regions due to its lack of global military goals, limited resources and little drive to build supremacy (Karnad 2015). As Mehta has points out, ‘India’s problem is not that its realism is constrained by considerations other than those of the exercise power; it constraints are more a consequence of its military, social, and political incapacity’ (Mehta 2009, p. 212). The discrepancy regarding India’s rise appears to be the widest between its own domestic perspective and others’ expectations of its international role. Thus, some clearly reject putting India in the category of great powers; as Sridharan states, ‘India is neither one of the great powers nor a minor power; but it is one that cannot be ignored, and in this sense, fits the most general definition of a middle power’ (Sridharan 2017, p. 56). Overall, the debate over India’s great power status remains unresolved; most observers however agree that India is on a rising trajectory.

Supplementing structural analysis, recent studies observing India’s rise calls for a broader understanding of its distinctive behaviour during this period of its rise in the international system. India’s strategy has generally been perceived as domestically-oriented, prone to regional conflict, less dependent upon and contradictory of the international regime (Anderson 1983; Thakur 1992). India’s foreign policy is generally attributed to domestic perceptions around preserving its autonomy and strategic independence (Cohen 2001, Mitra 2009). The strong emphasis on autonomy in India’s foreign policy has elicited a limited response from the major powers towards forging a convergence of interests with New Delhi (Perkovich 2003). India’s normative stance and bargaining behaviour was typically viewed as contrary to those of the international community; India volunteered to be a ‘contrarian loner’ in the world, which did not attract many in the international community to work with it (Ibid).

This predicates India as neither a military threat nor as a state overtly challenging the existing order (Cohen 2002; Malone 2011, p. 270; Wang 2015). For instance, after the 1998 nuclear tests, rather than subverting the nuclear non-proliferation regime, New Delhi initiated a process to reconcile its nuclear status with the international non-proliferation regime (Hall 2010). However, India’s rise as a nuclear power has generally failed to create a positive or comprehensive global reach in relation to the NPT regime, despite its relentless advocacy for non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament (Ghose 2012). To offset its status as a de facto nuclear-weapons state outside of the NPT regime, India continuously attempts to accommodate itself with the existing global nuclear order.
Recent debates around behaviour of rising powers continue to examine India's behaviour and strategy as a counter-narrative to the dominant structural theories of state behaviour. This literature on rising power cites political willingness and management as indicators of how successfully the status quo can be challenged (Miller 2016; Sridharan 2017). Narlikar employs Tsebelise's concept of the veto-player to measure those two indicators related to rising powers, with a veto-player being “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for policy change” (Ganghof 2017; Narlikar 2011; Tsebelise 2002). To challenge the international order, rising powers avail their increasing influence and political will to attain veto-player status, in order to partly or entirely reconstruct the international political consensus over their roles in the international system.

In taking steps to acquire a veto-power status, Narlikar develops a theory that indicates several stages through which rising powers influence and change the existing global order. The first is the acquisition of agenda-setting power by a rising powers to effect changes they so desire. (Narlikar 2011). A state can set an agenda, individually or collectively, with respect to the “self-defined national interest of increased scope and depth” to accommodate both internal ambition and external recognition (Miller 2016, p. 217). Instead of demonstrating the classical revisionism, the concept of veto-power strategy employs methods of flexible and selective coalition-building, relying on small constituencies that can nurture one another through the supply of “club goods,” or, a shared interest (Narlikar 2011, p. 1609). Club goods that can formulate a convergence of interest often result in certain coalitions that may help a rising powers bargaining ability both for status or access to key decision-making forums.

For rising powers, it is both less costly and more effective to generate political consensus in order to challenge the existing order (Ibid). During this process, the level of acceptance of the state translates into growing influence, which elevates its power position in the decision-making system. In this regard, rising powers takes on flexible strategies to forge consensus among existing institutions that enable their own rise while introducing alternative norms of global governance.

Based on its increasing nuclear weapon capabilities, India’s approach to integration in the NPT regime is not completely subversive but should be viewed as manifesting a strong inclination to become a veto-player in the global nuclear order. Since the NSG works on political consensus among its members, India’s policy objective is to gain full membership and to become a veto-player in a small constituency, like the NSG, that can be extended to a larger constituency like the NPT. For entry into the group, India’s agenda is based on a self-defined role as a responsible nuclear weapons state (Narlikar 2007). As the following section explores, India’s approach to the NPT through NSG cannot be classified into patterns of the classical revisionism. Rather, maintaining minimum deterrence
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capability, India’s aim is to bolster its legal status with in the NPT regime that advances its rise to a status quo power (Narlikar 2011, p.1608).

India Towards the NSG Membership

The NSG was set up with an idea to tighten the supply-side of nuclear nonproliferation. India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974 was a major shock to the NPT regime, resulting in a strong desire among technologically-advanced states to formulate a tougher non-proliferation policy (Barnaby 1977, p.469). After the 1974 PNE, major nuclear suppliers concluded that India’s actions were in violation of its nuclear energy cooperation agreements with the US and Canada (Weiss 2010, p.259). Led by the US, seven countries drafted the guidelines for major or potential nuclear exporters. This was initially called the London Club, and later became the NSG (Burr 2014). In 1977, this group finalized a document controlling the export of nuclear technology, equipment, and materials, which was later incorporated into the Trigger List of another nuclear export control group, the Zangger Committee. However, the NSG expanded to include enrichment and reprocessing technology and heavy water items in its nuclear trade guidelines.

Similar to Zangger Committee, NSG calls for ‘responsible’ government control and international cooperation over the transfer of nuclear and dual-use items before those items depart from the regulating authority’s jurisdiction. Although informal, NSG aims to add precision in the language of NPT article III.2, which dictates that each of the state parties must not provide ‘(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes’ unless the provided source or material is subject to the safeguards in compliance with the treaty (2005 Review Conference, 2–27 May 2005).

In the wake of Iraq’s nuclear programme during the Gulf War, the next meeting held in 1991 continued the intensive debate to update the items on the Trigger List. In its 1992 meeting at Warsaw, the NSG conditioned nuclear exports over the acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards covering all nuclear activities and facilities of the importing states (Bano 2014, p.119). NSG’s full-scope safeguards policy was then endorsed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 and synchronised the export control mechanisms between NPT, NSG and IAEA (Ibid). All major nuclear suppliers agreed to set ‘full-scope or comprehensive safeguards’ as a condition for nuclear trade (IAEA 2000, p. 5). This meant that all non-NPT nuclear weapons states could not engage in nuclear trade with any of

2 The formation of the NSG was heavily influenced by three events: India’s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, West Germany’s sale regarding a uranium enrichment and reprocessing plant to Brazil, and France’s sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan.
the NSG members. And in 2004, NSG guidelines adopted a catch-all rule that encouraged ‘[providing] a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items which are not on the control list’ (Hibbs 2011, p.10). Since 1974, nuclear export control conditions have become stricter and stricter due to the NSG.

From its inception, India viewed NSG as an oligopoly of the nuclear powers which was neither beneficial nor equitable for developing countries (Kamath 1977, p. 1; Sharma 1979, p. 8). As the NSG expanded and became a major institution of the non-proliferation regime, the gulf between India and NSG continued to grow over the technical and material origin of India’s PNE, its refusal to join the NPT, and its reluctance to accept full-scope safeguards. India’s self-declared nuclear weapons power status following the 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran further created a sense of disconnection between the two. Given this background, India’s reconciliation with NSG members during the Indo-US nuclear deal marked a dramatic turn as it acknowledged India’s nuclear weapons status (Horsburgh 2015; Mistry & Ganguly 2006; Pant 2007).

The Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation shared three policy objectives: to reinforce a strategic relationship that was motivated by the rise of China, to boost economic cooperation based on India’s economic development, and to enhance cooperation on counter-proliferation. In keeping these strategic calculations in mind, the Bush administration took a major step to make serious changes in the US non-proliferation policy. The deal required an amendment to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which lays down conditions for nuclear trade with other countries and is informed by IAEA’s full-scope safeguards. After an intense debate in Washington DC, President George W. Bush acquired a waiver authority from Congress to assume civil nuclear cooperation with India under three conditions: the conclusion of the India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement, consensus on the deal from the NSG’s participating governments (PGs), and documentation of the US commitment to the NPT regime (Boese 2008). In India, the Manmohan Singh government also withered a lot of domestic opposition to the deal; it had to undergo a vote of confidence in the Parliament for complying with the condition to separate military nuclear facilities from the civilian ones (Paddock 2009, p. 8). In lieu of the Separation Plan and the condition of IAEA safeguards, India bargained for a ‘clean and unconditional waiver’ from the NSG that was not welcomed by the US and the majority of NSG members (Kazi 2009, pp.96–98).

The issue of India-specific waiver in the NSG led to a split among the member countries into three distinct groups. The first group, which included major nuclear exporters such as Russia, France, and the UK, strongly supported the waiver for India. The second group including countries such as Germany, Japan, and Canada supported the process of India’s accommodation in the global non-proliferation regime but required some more persuasion. The last group was highly reluctant
to grant the waiver and sought to keep the non-proliferation principle intact. It included nations such as Austria, China, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland (Bano 2014, p.122). Those in the last group raised broad questions as to the effects of the India-specific waiver on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which invariably invited fundamental and technical questions regarding the sustainability of the NPT regime in respect to India’s entry (Hibbs 2011). The key points during the discussion for the waiver revolved around a number of demands: India should have a legally binding moratorium on nuclear tests, to establish an individual monitoring system in order to be vigilant about India’s commitment and to incorporate a clause reaffirming NSG’s strong support for NPT.

Even when the third group resisted the India-specific waiver, New Delhi received strong support from Russia, France, and especially the US. This generated intense pressure on the holdout countries, eventually leading to a unanimous consensus for an India-specific NSG waiver (Heinrich 2008). As David Mulford, the US Ambassador who played a key role during the NSG waiver process reminisced later, ‘it was the biggest diplomatic effort I have witnessed in my experience since the 1980s’ (Kumara and Jayasekera 2008). In response, India agreed to a Separation Plan that put 14 of its existing nuclear power reactors and all future nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards. India also agreed to shut down the CIRUS research reactor by 2010 and to replace the French-origin fuel core in the APSARA reactor (IAEA 2005). Yet, the controversy about India’s Separation Plan continued over of India’s fast breeder reactor program (Robertson and Carlson 2016). The Indian scientific community vehemently opposed any suggestions to put the fast breeder reactor program under IAEA safeguards. As the former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar argued, ‘both from the point of view of maintaining long-term energy security, and for maintaining the minimum credible deterrent, the fast breeder programme just cannot be put on the civilian list’ (Pomper and Harvey 2012, p. 157).

As a result, India gained a NSG waiver in 2008. This allowed New Delhi to trade in all nuclear or dual-use items on the NSG Trigger List. The waiver granted to India was clean but not absolute. First, India was prohibited from accessing ENR technology, and second that NSG members would consider India’s non-proliferation commitment before any nuclear trade (Kessler 2008). The resulting NSG waiver took immediate effect, granting India a unique status. India is the only non-NPT nuclear weapon state to possess a legal sanction for both a military and a civilian nuclear program.

Since then, India has tried to build upon the success of the Indo-US nuclear deal and to further expand its accommodation in the NPT based global nuclear order.

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3 Robertson and Carlson raised the possibility that India’s breeder reactor programs excluded in Separation Plan could produce fissile materials using imported uranium.
An NSG membership is critical to India's full accommodation. In this effort, she has found a strategic partner in the US. New Delhi has continued to reinforce its strategic partnership with the US, ensuring continuous support from Washington D.C. in exchange for economic and defence deals (Ghoshroy 2016). During President Obama's trip to New Delhi in November 2010, the India-US Joint Statement clearly indicated US support for India to join four multilateral export control regimes (NSG, the Missile Export Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement) (Gibbs 2010). US support for India's entry into the NSG was apparent when the former submitted a ‘Food for Thought’ paper on India's NSG membership in 2011. The aim was to provoke a discussion about NSG membership guidelines concerning new applicants (NSG 23 May 2011). The paper identified NSG as the consensus-based decision-making body and thus argued that new members could be accommodated in reference to the NSG guidelines. Membership application required the new applicants to be compliant with NSG's control lists; to follow and act in respect to the NSG guidelines; to have a legal domestic export control systems in effect; to support international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and to be party to the NPT, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, or Bangkok Treaty or any equivalent international non-proliferation treaty (Ibid).

The US set out to ensure that India met some of these conditions, especially being “supportive of international efforts toward the non-proliferation of WMDs” and “[having] in force a legally-based domestic export control system” in accordance with its commitment under the conditions of the NSG waiver (Ibid). India in fact enacted new laws to ensure strict export controls which was codified in the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery System (prohibition of unlawful activities) Act of 2005 and was passed in Parliament. It is even more stringent than the requirements under the NSG guidelines (Bano 2014, p. 124).

As with the India-specific waiver, on the question of India's NSG membership, the group once again appears to be a divided lot with three distinct groups of member-states: those in favour, those neutral or non-committal, and those opposed. Since 2008, India has collected more partners by concluding civil nuclear agreements with the UK and France that was designed to further persuade NSG members. The opposing camp comprised of members reluctant to grant the NSG waiver and included countries such as Austria, China, Ireland, Netherlands, and Switzerland. The opposition raised apprehensions regarding India's position with respect to not signing the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or accepting a moratorium on producing fissile materials. The opposition also held several technical concerns including the durability of India's nuclear testing self-moratorium, the continuity of fissile material production and the exception from full-scope IAEA safeguards on several of India's nuclear facilities (Williams 2016).
Prior to the NSG Plenary meeting in Seoul on June 2016, India made an intensive push for the membership based on a political calculation that at least 24 out of the 48 members were strongly in favour of its membership bid. New Delhi also believed that the several of the hold-out states may shift their position in favour of India given it makes a firm diplomatic push to convince them (Haidar 2016). From April to June, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Ireland, Mexico, and Switzerland, while Indian President Pranab Mukherjee flew to China and New Zealand. The Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, also contacted 26 NSG member countries (PTI 2016a; PTI 2016b). Believing Switzerland’s stance had swung from opposition to support, India expected a domino effect on opposing NSG members that would leave China isolated. However, Switzerland ultimately remained unconvinced, joining eight other NSG members (Austria, Brazil, China, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and Turkey) in opposition.

In its application, which included 300 pages of reference material, India requested that NSG to adopt a merit-based approach given New Delhi’s clean proliferation record and its commitment towards nuclear non-proliferation (Mitra 2016). India credentials included its domestic export control laws, cessation of nuclear testing, ratification of IAEA and additional protocols fulfilled the conditions defined in the NSG guidelines. This is to prove India’s voluntary compliance with the NPT regime. Most NSG members who had supported the civil nuclear deal with India, including the UK, Russia, Germany, Australia and South Korea, supported India’s merit-based approach. Those in opposition argued that the NSG’s Procedural Arrangement needed to be more stringently applied towards non-NPT applicants.

Although China was not the only state opposed to India’s entry in the NSG, its opposition combined with Pakistan’s application for NSG membership complicated the process for India (Lalwani and Mason 2016). Pakistan made two specific demands: first, that all non-NPT membership applications are considered together (the all-or-none principle) and that the membership process should not be discriminatory (Paracha and Leah 2016). From Pakistan’s perspective, the Indo-US deal was a breach of promise as stated in the 1992 NSG Plenary meeting at Warsaw: ‘there was a recognition by all participants of the need to ensure that supplier cooperation does not contribute directly or indirectly to nuclear proliferation, as well as the need to ensure that commercial competition does not compromise their mutually shared non-proliferation objectives’ (Qutab 2016).

That the case for Pakistan’s membership was a difficult one was obvious from the very beginning given its proliferation history especially the AQ Khan affair. For China and Pakistan, it was more of a strategy to complicate India’s application. New Delhi was persistent in holding official and unofficial bilateral talks uninter-
ruptedly with Beijing until the November NSG meeting in Vienna. Although India failed to accomplish its bid at the Seoul and Vienna NSG meetings in 2016, India's bidding process for NSG membership reflects upon the expanding scope of its participation in the NSG process and discussions with other member states. India's commitment to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime is no longer based on the past arguments of non-discrimination. Rather, it is based upon a normative standard of India being a responsible nuclear power. This has helped India not only to increase its influence on the NSG members but also distinguish itself from other states like Pakistan (Kumar 2014).

Notwithstanding the failure in Seoul and Vienna, India has reiterated its determination to pursue the NSG membership (Special Correspondent The Hindu 15 December 2016). The Minister of Atomic Energy and Space, Jitendra Singh, provided a written answer to the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) on 14 December 2016: 'India is currently engaged in nuclear trade with international partners based on a waiver from the NSG in 2008. The waiver is in the form of concession without according India the status of a full member and therefore has an element of unpredictability and attendant risks in the long run for India's long-term nuclear power programme' (Ibid). India perceives that full NSG membership would provide strategic and tactical benefits, including international prestige and stable, enhanced access to export nuclear components, fuel, materials and thorium-based reactor technology in the future.

**India's Rise Through NSG**

India's bid for the NSG membership helps us understand the behaviour of rising powers towards existing global order. In having the clear policy objectives of joining the NPT as a nuclear weapons state, and acquiring a seat on the UN Security Council, India aims to acquire a veto power in a small constituency within the 'existing institutions and norms of global governance order' (Narlikar 2011, p. 1607; PTI 2014). The NSG is a bridge institution that enables India to seize the equivalent right of other member states in a consensus-based decision-making body. As the NSG guidelines dictate, its members review agenda items, including membership applications, on a case-by-case basis and determine them by consensus. The principle of consensus confers veto-power to NSG members.

Compared to the first seven members that started the ‘London Club’, the current 48 member has a more complicated bargaining process to reach consensus. Each member holds an equitable veto power. Thus, India’s membership application requires a unanimous consent of all members. Theoretically, even one member in opposition could neutralize the support of the rest. This means that if India’s membership is approved, it would have a similar veto power over the application of any new entrant as well as over other matters subject to NSG vote. This
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surely would increase India’s influence over the consensus practised by the group. The prestige that comes with this veto power would identify India as a nuclear-weapons state trusted with NSG membership, as NSG guidelines comply with NPT Article III. 2.

In pursuit of becoming a veto-power player in the NSG, India’s strategy is to create a convergence of interest – common club goods – with other partners. Broadly, India’s strategy combines flexible coalition-building and selective partnerships on a case-by-case basis (Schaffer 2002). Compared to the other coalition-building strategies in India’s foreign policy – for instance on climate change or in the World Trade Organization (WTO) where India often maintains close relationship with developing countries to challenge developed countries – India’s approach to NSG is allied with major nuclear exporters like the US, Russia, the UK, France, Japan and South Korea (Basu 2009). India has sought to further consolidate bilateral relationships with these partners, anticipating a spill-over effect that would grant India global recognition in exchange for providing a profitable nuclear and defense market for its coalition partners (Ghoshroy 2016).

India’s flexible coalition-building has allowed its partners to rally behind India’s interests as was the case during the India-specific NSG waiver in 2008. Those strongly opposed to India’s bid, such as Austria, Ireland and China, for instance, publicly raised strong reservations on an India-specific waiver; however, their concerns could not be translated into collective action due to asymmetric diplomatic power on the Indian side. India and the US agreed to pursue selective coalition-building that would include support from major nuclear exporters and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors, which was sufficient to quell the opposition in the NSG. However, at the same time, India and the US continued to dispute liquor taxation and retail rules in the WTO during this time (Barbé Izeul, Costa, & Kissack 2016, p. 38; Ranganathan 2014, pp. 282–355; Zeigler 2010, p. 266). Thus, India’s coalition-building for NSG membership is independent of other issue areas in its foreign policy where its interests may not align with the same coalition partners. It is also highly selective. Foreign Secretary of India Shiv Shankar Menon said during the talk of Indo-US nuclear deal, the deal was “about the merit of trusting the [United States] or the consequences of a particular line of policy rather than about the substance of the agreements themselves” (Feigenbaum 2010).

The emphasis on the responsibility of nuclear weapons state’s behavior is to create additional push for India’s nuclear status. In the India-US deal, India’s stress on

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4 Ghoshroy argued that Indo-US nuclear deal was built up on the expectation of expanding economic and defense ties. The “126 for 123” affixed to Indo-US nuclear deal – India’s interest expressed to purchase 126 fighter aircraft from the US to push for the civil nuclear deal – captured how the bred broader convergence of interest to allows the strategic collaboration on the India’s rise.
its voluntary commitment to nuclear non-proliferation was not merely an announcement to an international audience but also a symbolic gesture to its partners in the NSG. India’s move to increase agenda-setting power to propel its rise in the nuclear order is rooted in such collective interests with its partners.

The Indo-Japan nuclear agreement, which was signed on 15 November 2016, demonstrates a similar pattern. The positive change in Japan’s position on the issue of nuclear trade with India suggests a steady increase in India’s coalition partners. Such nuclear agreements only create more legitimacy for India’s unique nuclear status and and further expand its influence on the NSG. Beginning with the Indo-US nuclear deal, bilateral nuclear agreements which India has been able to sign with countries such as Britain, Australia, Japan, France and Russia attest to the fact that India has been quite successful in selling its normative agenda of being a responsible nuclear power. This is in stark contrast to Pakistan, whose candidature is solely supported by China. India’s achievement is therefore far more significant on the global stage. Though support for India is not without limits, the convergence of interest between the status quo powers and India’s rise suggests some degree of coexistence on a quid-pro-quo basis.

Conclusion

This research focuses on India’s bid for NSG membership as a test case for understanding how a rising power engages in the global nuclear order. It argues that India’s attempt to be a veto-power challenges the notions of classical revisionism often attributed to all rising powers. As a veto player has significant authority to influence policy change, India attempts to establish an adequate agenda and effective coalition-building to ensure its entry into the NSG. The selective partnership initiated under the Indo-US nuclear deal has become the foundation for expanding the coalition with other like-minded states.

Though NSG non-proliferation agenda and India’s nuclear ambitions remained antithetical for a significant period of time beginning in 1974, India NSG membership bid has gained immense traction in recent years. If NSG members no longer see India as a nuclear outlier, India has also reconciled with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The process which began with the Indo-US nuclear deal has made significant progress. Yet, India’s bid for NSG membership remains inconclusive and it would be premature to judge if India can be fully accommodated within the system. However, India’s partial acceptance into the consensus-based, decision-making body, as shown by the NSG waiver and the vibrant discussions regarding India’s entry, attests to its rise in the global nuclear order.

Bio

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**Abstract**

This paper analyses India’s participation in more than two decades of global climate politics. India has transitioned from a protest voice on the fringes of global climate policy to one that is actively shaping international efforts to combat climate change. Analysis of the drivers behind India’s negotiating positions on climate change thus far has focused on the competing motives of equity and co-benefits, which has however been insufficient to explain some of India’s recent actions in global climate governance. There is a gap in the literature with regards to the analysis of Indian climate policy as situated in its larger foreign policy agenda and objectives. This paper studies the evolution of India’s climate policy through the perspective of its broader foreign policy strategy, arguing that India’s engagement with international climate politics can be better understood by locating its climate policy as a subset of its foreign policy agenda. Shifts in India’s climate change negotiation stance in the past decade have been but a part of its overall foreign policy adjustments in favour of greater responsibility in management of the global commons. Going forward, tracking Indian foreign policy objectives will yield vital clues towards India’s role in global climate action.

**Keywords**

Climate Change, UNFCCC, India, International Relations, COP 21

**Introduction**

The first global conference on the environment was held in Stockholm in 1972, which kick started a series of negotiations and discussions over international environmental agreements. Twenty years later, at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, countries got together to agree on the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Summit also led to the creation of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. These agreements form the basis of current international cooperation...
on environmental issues. In 1989, the Montreal Protocol also entered into force which has led to a phasing out of substances that deplete the Ozone layer.

This paper will analyse India’s role in global environmental governance through analysis of its participation in more than two decades of global climate politics. Climate policy has become the locus of current global environmental governance efforts. The issue of climate change continues to be politically charged compared to other environmental challenges and most environmental challenges including loss of biodiversity and desertification, are linked to the problem of climate change. India has transitioned from a protest voice on the fringes of global environmental policy to one that is actively shaping global environmental efforts (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). While there is significant analysis of the climate narratives in India and India’s shifts in negotiating position, there is little analysis of the motives behind this shift. India’s role in the successful negotiations for the Paris Agreement was praised by other countries but criticised and questioned in India, as it ran contrary to the founding intellectual beliefs of Indian climate policy. The paper is structured as follows: first, I trace the history of India’s participation in global climate politics from the establishment of the UNFCCC in Rio, 1992 to Conference of Parties (COP) 21 in Paris, 2015, noting the main narratives that have driven Indian climate policy¹ and the shifts in India’s negotiating position along the years. I then analyse the evolution of Indian climate policy through the perspective of its overarching foreign policy approach and objectives. Through the lens of India’s transformations in foreign policy, I tease out the motives behind India’s shifts in climate negotiations and its successful leadership towards the Paris Agreement. A short discussion of the main constellation of actors involved in shaping both Indian foreign policy and climate policy lends further credence to the arguments developed in the paper. Finally, the article ends with some implications of the paper’s conclusions, for global environmental governance going forward.

**History of Indian Climate Policy**

**Road to Rio & the Kyoto Protocol**

At the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s speech at the Stockholm conference initiated an intellectual tradition in Indian climate policy that pits socio-economic development against environmental protection and accuses the developed countries of the North for causing global environmental problems (Vihma 2011). In the build up to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the ideological foundations of India’s climate policy were further laid down in an influential report by the Centre for Science

¹ I use the phrase Indian climate policy in the paper as a synecdoche to refer to India’s engagement with the UNFCCC and associated climate negotiations. This is not to be confused with India’s domestic actions on climate change.
and Environment (CSE) called ‘Global Warming in an Unequal World’ which accused developed countries of carbon colonialism (Agarwal & Narain 1991). The report argued that developed countries bear the bulk of the responsibility for climate change given their historical emissions and that per capita allocation of emissions should be the metric for dividing responsibility for climate mitigation (Agarwal & Narain 1991).

It is important at this point to provide some numbers which set India’s position in appropriate scientific context. If climate change is considered a problem of stock of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. the total emissions built up over time which has a finite ceiling to limit temperature rise, then India bears little responsibility. A study of GHG emissions from 1850 to 2012 concluded that cumulative emissions in that period from the USA, European Union (EU) and China will contribute to 50% of the temperature increase by 2100 with emissions from the US, EU, and China being 20%, 17%, and 12% respectively (Rocha et al. 2015). India’s emissions in that same period contribute to just 5% (Rocha et al. 2015). In the UNFCCC, these differences in historical responsibility for causing the problem were acknowledged through the phrase ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR) in Article 3 of the Convention (UNFCCC 1992).

India also continues to remain a poor country by global standards with a third of the population below the poverty line. GDP per capita in India in 2015 was roughly 1,600 USD per annum compared to 56,000 USD in the United States (World Bank 2016). Even China at 8,000 USD holds little relevance currently in comparisons with India (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, India’s per capita emissions are low at around a third of the global average, and average Indian electricity consumption per capita is roughly a quarter of the global average and stood at just 10% of that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 2014 (World Resources Institute 2014; World Bank 2015). The difference in capabilities to address climate change owing to the differences in material wealth between developed and developing countries was also noted in the UNFCCC in 1992, through the phrase Respective Capabilities (RC) in Article 3 (UNFCCC 1992).

On the other hand, if climate change is viewed through a different temporal lens and analysed as a problem of current and future GHG flows, India is the world’s third largest emitter with rising emissions and therefore matters significantly to climate action. This duality in India’s position – being simultaneously a large emitter currently but not bearing great historical responsibility for climate change, a problem to which it is highly vulnerable, means that India occupies a unique role in global climate politics (Dubash 2016).

The historical responsibility of the North and per capita rights to the global car-
bon budget were quickly adopted by India’s climate negotiators as the bedrock of India’s position in the first change climate negotiations (Dubash 2013b). In the early years of Indian climate policy starting with the UNFCCC in 1992, India identified itself with the Group of 77 (G77), i.e. developing nations who urged developed countries to take action on climate change while arguing that developing nations might only take on voluntary commitments conditional on receipt of finance and technology transfers from industrialised nations (Dasgupta 2012). The principles of equity being reflected in the UNFCCC at Rio in 1992 through the phrases CBDR and RC were therefore important victories for developing nations (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012) and Indian negotiators claim significant influence over this intervention (Jakobsen 1999).

Following on from Rio, India continued to play an active role in global climate negotiations and its efforts were seen as crucial to securing the Berlin mandate in 1995 which would guide two years of negotiating processes for the legal instrument focused on mitigation actions by developed countries. The negotiations eventually resulted in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which required Annex I parties of the UNFCCC, i.e. developed countries, to commit themselves to “quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives” while developing nations such as India were exempted from legally binding commitments (UNFCCC 1997). For India and other G77 nations, the Kyoto Protocol emphasised the continued relevance of the firewall differentiation between developed and developing nations with respect to the burden of responsibility for climate action. India was able to successfully protect its space for socio-economic development while simultaneously pushing for developed countries to take on more responsibilities (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012). This intellectual tradition, that prioritised economic development to eradicate poverty as most important for India and resisted the call to arms for climate action, all while calling upon principles of equity to push for stronger action by Annex I countries, has remained steady over the years and is the principal reason why India has acquired a reputation of being a difficult partner in climate negotiations (Vihma 2011).

Rise of BASIC & the Copenhagen Accord

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was to run from 2008-2012 and as such, negotiations during 2007-2009 focused on the agreement of a post 2012 climate governance regime. During this time, strong economic growth in the early years of the new millennium for developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa (together referred to as BASIC) had led to an increasing expectation on these countries to take the lead in influencing the outcomes of global governance (Hallding et al. 2013). These countries began to be termed ‘emerging economies’ and distinguished as different from the G772 bloc.

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2 The G77 does not include China but China has commonly associated itself with the G77 on many
on the basis of their economic power and carbon footprint. Developed countries also began initiating dialogues with the emerging economies outside the UN-FCCC process such as the G8+5 Dialogue on Climate and Energy in 2008 and the US led Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate in 2009. The view that emerging economies should contribute to mitigation action began to hold sway (Hallding et al. 2013) and it was argued that Kyoto exemptions for developing countries should not apply to advanced developing countries such as India (Stern & Antholis 2008). Given the pressure to take on climate commitments as a result of their economic development, the BASIC countries began to pursue negotiating strategies independent of the G77 (Kasa et al. 2008) and more closely coordinate their climate policies with each other (Vihma et al. 2011).

In the lead up to the COP 15 summit at Copenhagen in 2009, there were notable shifts in India's climate policy along with other emerging powers (Atteridge et al. 2012). At COP 13 in Bali in 2007, India surprisingly accepted that developing countries should participate in the global mitigation effort, at least on a voluntary basis in line with their capabilities (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). On a domestic level, India also released its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008. Moreover, ahead of the Copenhagen summit in late 2009, India along with other BASIC countries announced voluntary targets to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25 percent against 2005 levels by 2020 and never exceed the per capita emissions of Annex I countries. It is important to note that at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, India had explicitly refused any notion of voluntary commitments (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012).

The Indian Minister for Environment and Climate Change, Jairam Ramesh, also publically articulated his position ahead of the Copenhagen summit as ‘per capita plus’ and signalled his intention to change the ‘narrative of India in climate change negotiations’, arguing that India wanted to achieve a meaningful agreement in Copenhagen even if it meant compromising on some aspects of its traditional position (Vihma 2011).

The shifts in Indian climate policy were not frictionless. Senior members of India's negotiating team publically fell out with the Minister over what they perceived to be inexplicable concessions undoing years of careful Indian negotiating strategy (Vihma 2011; Thaker & Leiserowitz 2014). Ramesh was also heavily criticised in domestic debates by the leading opposition party for his relaxation of India's conservative role in climate change negotiations and was forced to insist that the Copenhagen Accord did not compromise India's sovereignty (Parsai 2009).

In the end, the COP summit at Copenhagen was a failure in terms of agreeing upon a new climate agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol. The Copenhagen
accord that was salvaged from the summit initiated the process of inverting the climate governance architecture from a top down differentiated approach to that of bottom up commitments with pledge and review (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012).

**More Seismic Shifts**

If the shifts in India’s engagement with global climate politics ahead of and during Copenhagen were surprising to old stalwarts of India’s negotiating team, they were in for further rude shocks in 2010 at COP 16 in Cancún. Minister Ramesh broke with India’s long established strategy by announcing that all countries ought to take on legally binding commitments under an appropriate legal form (Lahiri 2010). While this left room for differentiation in commitments between countries and was therefore arguably a shift ‘more in strategy than substance’ (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012), it nevertheless caused furore in India given its contradiction with decades of intellectual tradition. Opposition parties in India accused Ramesh of selling out the country and compromising on India’s sovereignty (Lahiri 2010). Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a lead negotiator for India at the UNFCCC for several years criticised Ramesh’s decisions in Cancún in an editorial and called it ‘mystifying’ (Dasgupta 2011). Note that Dasgupta and two other senior members of India’s negotiating team had been dropped from the delegation for a certain period in 2010 due to their differences with Minister Ramesh a year earlier at Copenhagen (Sethi 2010).

At Cancún, India also played a leading role in negotiating compromises on the issue of transparency, gaining widespread recognition and receiving personal thanks from the COP President during the closing plenary (Vihma 2011). This was another marker of the new found flexibility in India’s engagement as in previous years issues of transparency were a red line with Indian negotiators, who were reticent to discuss any measures that could impinge on the country’s sovereignty.

**Plus Ça Change…**

The following year, at COP 17 in Durban in 2011, India’s delegation was led by a new Environment Minister for India, Jayanthi Natarajan, who quickly attempted to reverse the shifts in India’s climate policy and fall back on traditional arguments (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012; Thaker & Leiserowitz 2014). In fact, in some quarters India was portrayed as a ‘deal breaker’ in Durban for refusing to sign a new legally binding framework including both developed and developing countries (Thaker & Leiserowitz 2014). The push back may have helped stem the tide vis. a vis. India’s rising ambitious engagement with the global climate regime but did little to change the course of broader developments in the negotiations (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). At Durban, countries agreed to terminate the Bali Action Plan and replace it with a new process called the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which further unravelled the rapidly disintegrating
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firewall between North and South for climate action. Unlike the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements which reemphasised the importance of equity and CBDR, the Durban Platform made no such reference to these founding principles, and instead called for negotiations towards a new global agreement applicable to all to be agreed upon by 2015, signalling a significant shift in global climate politics (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012). As an advisor to the US Chief Negotiator remarked “There is no mention of historic responsibility or per capita emissions. There is no mention of economic development as the priority for developing countries. There is no mention of a difference between developed and developing country action (Broder 2012).” Therefore, despite Natarajan attempts to lock down the stables, the horse had evidently bolted and the process to invert the top down differentiated regime that started in Copenhagen had gained irreversible momentum.

COP 21 and the Paris Agreement

The negotiating track that began in Durban in 2011 decisively marked a shift towards a bottom up architecture for climate governance wherein all countries would make pledges for climate action under a system of peer review. At COP 19 in Warsaw in 2013, the idea of Nationally Determined Commitments was first mooted and eventually led to the final version of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) which was adopted by countries in 2014 at COP 20 in Lima. Prior to COP 21 in Paris, all countries were asked to submit INDCs outlining their plans for climate action up to 2030.

In its NDC³ submitted in October 2015, India committed to installing clean energy capacity equivalent to 40% of the total installed electrical capacity in the country by 2030, pledged to reduce the the carbon intensity of its economy by 33-35% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, and announced a goal to install carbon sinks worth an additional 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of Carbon Dioxide equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030 (Government of India 2015). In its own words, the Indian Government called its NDC ‘fair and ambitious’ even though India’s contribution to climate change is ‘limited’ (Government of India 2015). At the Paris negotiations itself, India surprisingly accepted the 1.5 degrees goal for climate policy given that it could potentially be used to close the gates on carbon emissions from late industrialising nations such as itself, in the absence of more stringent emission reductions from developed countries (Dubash 2016). India also launched the global solar Alliance on the side lines of COP 21 and is aggressively pushing for expansion of its renewable energy program. Prime Minister Modi has announced a domestic goal of 175 GW renewable energy by 2022 in 2014, which if achieved would further demonstrate India’s leadership in global climate action (Climate Action Tracker 2017; Allianz Climate Solutions

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³ INDCs are now NDCs after the successful ratification of the Paris Agreement.
et al. 2017). India also quickly ratified the Paris Agreement to help bring it into force, despite concerns that it would insist on developed countries first fulfilling their pre 2020 commitments under the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol. As a result of these actions, India’s ‘leadership’ in global climate policy was praised by several commentators during the COP 21 negotiations (PTI 2016) and after its early ratification (Anon 2016).

**Indian Climate Policy Narratives**

Overall, viewed from the perspective of a longer timeline, the Paris Agreement marked the end of a move towards a bottom up, self-differentiated global climate regime which began in Copenhagen in 2009 and reversed the top down, differentiated model of the Kyoto Protocol. India was an active participant in this process and while there are debates over the magnitude of shift in Indian climate policy, the early narratives of Indian climate policy, which framed economic development as a competing interest with environmental protection, are no longer the dominant paradigm (Stevenson 2011).

Dubash (2009) has characterised the narratives of Indian climate policy as a tussle between Growth First Stonewallers; Progressive Realists; and Progressive Internationalists. The three categories and their respective worldviews are shown in Figure 1

**Figure 1: Narratives of Indian Climate Policy (Dubash 2009)**

- **Growth First Stonewallers**
  - CBDR-RC: Primary narrative is poverty and development
  - Equity is a demand out of principle but also strategic, to keep industrialized world at bay

- ** Progressive Realists**
  - Per capita +, negotiations are unfair but there are opportunities in climate action
  - Climate change is a real threat to India
  - Development with co-benefits

- ** Progressive Internationalists**
  - Shape international process with strong Indian engagement
  - Climate change will impact the poor the most
  - Link actions with global regime – opportunities in low carbon technology

Intuitively, it is evident that Indian climate policy in the 1990s most strongly characterised the narrative of the Growth First Stonewallers who wanted to protect India’s right to socio-economic development and were deeply suspicious of western efforts to involve India in taking on climate commitments (Dubash 2009). Similarly, events at Copenhagen in 2009 and the Paris Agreement in 2015 roughly correspond to the pre-eminence of the narratives of the Progressive Realists and Progressive internationalists respectively.
India’s departure from arguing for strict differentiation between developed and developing countries in the 1990s to leading the negotiations towards a loosely differentiated regime poses questions over what motivated this change. Why did the narrative of Indian climate policy change in favour of greater salience of the viewpoints of Progressive Internationalists? What accounts for the shifts in India’s climate negotiating stance, first before Copenhagen and then in the lead up to the Paris Agreement? What were the reasons for the particular timing of the shifts in policy?

The characterisation of the dominant narratives of Indian climate policy tell us little about why the emphasis has shifted from one to another at different points in time.

**Links Between Indian Foreign Policy and Climate Policy**

**Non-alignment and Strategic Autonomy**

Understanding the shifts and pivots in India’s climate policy may be better served by examining its actions and engagement in global climate politics through the lens of its larger foreign policy agenda. During much of the cold war, Indian foreign policy emphasised strongly on principles of national sovereignty and non-alignment with either of the two major powers, sought autonomy through non-interference of foreign powers in India’s domestic affairs, and strove for solidarity among fellow developing countries (Ollapally & Rajagopal 2011). India was one of the early leaders of the global non-aligned movement (NAM) – a group of states not formally aligned with either power bloc during the cold war. The quest for autonomy and independence of choice and action above all formed the dominant worldview of early Indian foreign policy (Narang & Staniland 2012), perhaps motivated by the history of colonial subjugation (Ganguly & Pardesi 2009). Indira Gandhi who was the Indian Prime Minister for much of the cold war period (1965-77, 1980-84) consistently stressed the importance of independence in foreign policy and viewed strength in terms of independence (Narang & Staniland 2012). Indira Gandhi’s view of global politics was that “the principles of non-interference by one State in the internal affairs of another, of scrupulous respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political integrity of all States are essential to the principle of political co-existence” (Gandhi 1975).

The prioritization of non-alignment in India’s relations with major powers, emphasis on self reliance in national security through pursuit of nuclear weapons, and blocking of any moves towards internationally supervised climate mitigation, can therefore all be imputed to the omnipresent strategic culture that set out to protect sovereignty and independence while criticising inequity in global regimes. As Rajan (1997) notes, India’s approach in climate negotiations in the early 1990s ‘reflected more vaguely the traditional developing country concerns about sover-
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eignty, equity, and the importance of economic development.’ Scholars have argued that initial Indian government positions on climate change served to protect India’s sovereignty but also possible economic development pathways (Thaker & Leiserowitz 2014; Sengupta 2012; Atteridge et al. 2012). The desire for autonomy of choice is reflected in other foreign policy themes - on the question of nuclear weapons for instance it has been argued that India’s emphasis on universality in regimes served to protect its own options (Mohan 2010). Accordingly, the dominant narrative of India’s ideological commitment to equity in early climate negotiations obscures other important motivations of Indian policymakers, which were to ensure sovereignty and strategic autonomy, in line with larger foreign policy goals. The implications of taking on carbon reduction commitments above all meant a compromise over its ability to choose, and secondly, a requirement to be under foreign oversight – both vehemently unacceptable to Indian policy elite at the time.

Shifts Towards Pragmatism in Foreign Policy

Following on from the liberalisation of India’s economy in 1991 after a balance of payments crisis and the end of the cold war, Indian foreign policy began to slowly break loose from the ideological shackles of non-alignment and uncompromising strategic autonomy. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao sought to chart a new course for Indian foreign policy (Ganguly & Pardesi 2009). The ideological shift in India’s foreign policy away from strict Nehruvian non-alignment towards pragmatism, i.e. ‘an unabashed consideration of the Indian national interest rather than global justice or ethics’ (Ollapally & Rajagopal 2011) was animated by the reality of a unipolar world and growing economic and social relations between India and the US (Chiriyankandath 2004). As former Indian Prime Minister IK Gujral stated “It is a mantra that we have to keep repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against?” (As quoted in Ganguly & Pardesi 2009). Certain Indian strategists also felt that India’s stance in world affairs had thus far led to a series of strategic missteps and yielded little in terms of material gain (Ollapally & Rajagopal 2011). Pragmatists in Indian foreign policy therefore began to call for considerations of national interest to hold primacy in assessment of foreign policy strategy rather than sovereignty and questions of equity and justice in global affairs (Ollapally & Rajagopal 2011).

The shift towards more realistic assessments of benefits and trade-offs was soon reflected in Indian climate policy. In 2002, India reversed its long standing scepticism of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol and Indian entrepreneurs began to engage with the mechanism to gain funding for projects in India. To date, India has hosted the second largest number of projects under the CDM. While some analysts saw the reversal on CDM as a product of heavy lobbying by Indian businesses which changed government minds on the
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issue (Thaker & Leiserowitz 2014), the neoliberal shift towards engaging with
global economic arrangements and securing material heft was clearly a process
that had been long underway both in the wider economic and foreign policy
sphere. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, economic growth rapidly picked up
in India and other emerging economies such as South Africa, Brazil, Russia and
China. The term BRICs was coined in 2001 in a Goldman Sachs report referring
to these economies and their growing political and economic clout (O'Neill
2001). India's economic transformation was mirrored by a general transition from
acting like a ‘porcupine’ to acting like a ‘tiger’ in international relations (Mohan
2003) This meant that although India would continue to not give in easily or be
docile, it would be flexible, confident, and looking to benefit from any opportuni-
ties in its interactions, rather than sticking to entrenched positions.

Explaining the Lead up to Copenhagen

India's shifts in its climate negotiation position in the period up to Copenhagen
in 2009 have been highlighted earlier and according to a former lead negotia-
tor for India at the UNFCCC, represent the major shift in its climate policy to
date (Author interview with former Indian Lead Negotiator, Email, 12th May
2017). Much of the responsibility for the adjustments in India’s climate policy
and the softening of its defensive posture in climate negotiations has been attrib-
uted to the strong personality and worldview of the Environment Minister Jairam
Ramesh (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012; Vihma 2011; Dubash 2013b), who
held the post between 2009 – 2011 before his promotion to Cabinet Minister.
However, while the influence of a strong personality such as Minister Ramesh
was certainly a factor, it does not account for the full range of shifts in India's
climate policy, both before and after Copenhagen. For instance, it’s been argued
that a general trend toward a more dynamic posture in India’s climate negotiati-
ing strategy started in Bali in 2007 before Ramesh took office (Mathur & Varughese
2009; Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). Furthermore, India's flexibility in cli-
mate negotiations has continued after Ramesh left office, and even following a
change in government in 2014, as evidenced by the praise for India subsequent to
the Paris Agreement.

Some commentators have indicated that the widening of domestic debates in
India on climate change has impacted its international negotiating position. For
instance, Dubash (2013b) argues that while Indian climate policy has been con-
sistently framed through the question of equity, domestic concerns over energy
security and co-benefits of climate action have led India to engage more strongly
with possibilities for climate mitigation. The NAPCC is seen as the cornerstone
of these efforts (Dubash 2013b). Similarly, Thaker and Leiserowitz (2014) see the
primary shift in the climate discourse in India as a result of a growing recognition
of the co-benefits approach where policies to address climate change are main-
streamed into domestic priorities of poverty alleviation and economic growth, a process that gained momentum with Indian engagement with the CDM. The logic of co-benefits and mainstreaming of climate action in domestic development plans and policies however have modest explanatory value since they do little to explain the timing of India’s shift in its negotiating stance. And as Hurrell and Sengupta (2012) have noted, the domestic debate was more of a consequence of the decisions taken independently by key policymakers pre-Copenhagen, rather than its cause.

Vihma (2011) has argued that the pressures of international climate negotiations may have affected Indian policy in fundamental ways between 2007 to 2009, causing its actions to change even if the rhetoric continued to be largely stable. However, while international pressure on India to take action on climate change grew in the early 2000s as a result of a significant upside in its carbon emissions since the early 1990s, it nevertheless retained excellent grounds for it to continue with its traditional negotiating position. Developed countries had to a large extent failed to meet their commitments under the first period of the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore had little moral high ground to pressure India. And despite strong economic growth, in per capita terms India still had at least as much in common economically with fellow G77 members such as the Least Developed Countries as with Brazil, South Africa or China (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012). As climate policy experts in India were to later observe, the shift in Copenhagen to the format of ‘pledge and review’ was an effective dismantling of the top down regime and a reopening of the basic issues that were thought to be resolved at the creation of the UNFCCC in 1992 (Dasgupta 2012). In fact, analysed through the prism of climate negotiations, India had much to lose and little to gain from a dilution of responsibility for climate action between developing and developing nations that was the bedrock of the Kyoto Protocol (Raghunandan 2012). Powerful voices in the Indian climate negotiating team clearly believed this and desired a continuation of the tried and tested intellectual logic, given their public fall out with Minister Ramesh over his interventions at the time.

Seen through the prism of its broader foreign policy motivations at the time however, India’s flexibility and concessions pre Copenhagen are more readily explained and in line with its other international actions. There are three ways in particular through which big picture Indian foreign policy objectives affected India’s negotiating position before the Copenhagen summit. Firstly, the rapid economic growth posted by BRICS countries between 2002-2007 and subsequent strong performance both during and subsequent to the crisis by China and India strengthened their claims as international heavyweights (Kahler 2012). Global governance began to be characterised by a shift from unipolar US hegemony to one of ‘emancipatory multipolarity’, wherein the world’s most populous
countries now had a position at the head table of global affairs (Gray & Murphy 2013). With the clamour for greater power in global governance came the onus of responsibility for emerging powers such as India to contribute to solving global challenges (Rastogi 2011). In the aftermath of the financial crisis for instance, India’s contribution to stabilising the global economy was seen as critical (Rastogi 2011). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also alluded to the importance of taking on responsibilities a few months before Copenhagen, stating that India “should play a role in the international arena in a manner that makes a positive contribution in finding solutions to major global challenges, whether in the field of trade or climate change” (Anon 2009). India’s flexibility at Copenhagen ensured that the perception of India being a responsible partner was successful. While much of the blame for the lack of an agreement was placed on emerging economies, especially China, India was seen in a more favourable light in some quarters given the flexibility it showed in its negotiating strategy (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). In some quarters it was even praised as a ‘deal maker’ for its efforts towards the Copenhagen Accord and help in finding middle ground between China and the United States (Rastogi 2011). Most pertinently, India’s diplomatic interests were served well by the perception that it was ‘part of the solution’ at Copenhagen (Mukherjee & Malone 2011; Sengupta 2012).

More broadly, Copenhagen reflected the limited appetite of the largest emerging economies to undertake significant revisionism of the status quo in global governance regimes (Kahler 2012). Instead, for India at least, the motivation at Copenhagen seemed to be to minimise damage to its broader foreign policy ambitions. These ambitions included primarily a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which it had been coveting since the early 2000s. India was counting on support from the G77 developing nations for its Security Council claims. Defending his decisions in Parliament, Jairam Ramesh had himself pointed to the criticism from climate vulnerable G77 countries such as Maldives and Bangladesh of India’s intransigence in climate talks, as pertinent to his calculations in Copenhagen, as he worried about the dents to India’s reputation among fellow G77 members if it failed to take on some level of climate commitments (Vihma 2011). Domestically, India’s actions at Copenhagen were therefore analysed in the light of its quest to gain permanent UNSC membership (Gupta et al. 2015).

The third and final way in which broader Indian foreign policy initiatives brought to bear its pressure on India’s climate change negotiating stance at the time was its blossoming strategic partnership with the US. Note that in 2008, India with strong support from the US following the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in 2005, had successfully negotiated a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to engage in global nuclear commerce despite being a nuclear weapons state that had not
signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some accordingly felt that India’s concessions in the negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen summit were a reflection of the increasingly close Indo-US bilateral ties (Raghunandan 2012; Dubash 2013b).

Incidentally, in signing the waiver and accepting help from the US to gain an exemption from the NSG, India had opened itself to working with the non-proliferation regime even though it considered the NPT unacceptable (Ollapally & Rajagopal 2011). In other words, with growing appreciation of the value of pragmatism in Indian foreign policy circles, India became compelled to shed some of its ‘past baggage about equity and justice’ in global regimes (Mohan 2010). Furthermore, as a result of US pressure, India went against the rest of the NAM nations and voted for sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program in 2006 (Chenoy & Chenoy 2007), helping implement the rules against some of its ‘fellow Third World travellers’ (Mohan 2010). The locus of objectives of Indian foreign policy had therefore decisively moved from pure strategic autonomy to pursuit of arrangements that yielded material heft.

These strategic recalculations were far from smooth, as described previously. The shift was accompanied by stringent criticism by certain domestic actors who felt that India was compromising on its independence in international affairs (Atteridge et al. 2012). Interestingly, this had been the same line of argument used to attack the Indo-US nuclear deal. The Communist Party of India (CPI) which was part of the coalition government at the time, had criticised the deal as impinging on India’s sovereignty (Zaheer 2007).

The tension between the old focus on strategic autonomy and new directions in foreign policy towards pragmatism was also evident in Durban at COP 17. As discussed previously, India tried to reverse some of its concessions but with little success due to global negotiations now reconfigured in a new paradigm. This cognitive dissonance within the Indian climate policy establishment led to India being isolated in Durban, caught between old arguments and allies such as the G77 and new realities and groupings such as BASIC (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012).

**High Ground to High Table**

Following on from the election of the Modi led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2014, Indian foreign policy has taken on yet more decisive turns. Much of the renewed vigour and energy in Indian foreign policy has been credited to the Prime Minister Narendra Modi who has scored a list of foreign policy ‘firsts’ including articulating the need for India to lead the fight against climate change (Sidhu & Godbole 2015). Under the Modi government, India is looking to play a greater role in solving global challenges and shaping the rules, norms and processes that guide those efforts (Sidhu 2015). This is an even bigger departure
from the previous shift in Indian foreign policy wherein pragmatism and tangible gains were the primary motivating factor in diluting the emphasis on autonomy and global justice. In short, India has transitioned from the ‘role of a global opposition to that of a global agenda setter’ (Saran 2015).

Perhaps as a result of this new strategic vision, India was perceived at its most progressive and flexible in climate change negotiations after the Modi government came to power (Author in-person interview with LDC Delegate, Bonn, 11th May 2017). Interestingly however, the appreciation abroad for India’s progressive stance was contrasted with captious reactions at home. The Paris Agreement was criticised for reducing equity to ‘sweet nothings’ (Narain 2017) and India’s participation in the Agreement was seen at home as completely contrary to the traditional logic of Indian climate policy (Dubash 2016).

India’s foreign policy endeavours in recent years however lend ample rationale to India’s leadership towards the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement has signalled the dominance of the Progressive Internationalists narrative (Dubash 2009) in Indian climate policy, as the paradigm of rule setting and regime building takes centre stage. This shift in narrative has mirrored an indistinguishable shift in India’s overall diplomatic strategy towards taking on leadership and responsibility in the management of the global commons, which began following the financial crisis in 2008 and has been reenergised under the present BJP led government.

Who Decides? Key Actors in Indian Climate Policy

The revisions in India’s negotiating stance over the years and shifts in the competing and yet equally compelling narratives of Indian climate policy beg the obvious question – who decides? A glimpse into the actors involved in India’s climate policy establishment can also provide answers as to the motivations behind the changes, or validate the arguments provided in this paper.

The first thing to note is that the Indian climate policymaking apparatus is a closed, tight knit and relatively small group (Sengupta 2012). Perhaps as a result, India’s negotiating team at UNFCCC meetings is actually small compared to nations of a similar size. At Copenhagen for instance, India only sent 77 delegates as part of the delegation compared to over 300 for China and Indonesia respectively (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012). India’s small negotiating team has in fact been a frequent point of criticism in analysis of India’s engagement with global climate governance (see for instance Dubash 2013a).

Negotiating teams are usually comprised of a mixture of personnel from different ministries such as the Ministries of Environment, Power, Commerce, and External Affairs. As a long time member of India’s UNFCCC negotiating team
explained in an interview:

“The Indian delegation was always much smaller than the requirement or even compared to delegations of other similar countries. Briefs for climate change meetings were prepared jointly by the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Political negotiations had MEA officials in the lead with MoEFCC and other ministries playing this role during particular substantive negotiations but it was a team effort. While the Prime Minister’s Office was always in the loop given the importance of climate change negotiations, right from the time of finalising the delegation; post 2014 it was the PM I believe who took a more direct role” (Author interview with former Indian Negotiator & Senior Civil Servant, Email, 30th April 2017).

The intellectual godfathering of Indian climate policy by its overall foreign policy has therefore transpired mainly because limited capacity being deployed for climate negotiations has meant that the MEA, India’s foreign ministry, has played a critical role in India’s climate negotiating team. As a result, the continuum of intellectual mores across different arenas of global diplomatic negotiations has been steady and ensured a consistency of principles and objectives across issues such as nuclear weapons, climate change, and global economic co-operation. The introduction of new actors such as Jairam Ramesh in 2009 and PM Modi in 2014 helped stimulate fresh ideas for these shifts to take place, but only in so much as those were attuned to wider diplomatic objectives. The same cerebral strands that drove India’s focus on strategic autonomy, its shift to material based pragmatism, and its more recent moves towards norm setting and leadership in global governance issues in the conduct of its foreign policy, have influenced India’s climate negotiating stance.

Conclusions & Looking Ahead

Indian climate policy in the literature has predominantly been portrayed as a tussle primarily between two narratives – equity concerns and co-benefits – with equity concerns being dominant. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that this is insufficient to explain the full shift in India’s involvement in global climate policy in recent years, particularly India’s actions in the build up to Copenhagen and subsequently, its role in the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement and its early ratification. Instead, this paper has attempted to explain Indian climate policy as a subset of its larger foreign policy agenda. In early climate negotiations leading up to the UNFCCC, the didactic arguments of equity and CBDR were useful rhetorical pivots supporting underlying motivations of sovereignty and independence of choice that were a central pillar of Indian foreign policy at the time. Similarly, since the turn of the millennium, India’s geopolitical shift
towards pragmatism and then later norm setting has been reflected in its engagement with climate negotiations. The big departure from previous arguments took place between 2007 – 2009 in the negotiating track to COP 15, stimulated by broad-ranging diplomatic initiatives that were looking to relocate India’s role in global affairs. Furthermore, more recently under Prime Minister Modi, India has fully taken on the role of a responsible steward in the management of the global commons and this was reflected in its contribution towards the Paris Agreement.

One of the limitations in offering explanatory theories for events that have tightly coupled multiple causalities is that focusing on one set of rationale – in this case foreign policy – naturally underplays other factors. It is entirely reasonable to argue for instance that India’s climate policy was also affected by the disintegrating logic of the Annex and Non Annex differentiation (Obergassel et al. 2016), the growing business opportunities in climate action through the development of low carbon technologies, and related changes in the paradigm of global climate politics in favour of a global transformation approach (Hermwille 2016). In summary, external events played their part in as much as India’s own foreign policy calculus and while it is always tricky to disentangle the sequence of logic in such situations, i.e. which of the two impacted climate policy first, it is certain that by its very nature, foreign policy decisions are not made in a vacuum but are sensitive and responsive to external determinants. Identifying the foreign policy signal in India’s decision making in climate negotiations therefore need not be irreconcilable with the influence of changing dynamics in global climate politics.

In any case, the understanding that Indian foreign policy goals and objectives drive its climate policy naturally holds value in its predictive utility. What can the directions in Indian foreign policy tell us about how India will behave in climate negotiations going forward? The reasoning of this paper suggests that India’s machinations in the broader global diplomatic realm have foreshadowed India’s actions in climate negotiations. India’s climate policy must be located within the map of its overall geopolitical calculations (Atteridge et al. 2012; Dubash 2013a). Tracking the strategic aims of Indian foreign policy may yield clues as to how India will engage in global climate governance. Appplying this framework in retrospect for instance behoves one to wonder if a compromise from developed countries in the early days of climate negotiations, perhaps demanding voluntary goals from developing nations but with little to no oversight and accountability, may have been palatable to India. Debates over equity and justice were to some degree proxy politics, but ended up overwhelming negotiations at the time and perhaps myopically preventing an understanding of the deeper underlying concern of economic independence and sovereignty for developing countries.

In the case of the present and the foreseeable future, Indian climate leadership looks set to continue. In the case of the Paris Agreement, the Trump administra-
tion’s declaration to pull out the United States from the Agreement has not led to any change in climate policy from India. On the contrary, statements indicating a willingness to increase the ambition of domestic climate action even further have been issued by leading Indian officials (see for instance IANS 2017; Vishnoi & Chaudhury 2017). As outlined previously, Indian foreign policy is increasingly placing emphasis on India’s responsibility to protect norms in global governance. As long as India’s hard power grows on the back of strong economic growth rates, its soft power ambitions will likely follow suit. Nevertheless, it would be remiss to not insert a note of caution – the transformation in Indian foreign and climate policy is far from a linear process, there is a continuous tension between the competing narratives and the recrudescence of a pull back towards a more parochial engagement in global affairs very much exists. If such a development does occur however, it will likely manifest first in India’s wider diplomatic outreach before influencing Indian climate policy.

Lastly, greater understanding of a country’s climate and foreign policy strategy going forward will require more participation from scholars of international relations. In general, global environmental governance has been an understudied field in international relations – just 2% of articles in top journals in the field are on environmental subjects and only 1.2% address global environmental politics (Green & Hale 2017). The study of global climate politics will benefit from the unique disciplinary attributes that are housed under the field of international relations and political science. Insights from these disciplines can help break deadlocks in climate negotiations by revealing the deeper strategic preferences of critical actors, which may help to increase the collective ambition of action to take on one of the most pressing challenges of our times.

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From Rio to Paris: India in Global Climate Politics


ings India.


Article

India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms

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Abstract
The United Nations Security Council has emerged as the key arena and barometer for evaluating the promise and progress of accommodating new, rising powers in the international system. The case of India provides one of the best examples of a rising power coming to terms with its increased power, role and expectations of itself and of other powers, great and small, in negotiating its place in the reformed Council as a permanent member. This paper begins by mapping its historical association and varied interests vis-à-vis the Security Council, and its perspectives on various strands to reform the Council and finally, Indian strategies over the years to gain permanent seat in the reformed Council. This paper concludes that only a pragmatic, realpolitik approach that involves hard power bargaining would lead India to achieve its decades old aspiration to sit at the global high table.

Keywords
India, Security Council, Permanent Membership, G4, Diplomacy

Introduction
In a truly “historic” move to reforming global governance in the arena of international peace and security, the 193 member-United Nations adopted a consensus resolution in its 69th General Assembly on September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) to a Text-Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the United Nations Security Council. Welcoming this General Assembly Decision 80/560 and calling it a “significant development,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (2015) struck a very optimistic note:

*We look forward to early commencement of text-based negotiations with a view to securing concrete outcomes during the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. We call upon all Member States to constructively engage in this process so that the long pending reform of the UN Security Council can be achieved so as to equip the Council to more effectively address the global challenges.*
In the Indian eyes, “no reform of the United Nations (UN) is complete without the composition of the Security Council changing to reflect contemporary realities of the twenty-first century. This requires expansion in the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories.” This Indian quest for the Security Council permanent membership, what India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once rightly described as “an essay in persuasion” lies at the heart of repeated Indian pleas for reforming the UN, the only existing universal organization of global governance. (Nafey 2005, p.1) This paper posits some fundamental questions: what have been the Indian experiences vis-à-vis the Council; what drives the Indian interests in pursuing the permanent seat in the Council; what perspectives and positions have India articulated on the proposed reforms; what bilateral and multilateral strategies has India put in place in pursuance of its Council objectives; and lastly, what roadblocks India needs to surmount before it achieves its objective of a permanent Council seat. Reflecting what Teresita C. Schaffer (2010, p.219) calls India’s multilateral “personality,” this paper seeks to locate current Indian perspectives and positions on the entire issue of reforming the Security Council. It begins with first delineating the nature and role of the Security Council itself and the Indian experiences therein of serving two-year seven terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. It then examines the multi-layered calculus in pursuing a permanent seat in the reformed Council by looking at its historic role in the UN system, its intrinsic value and its great power ambitions. Further, Indian perspectives on the five sets of issues marked by the General Assembly and Indian strategies, viz., its diplomacy, are discussed. This paper ends by identifying serious roadblocks to Indian Council seat ambitions and concluding that India has to display more pragmatism, more realpolitik to realize its aspiration to be a permanent member of the Security Council, the global high-power table.

**Understanding Role of Security Council: Indian Experiences**

Before examining the Indian ideas, aspirations and strategies, an understanding of the very special nature of the UN Security Council becomes necessary. The founders of the UN were very clear about a “security specialist” Council whose pre-eminent purpose was the maintenance of international peace and security. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that in pursuance of its security-specific mandate and promised efficiency, it has an extremely rigid representation system matched with an extraordinary decision-making power/procedures (Goodrich 1969). To “ensure prompt and effective action” the Council was created as a strictly limited membership body. This membership, not a right but a privilege, was structured in two categories of membership, viz., permanent and non-permanent. Although Article 23 of the Charter names the five member states as permanent members of the Council, the criteria for conferring this privileged permanent membership
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remained conspicuous by its absence. Thus, a self-conferred status formalized the formidable stature of some states who were on the victorious side who “froze their superior status and built near-insurmountable hurdles to any future alteration attempt.” (Murthy 1995, p.18-20) Regarding the non-permanent members of the Council (that increased from six to eleven in a 1963 Charter amendment that became effective from 1 January 1966), it was seen by the UN’s founding fathers as facilitating legitimacy of the Security Council decisions. Thus, an addition of non-permanent members was seen as providing a much needed representational character to the Council and making it a “microcosm of world opinion.” (Nicholas 1975) Although the Charter has not put any criteria for permanent members, it has provided for a two-part criteria for the election on non-permanent members: the contribution to maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the Organization, and equitable geographical distribution. Further, to ensure restricted access to the membership of Council, it was required to elect the non-permanent members with the support of two-thirds of members voting in the General Assembly and it would be only for a two year term. Also, Article 23 explicitly disallowing immediate re-election of a retiring member ensures that the non-permanent members shall not be accorded “even a pretense of permanence.” (Murthy 1995, p. 20) Most significantly, the permanent members were provided with a veto power on substantive matters of peace and security.

The Indian approach to the UN, in India’s first PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s words, is characterized by “whole-hearted cooperation” through full participation “in its councils to which her geographical position, and contribution towards peaceful progress entitle her.” (Murthy 2010)

The UN Security Council, with its exceptional role in the UN in preserving international peace and security, has always been of significance for India right since its founding years. During the 1945 San Francisco conference itself, India displayed a keen, active interest in Security Council’s composition, especially the basis of election of non-permanent members. Here, India strongly advocated weightage for factors such as population, industrial potential, willingness and ability to contribute to international peace and security, and past performance, and the need for representation for various regions for states to be selected for the Security Council. Significantly, India did not have to press for a vote on its amendment as the Sponsoring Powers accepted this suggestion and modified their original proposals. (Murthy 2011, p.2)

India has been elected for seven terms for a two-year non-permanent member seat, the last being 2011-12, only behind Japan, Brazil and Argentina. Except for the first time, when India held the seat earmarked for the Commonwealth group, it has held the seat on every other occasion on behalf of the Asian group. India has been a member of the Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73,
1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92, and lastly, 2011-12 which was seen as a “rehearsal for permanent membership” (Srinivasan 2013) During the last term, India won the non-permanent seat with the highest number of votes in the General Assembly showing its impressive electoral popularity. It needs to be recalled that not long ago in 1996, India had lost the elections to Japan by a wide margin for a non-permanent seat.

The typical Indian preferences in the UNSC has always been to be the part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. Analyzing all terms of India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 per cent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 per cent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stood aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had company of other Council members on many occasions. The Indian behavior herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.

**India’s Security Council Calculus**

The origins of the Indian interests in the Security Council can be traced as back to the founding of the UN itself when Mahatma Gandhi felt that India, then including Pakistan and Bangladesh, should become a veto-wielding member of the Security Council. But the leadership precedence for independence and managing the difficult, bloody partition followed by the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir moved their attention and interests away from the possible opportunity of a seat. (Cohen 2001, p. 33) Later, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shied away from the highly debatable offer to join the Security Council by both the superpowers, the US and the then Soviet Union in 1950 and in 1955 respectively, keeping in mind the emerging Cold war calculus and steadfastly refused to join at the expense of China (Harder 2015). Specifically acknowledging India’s rightful claim to a permanent seat, Nehru wrote:

> It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train…. India, because of many factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.

The Indian calculus on permanent membership of Security Council flow broadly from a mix of, not necessarily hierarchical, three streams, viz., India’s historic as-
association with the UN system itself since its independence, India’s intrinsic value and place in contemporary international politics and its ambitions as a traditional great power in Asia and beyond.

**India in UN System:**

In pursuance of its claims to the Council seat, India points out its rich history of consistent international, multilateral posture of cooperation and fraternity, especially when it comes to the UN. The origins of Indian multilateral engagement dates back to 28 June 1919 when India signed the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War and created the League of Nations, the precursor of the UN, wherein India, too, was a member. India, also the original member of the UN that signed the Declaration by the UN at Washington on 1 January 1942, participated in the historic UN Conference of International Organization at San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York, no date given)

India, since its independence and even before that, has been an active participant in all initiatives undertaken by the UN and the various UN organs including the various discussions on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development Goals, and various UN summits, including most importantly on climate change. India also contributed most importantly by being instrumental in establishing the G77 of developing states at the UN, other than supporting the establishment of various bodies like the UNICEF on a permanent basis, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the restructuring of the economic and social fields of the UN and the UN Development Fund.

India also makes a strong case by highlighting its regular, significant contributions to the UN. In the arena of peacekeeping, India has remained the largest cumulative contributor of UN peacekeeping troops with around 180,000 troops since the 1950s. Currently, around 7700 Indian peacekeepers have been deployed in 13 missions (out of the total of 16) in 11 countries. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York 2016)

Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of peacekeepers deployed in the ground as do China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States combined – also known as the P5, the five countries that wield veto power at the Council. In terms of financial contributions to the UN, India with US$ 20.46 million ranks 23rd in the list of contributors. On this, India has emphasized way back in 1993 itself: “…not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into account.” Adding further, India asserted: “the financial contribution does not remain static
forever, and the crucial issue is the readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a particular point in time. The point is India could emerge before long, if its economy performs well, as a sizeable contributor to UN budget.” (Menon 1995, p.15)

Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by its history of interacting with the Security Council. In the early years of its independence during its armed conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir, India paid the price for being “idealistic” to take the Kashmir issue to the UN wherein it had to battle hard real-politik of Cold war years leading to UN interventions over the Kashmir dispute. To prevent this negative outcome ever again, the Indian presence at the Security Council, it is hoped will ensure Indian interests are not sacrificed at the altar of great power politics. Most importantly, it will stall any possible intervention by China, a permanent member at the behest of its ally Pakistan.

Indian interests in the Security Council also flow from the larger, many foreign policy debates in India on whether it will be a status quo power that accepts liberal norms and positions itself as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system or a revisionist power that seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits agree that India would be moderately revisionist that seeks to adjust international norms and frameworks that suits its global vision, without seeking to overthrow the current international system.

India also always seen itself as a champion, a ‘moralistic force’ of the so called Third World, the developing states. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that India has been one of the most significant votaries of shaping the UN agenda on behalf of the developing world. At his speech in New Delhi, Annan stated: “Indians have better understood than many other peoples that the goals of the ‘larger freedom’ that which include development, security and human rights are not alternatives. They have been single-mindedly pursuing larger freedom through pluralist democracy.” (Annan 2005)

**India’s Intrinsic Value:**

India’s Ministry of External Affairs has clearly articulated India’s “legitimate” candidature to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It declares:

> By any objective criteria, such as population, territorial size, GDP, economic potential, civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, political system and past and ongoing contributions to the activities of the UN — especially to UN peacekeeping operations — India is eminently qualified for permanent membership.” Going further, it says, most importantly, “India has affirmed its willingness and capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of permanent membership.
At the outset itself, demography remains the primary reason why India should be in the Council. India, with its population at 1.25 billion now, is the second most populous country in the world comprising almost one-fifth of humanity. This basic fact itself warrants Indian inclusion and representation in the Security Council. For India, moreover “population represents both an expression of the principle of democracy and an element of power. With increasing emphasis on the principle of democracy at the national level, there is a need for extending the principle to the international level also.” (GA/48/264, 20 July 1993, p. 48)

India's rising economic stature globally has added to Indian claims as well. India is now the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and Asia's third largest. India's real GDP growth, as its 2017 Economic Survey predicts, will remain between 6.75% and 7.5% despite international upheavals like growing oil prices, Brexit, growing protectionism and trade related tensions between major economies. India's leading position in software and its IT-enabled services making it a global technology giant adds to its increasing economic and trade footprint across the world. India is now counted amongst the most influential players in economic organizations like the WTO, BRICS and the G20.

India's newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in May 1998 also makes India a natural claimant as a permanent member similar to the existing permanent members who are all Nuclear Weapon States. Though India has not been accorded a de’ jure recognition of this by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, India now stands recognized as a de’ facto NWS due to the nuclear deal signed by India and the United States in 2005 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 to nuclear transfers for India despite not being a NPT signatory. On the negative side, it is argued by critics that India has still not signed the NPT, had rejected the CTBT in 1996 and in fact, was the target of unanimous Security Council Resolution 1172 after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998. But, India's nuclear diplomacy after the May 1998 tests successfully turned India from a pariah state to being increasingly a part of the non-proliferation regime.

**India's Great Power Ambitions:**

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalized big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its geo-political and geo-economic clout glob-
ally. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China in a leadership role in Asia. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of international hierarchy of states.

As India’s international profile and capabilities rises due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas like politics, development, economics, and culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules and wants now to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests.

In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”

Indian perspectives on Council Reforms

The UN Security Council reforms became an international agenda with the UN General Assembly adopting in 1992 the Resolution 47/62 entitled “The Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council.” In 1993, the Assembly set up an open ended Working Group that would facilitate a full and frank exchange of views. In its report to the 1994 General Assembly, the Group stated:

“.....the debate was substantive and constructive, clarifying the positions of member states, (but) no conclusions were drawn. While there was convergence of views that the membership of the Security Council should be enlarged, there was also agreement that the scope and nature of such enlargement require further discussion.” (Murthy 1995, p. 22)

The arguments put forward by the Member States centered on four aspects for making the Council more representative: the future size of the Council, the categories of membership, the criteria of membership, and the veto power. It needs to be recalled that the Security Council reformed as back as 1965 when it increased its non-permanent members from 11 to 15, and increased the necessary votes for
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The adoption of resolutions from seven to nine.

The Indian attempts at reforming the Council date as back as 1979, when India’s ambassador to the UN Brajesh Mishra along with other NAM countries submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly calling for an increase in the non-permanent membership from 10 to 14, arguing an increase in the UN membership as the principal reason. The 1990s also saw Indian attempts at pressing for UN reforms. India joined a number of countries in adopting General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/62, inscribing this item on our agenda for the first time in September 1992.

Calling the 69th UN General Assembly decision of September 2014 “truly historic and path-breaking on several counts,” Asoke Mukerji, India’s then Permanent Representative to the UN, clearly put forward Indian thinking on the matter. Three issues were highlighted specifically. Firstly, that the consensus decision was not a technical, but a substantive decision since it was now adopted through an official formal L document of the UNGA, the A/69/L.92, and the first in the history of the Inter-Governmental Negotiation process. This was “a most positive and unique development” for India as these moved beyond mere statements, compiled texts or summaries. Secondly, the UN General Assembly decision has formally changed the IGN process to a text-based negotiations. And, lastly, quoting the UN General Assembly President’s 31st July 2015 letter that reflected a true mandate, India highlighted that the text attached to the letter “represents a sound basis upon which Member States can engage in text-based negotiations through the next phase of the IGN.” India, in fact, in April 2013 itself, had already called for a conclusion of the IGN process on UNSC reforms by the 70th anniversary of the UN. Hoping that the UN now moves purposefully to conclude the negotiations during the 70th session, India reminded that the World Summit of 2005 had given a unanimous mandate for “early reform” of the Security Council and make it “more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.”

In order to move the TBN process forward, India has clearly, frequently and seriously articulated its positions on diverse aspects of the Security Council reforms. Two organizing principles do stand out: first, purposeful, result oriented negotiations and secondly, parity for the unrepresented and the underrepresented.

Five sets of issues have been identified by the General Assembly 62/557 decision on “question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”: categories of membership; question of veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.
On the issue of categories of membership, India has argued that an overwhelming majority of Member-States have already supported expansion in both categories. Two largest groups including Africa with 54 members and L.69 with 42 members and CARICOM, G4 and another 233-Member States including 2 permanent members, France and UK have supported expansion in both categories. India claims that around 85% of total submissions that are part of the text and the annex have supported expansion in both categories.

India supports increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership of UN Security Council. Making a case that there is an imbalance of influence between the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, India has called for a “balanced enlargement in both categories.” Herein, India has highlighted the need of Africa to be represented in both categories. This directly challenges the proposed “so called” intermediate models wherein a longer term and immediate re-election are seen as compensations for a permanent membership. India, citing the deliberations held in 1945 itself, pointed out that these models were rejected by an overwhelming majority. India identified number of reasons for its opposition to increase in non-permanent category only. Firstly, the issues raised by the current imbalance between permanent and non-permanent members are not addressed due to lack of any checks or balances. Secondly, the African continent and other developing countries would still not be represented fully in the Council. Importantly, it would mean a new category of members and addition of new members that fails to make the Council more effective and accountable. According to India, only addition of elected, new permanent members which are subject to “stringent review” could provide such an accountability. Siding with the small states, India supported their contention that the chances of the small states to serve at the Council would be reduced as the proposed intermediate models surely enhanced the chances of more resourceful middle powers to contest in both the traditional non-permanent category seat and the “so called long-term seats.”

On the most important question of veto, Indian position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto and till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council which should have all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto. (March 2016) The Indian position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing restrictions. India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle, it is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until
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Regional Representation

On the question of regional representation, India has forcefully argued for an equitable geographical representation and the urgent need for mitigating the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. Making the case, India has pointed to the increase in the number of states to 193 at present from 51 when the UN was founded, and the un-tenability of whole continents not being represented at all in the permanent category. The Council in its existence of 70 years also does not represent the geo-political and economic realities. The Security Council, for India, needs to reflect contemporary realities and provide adequate representation to all regions of the world. India sees the growing clamor for regional representation as “a cry of frustration and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs.” The demand for regional representation has been made on multiple grounds including historical injustice, entire regions not equitably represented or even unrepresented in a key category, and hope of moving beyond the nation state as the primary actor on international affairs. In Indian eyes, it is “anachronistic” situation that the UN has three of the five permanent members from one region alone while the regions of Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean states and the Small Island developing states remain excluded from the functioning of the Security Council. On the role of regional groupings in the selection of new members, India favored the current practice, viz., each regional grouping would endorse its candidate, to be followed by the need to contest an election on the floor of the General Assembly for occupying a seat at the Security Council.

Acknowledging the various existing perspectives on the on the issue of regional representation that vary from one region to another, India has welcomed the approach of regions like Africa who have asked as a collective to be treated as a unique case. But, these should be seen as supplemental in nature and do not replace the Charter requirements of all Member States voting to elect a permanent member for an equitable regional representation. While India accepts the inter-linkage drawn by the African states between the issue of categories and regional representation, India opposes such linkages. (Joint G4 Statement by Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, April 2017) Realizing that such a unanimity in the Asian region does not and will not come about, India has stated that though it respects the unanimous desires of a region like Africa, it cannot be replicated elsewhere where such desires do not exist.

Size of Council and Its Working Methods

On the question of the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the
Council, India has stated that ‘we the peoples’ in whose name the Charter was agreed to have more than trebled since 1945, from about 2.35 billion worldwide to more than 7.3 billion estimated today. Also, at the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, the Security Council had 11 members including 5 permanent members and 6 non-permanent members and a total of 51 member states. Thus, there was one Council member for every five Member-States and one permanent member for every 10 of the General Assembly. The UN membership now has also trebled. (Feb 2016) India, realizing the need to be realistic, has not called for a three-fold expansion in the membership of the Council.

**Relationship Between Security Council and General Assembly**

On the equally significant issue of the relationship between Security Council and the General Assembly, in India’s view, it should not be competitive or adversarial, but “one of synergy and complementarity” which benefits the UN objectives of the promotion of international peace and security. A relationship with the General Assembly based on transparency, mutual trust and frequent interaction with all Member States will increase the credibility of the Council that includes increase in dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. India thus has called for a greater transparency and consistency to improve the relationship between the two. (G4 Joint Statement 2014)

Additionally, and crucial, as it assumes implications for Indian success in getting the permanent seat in the Council, on the issue of election process of new permanent members, India has argued for a process of elections by a secret ballot in consonance with the UN Charter and General Assembly rules. Article 108 of the Charter stipulates that the any amendment to the Charter could be done with a vote of two-thirds of members of the General Assembly. On the other hand, Rule 83 of the GA Rules of Procedure says that two-thirds of the majority of the members present and voting can take decisions of the General Assembly on important questions. Such decisions include recommendations regarding maintenance of international peace and security and the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. India has also cited that the General Assembly's Resolution A/RES/53/30 of 23 November 1998, which was unanimously adopted, decided on a 2/3rd majority of the membership, as the threshold for arriving at substantive decisions on Security Council Reforms.

**Indian Strategies: Diplomacy in Action**

India has adopted a multi-layered strategy to assume the highly coveted permanent seat in the Security Council. According to Stuenkel, the Indian strategy of “revisionist integration” into the Security Council consists of two components: Maximizing support in the UN General Assembly and Minimizing resistance in the UN Security Council. India’s continued leadership of various Global South
forums such as G 77 and NAM, it hopes would garner the much needed numbers in the UNGA. This is amply reflected in India’s strong defense of the principle of sovereignty and the constant voluble criticism of the “Responsibility to Protect.” On the other hand, India’s growing strategic partnerships with the P5, including the historic nuclear deal with the US in 2005, reiteration of historic ties with Russia, and most importantly, seeking a rapprochement with China, in Indian eyes, paint a favorable picture for Indian hopes in the Security Council by the existing permanent members. (Stuenkel 2010, p. 59) Explicit public declarations supporting India’s candidature as a permanent member in the Council now embodied also in bilateral Joint Statements/Declarations since last few years by most of the P5, including China, have shown Indian successes in garnering agreement for its Council objectives.

Parallel to courting powers, big and small, in a bilateral framework, India has also formed the G4 comprising Brazil, Germany, itself and Japan, its “coalition of the willing”, a “collaborative strategy” to negotiate reforms of the Council. After initial euphoria after its creation in 2004 when its first summit-level meeting was held, Indian interest ebbed as its campaign to secure a seat did not fructify in 2004-05. After 2004, G4 has been revived by the current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. PM Modi, speaking at the G4 Summit held in New York in September 2015 clearly identified the rationale for coming together, viz., “our shared commitment to global peace and prosperity, our faith in multilateralism and our willingness to assume our global responsibilities that the world expects from us.” (“Modi pitches for permanent seat” 2016). He further reiterated that the UNSC “must include the world’s largest democracies, major locomotives of the global economy, and voices from all major continents” to carry “greater credibility and legitimacy.” Making a much stronger case for the G4 in its entirety, he said that “more Member States have the capacity and willingness to take on major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and security.” In a move to garner substantive support, the G4 Joint Statement pledged to support “Africa’s representation in both the permanent and non-permanent membership in the Security Council,” and highlighted the significance of “adequate and continuing representation of small and medium sized Member States, including the Small Island Developing States, in an expanded and reformed Council.” (Full Text of G4 Joint Statement 2016)

India has also joined the L-69, the 42 member grouping of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. India also, in late 2016, joined as a member the newly founded group of Friends on UN Security Council Reform created to accelerate the negotiating process of Council reforms. India had hoped that in next UN General Assembly session, the 70th one, and entering 10th IGN process and 25th year of the consideration of the issue of the reforming the Security Council's
Council by the UN General Assembly would bring out the desired outcomes expressed by a large majority of Member States, but it remains unrealized.

However, Mukherjee and Malone (2013) highlight at least three challenges in Indian aspirations at the UNSC: lack of enough Indian government resources for multilateral diplomacy, insufficient engagement with the normative aspects of many UN Security Council issues, and an over-reliance on entitlement as the bedrock of India’s claims to permanent membership, at the cost of more hard-nosed realpolitik bargaining in the UN. Further, with India as part of G4 seems to have limited its options to negotiate a seat for itself as great power and regional politics would circumscribe the G4 attempts to win permanent seats for all as a group (Baru 2015).

More significantly, the status quo bias amongst the existing P5, despite the General Assembly consensus, remains the overriding obstacle to adding permanent seats. This has been amply demonstrated by the lack of any progress since 2015 as the US, China and Russia have not yet submitted their country positions for TBNs and no agreement at all on the criteria for deciding permanent membership of the Council.

**Conclusions**

India has emerged as a foremost, singularly acknowledged rising power seen by most states, great and small, as making a legitimate claim to a place in the changing architecture of global governance, including the UN Security Council.

The Indian interests in joining the reformed UN Security Council stem from its long, civilisational history, an exceptional, globally impacting geography and demography, its rapidly increasing traditional great power ambitions, and assuming its rightful place in the comity of nations in addition to its truly rich, varied and significant historic contributions to the UN system. Successive Indian leadership have therefore, emphasized again and again, the pressing need to democratize the international relations embodied most importantly in the UN and its all–powerful Security Council. Reiterating this, the Indian PM Modi said in September 2014:

*We must reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century won’t be effective in the 21st. It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing turbulence with no one capable of addressing it… Let us fulfill our promise to reform the United Nations Security Council by 2015.*

Though these Indian desires repeatedly articulated at the highest levels of government remain unfulfilled and seemingly intractable, its ideas and diplomacy, bilat-
eral and multilateral, over the last few decades on the UN Security Council and its reforms including its quest for a permanent seat, highlight a growing, powerful great power consciousness in India. The Indian decision makers realize that it is now historically placed to become an international rule maker and shaper than a meek rule follower in the policy relevant future. It truly marks a rising India's dramatic desire to move to the centre from the periphery of global politics.

Bio

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India and the Liberal Global Order
Abstract

India is commonly – and rightly – considered a reluctant democracy promoter. But while sceptical about the motives behind Western attempts to promote democracy and about the effects of their democracy promotion efforts, India has since the mid-2000s moved warily to involve itself in “democracy assistance”. This article argues that New Delhi has engaged in these activities in the context of a wider shift in strategy, in parallel with the forging of a strategic partnership with the United States and with growing concern about managing China’s influence in South Asia. It observes that India’s foreign policy elite still has considerable doubts about democracy promotion, both in terms of its inconsistency with basic international norms, especially state sovereignty, non-interference, and non-intervention, and in terms of its patchy recent record of success. It argues that India’s approach to democracy assistance, which involves a blend of multilateral and bilateral initiatives, most aimed at South Asia, and most in parallel with better-funded economic development projects, reflects these various pressures and concerns.

Keywords

India, Indian Foreign Policy, Democracy Promotion, Democracy Assistance

Introduction

India is wary of “democracy promotion”, despite its extraordinary – if not unblemished\footnote{India’s democratic processes were suspended during the “Emergency” called by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between June 1975 and March 1977. In addition, successive governments have postponed elections and curbed constitutional rights in certain Indian States by the imposition of President’s Rule, notably in Jammu and Kashmir between 1990 and 1996 and in Punjab State in the mid-1980s and again between 1987 and 1992.} – record in maintaining its democratic institutions since independence in 1947 (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, pp. 77-78; cf. Cartright 2009; Choedon 2015; Kugiel 2012; Mallavarapu 2010; Mishra 2012; Mohan 2007; Muni 2009).
To some, this is a concern. India’s apparent unwillingness to promote democratic norms and institutions generates worries, especially among Western observers, about the extent to which it will defend and extend the so-called “liberal international order” (see inter alia Faust and Wagner 2010; Piccone 2016, pp. 75–81). For a number of analysts, it suggests that despite India’s growing economic, political and military power, New Delhi is reluctant to take on greater responsibility for upholding that order and for providing global public goods (Destradi 2012; Destradi 2014; Destradi 2017; Dormandy 2007; Mehta 2011). For others, it highlights a lack of appropriate capacity to deliver policies like democracy promotion in India’s notoriously over-stretched and under-staffed foreign policy bureaucracy (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, p. 81; cf. Chatterjee Miller 2013).

This article takes a step back from these wider debates about what India’s lack of enthusiasm for democracy promotion, as practiced by Western states and institutions, might mean for the liberal order. It notes, as a number of analyses have shown (e.g. Choedon 2015; Mazumdar & Statz 2015), that India’s reluctance to endorse those Western practices does not imply that it is wholly disinterested in supporting democratic transitions or helping to strengthen existing democracies. Like those studies, this article observes that even though India remains wary of democracy promotion, it does engage in “democracy assistance”, and its approach in this area is growing and evolving. It argues that India’s approach to democracy assistance has been shaped by the coalescence of the view in New Delhi that working in this area may help to further both its partnership with the United States and its efforts to manage some of the challenges generated by China’s rise. India’s policymakers now perceive that the spread and consolidation of democracy, including in South Asia, may align with what they see as the country’s economic and security interests. But it also argues that India’s approach to democracy assistance has been shaped by long-standing commitments to non-intervention and non-interference that date back to the postcolonial period and newer doubts arising from critical assessments of the mixed consequences of Western democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period.

Throughout, this article takes an interpretivist approach, one that holds that social actions are better explained by reference to the meanings that they have for the actors who perform them than to theories of power-maximisation or rational choice (Lynch 2014). Interpretivists explain political behaviour by analysing what policies mean for those carrying them out, referring to traditions of thought inherited by political actors and the beliefs they hold, insofar as the critical assessment of the texts they produce – speeches, statements, memoirs, and so on – provides sufficient and compelling evidence for them (Hall 2014, pp. 308-309). This interpretivist approach is well suited to analysis of Indian foreign policy because of the small size and relative intellectual cohesion of the relevant political
and bureaucratic elite in New Delhi, its clear past preferences for policies that diverge from those predicted by realism or rational choice, and its long-recognised relative insulation from the influence of a range of societal actors that can affect decision-making in democracies, such as parliamentary scrutiny, public opinion, institutional structure, coalition politics, and business interests.²

The Rise of Democracy Promotion

Democracy promotion covers a wide range of practices in contemporary international relations that aim to extend the institutions and norms of democratic government to hitherto non-democratic states. They include regime change by military intervention or political subversion, diplomatic engagement with elites, the manipulation of economic incentives, the use of public diplomacy or propaganda, and the setting of conditions in international agreements. Although not unknown before the end of the Cold War,³ these practices have been used far more extensively, and in more determined and strategic ways, since that conflict ended, with the twin objectives of extending democracy to societies hitherto ruled by authoritarian regimes and extending the “democratic peace” (see Russett 1994). Democracy promotion became a major part of the European Union’s external policy after the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union in 1991, which committed the organization to the international promotion of democracy and human rights (Manners 2002, p. 241). It became a key feature of American foreign policy under President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) (Carothers 1995) and was pursued assertively by the George W. Bush administration (Carothers 2003). During the 1990s and 2000s, democracy promotion was merged into the broader “good governance” agendas of international institutions, with conditionality used as an instrument for encouraging and consolidating political reform in transitioning states (Kapur & Naim 2005).

For a decade or so, democracy promotion through traditional and public diplomacy, aid and education programs, and the wielding of economic sticks and carrots mostly paid off. Between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it helped consolidate the “third wave” of democratization that saw political transitions from authoritarian rule to nascent democracy in Eastern Europe and significant parts of Africa and Asia, including in major states like South Korea and Indonesia (Huntington 1991).

² The prevailing consensus is that in India, the core executive – concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), including politicians with relevant portfolios (principally the Prime Minister and the External Affairs, Defence, Home, and Finance Ministers) and key officials (the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, above all), as well as political advisors and officials who provide advice or deliver action – makes foreign policy. See Schaffer and Schaffer 2016. For challenges to the consensus, see Hansel, Khan and Levaillant 2017.
³ For a history of US democracy promotion, see Cox, Lynch & Bouchet 2013.
In the early 2000s, however, the ideological consensus underpinning democracy promotion began to fragment, as the George W. Bush administration integrated it into its post-9/11 national security agenda and the United States (US) pushed harder for “regime change”, especially in the Muslim world. The set of instruments used for democracy promotion was broadened to include the use of military force or political subversion. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy took an uncompromising line, declaring “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” the “single sustainable model for national success”, and making their promotion core to American foreign policy (Department of State 2002, p. iii-iv). The construction of a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan was framed in these terms, as was the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, especially after the failure to locate the Weapons of Mass Destruction that had been the original casus bellum (Dalacoura 2005). Later efforts to encourage democratic transitions in the Middle East during and after the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011 were also understood in these terms, notwithstanding the more ambivalent stance taken on democracy promotion by Barack Obama’s administration (Hanau Santini & Hassan 2012).

The mixed success of these efforts, evident as the Taliban revived itself in Afghanistan and began to challenge President Hamid Karzai’s nascent, quasi-democratic government, and as Islamist insurgency grew in Iraq, led many to question the wisdom of democracy promotion as a project (Kopstein 2006). The results of the Arab Spring, which brought a peaceful transition in Tunisia, but instability and bloodshed in Egypt, and civil war in both Libya and Syria, compounded this scepticism in the minds of many in the West and outside it, even among ardent liberal democrats (see, for example, Fukuyama 2015). By the mid-2010s, moreover, the resurgence of Russia under the authoritarian Vladimir Putin, the rise of China, and the backsliding of some hitherto transitioning governments towards increasingly illiberal or undemocratic practices, contributed to a growing sense that Western practices of democracy promotion has been less successful than hoped, and democracy was being and could be rolled back (Diamond 2016).

India and Democracy Promotion

India’s emergence as a putative democracy promoter began only towards the end of 1990s, as Western efforts were starting to come under strain. In the context of a broader dialogue with the US initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests, as Mazumdar and Statz observe, India took some small steps towards a democracy promotion agenda of sorts, consistent with India’s traditional preference for multilateralism and the United Nations (UN) system, and driven by a broader “desire to improve [India’s] relationship with the US” and enhance “its status as a emerging power” (Mazumdar and Statz 2015, p. 87). As Bill Clinton’s administration reached out to India via Strobe Talbott’s back-channel negotiations with Jaswant Singh on the nuclear issue (see Singh 2007; Talbott 2004), India hosted a World Move-
ment for Democracy conference in 1999, an event which had financial backing from the US National Endowment for Democracy; issued a joint “Vision Statement” with the US promising to nurture and strengthen democratic institutions (quoted in Choedon 2015, p. 162); and worked closely with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on a proposal for a new initiative, the Community of Democracies (CD) forum, launched in mid-2000 (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, p. 83).

This new, limited engagement with aspects of the international democracy promotion effort was notable for several reasons. First, it occurred in the absence of any obvious clamour in its favour from the academic or think tank community in New Delhi. At this time, most Indian intellectuals and analysts interested in foreign policy were broadly sceptical about such practices, especially when used by the US. Indian elite opinion, long critical of the aims and methods of US foreign policy, remained through the 1990s suspicious of Washington’s motives and capacities. Prominent Indian intellectuals and analysts were coruscating, in particular, about American efforts to use the “unipolar moment” to bring about a global democratic peace (see, for example, Kanwal 1999a & 1999b). Leading thinkers were also vocal in their opposition to all forms of interventionism, from the use of force in humanitarian crises to attempts to use economic sanctions to bring about political transitions (see Hall 2013, pp. 90-93).

It is clear, however, that whatever reservations existed outside government, Indian policymakers began to perceive merit in establishing a stronger partnership with the US, and that this helped facilitate official dialogue on democracy promotion. The back-channel talks, combined with high profile visits from Bill Clinton (in 2000), George W. Bush (2006), and their officials, the deliberate effort by Washington to “de-hyphenate” relations with India and Pakistan, the changed context of post 9/11 South Asia, with greater US involvement in fighting terrorism Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the rise of China all helped to shift perceptions in New Delhi (Mohan 2007, pp. 103-107). Although many analysts and policymakers continued to doubt the wisdom of American foreign policy behaviour, notably with regard to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the management of the Islamist insurgency that followed, key figures began to see India and the US as “natural allies”, as Vajpayee put it in 2000 (Ollapally 2004, p. 1). This laid the groundwork for the US-India nuclear deal (concluded 2005, in force 2008) and the ten-year Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement (also concluded 2005), but also for multilateral democracy promotion projects like the Global Democracy Initiative (GDI), announced at the same time, at the same Bush-Singh Summit, as the nuclear deal (Hall 2016, pp. 273-274).

Second, as Mazumdar and Statz rightly observe, India’s hedged endorsement of

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4 This is not to say that Indian analysts have not been interested in the topic or its foreign policy implications. See, for example, Sondhi 2000.
democracy promotion was bipartisan (2015, p. 82). Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition took India into the CD and helped form the IBSA forum – a self-conscious binding together of developing democracies – with Brazil and South Africa (Chitalkar & Malone 2011, p. 84). But it was Manmohan Singh’s Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which ruled from 2004 to 2014, which in mid-2005 took India into the GDI and began to make generous contributions to the newly created UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) (Mazumdar and Statz 2015, p. 83). Between 2006 – the UNDEF’s first year of operation – and 2013, the UPA government was a major donor, giving some US$31.5m to the UNDEF, compared to $47.6m provided by the US over the same period (United Nations Democracy Fund 2017a). In 2004 India also helped form the United Nations Democracy Caucus (UNDC) – the “only body within the United Nations system to convene democratic states based on shared values instead of regional affiliation” (Community of Democracies 2017; cf. Delcourt and Wilen 2009), although it declined an American offer to lead it (Mohan 2007, p. 105). Throughout these years, moreover, prominent Indian politicians from both sides of the political divide made more public and unequivocal statements in favour of democracy as a form of government (Chitalkar & Malone 2011, p. 84; Choedon 2015, p. 163; Mazumdar and Statz 2015, p. 82).

Third, it is evident in retrospect that India’s change of position signalled a deeper shift in New Delhi’s perceptions of its international interests, which was most clear in its changing attitudes to democracy in South Asia. Whereas India had earlier taken shown itself mostly indifferent to the nature of regional state regimes, in both rhetoric and practice, and tended to prioritise its security interests if they came into conflict with support for a democratic regime (Chitalkar & Malone 2011, p. 83), it began to take seriously the proposition that democratic governments might generally better serve its economic and security interests than non-democratic ones (Muni 2009). True, some of its enthusiasm for defending democracy in South Asia was motivated by a search for instruments with which to pressure Pakistan. India’s backing of the Commonwealth of Nations’ condemnation of the ouster of Prime minister Nawaz Sharif by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 can be seen in that light (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, p. 83), as can, in part at least, India’s support for post-Taliban governments in Kabul (Destradi 2014; Joshi 2014). True too, New Delhi’s new found sympathy for democracy in the region was shaped by concerns about China’s growing influence in its neighbourhood, reflecting the view that democratic governments may be more capable of withstanding Beijing’s entreaties (Cartright 2009, p. 425; Lahiri 2017, p. 42). It is clear that India’s close involvement in the democratic transition in Nepal, and its willing engagement of the US in that process, was moved in part by a desire to see a legitimate government in Kathmandu capable of managing the pressures on
the country generated by China (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, 85-86; 89-90; Mehta 2011, pp. 108-109). But it was also equally clear that where New Delhi perceived that it should distance itself from democratic forces in order to maintain some influence with an authoritarian state, as it did with Burma / Myanmar from the early 1990s until the mid-2010s, it would do so (Egreteau 2011).

Fourth, India’s partial engagement with democracy promotion was part of a wider move to try to build India’s “soft power” (Nye 1990) – and to reinvigorate its capacity to act as a kind of “normative power” in international relations. In the late 1940s and 50s, India tried to establish itself as a moral leader – a campaigner against colonialism and racism, and for national self-determination and nuclear disarmament – drawing on South Asia’s extraordinary cultural and intellectual inheritance (Chacko 2012, pp. 190-106). By the 1970s, however, India’s influence had deliquesced. Since then, successive governments have sought to reclaim the idea of India as a normative power, with pushes to improve its public diplomacy to acquire and use soft power (Hall 2012; Hall 2017). Leveraging India’s democratic experience as a model for other developing states of how to manage a large, economically, linguistically and religiously diverse polity is increasingly part of that effort. Manmohan Singh’s twin observations, made in 2005, that “[l]iberal democracy is the natural order of political organisation in today’s world” and that India has “a obligation to history and mankind to show that pluralism works” captures this new mood (quoted in Mohan 2007, p. 99).

Finally – and crucially – as India’s calibrated involvement with democracy promotion progressed, it became increasingly clear that its approach was carefully hedged to manage elite concerns in New Delhi and the possibility that it might generate negative perceptions of India in South Asia or further afield. Many in the policy-making elite continue to argue that India can do more to promote democracy by making it work at home, and serving as an example to others. As Mehta puts it, “India’s own success will do far more for democracy promotion than any overtly ideological push in that direction could ever hope to accomplish” (2011, p. 112; cf. Khilnani et al. 2012). Powerful voices remain straightforwardly opposed to extending democracy by regime change or by transgressing the norms of non-interference and non-intervention (see, for example, Puri 2016). The consensus view is that when support to others is provided, it ought to take place with the consent of the target state, only after an invitation is issued by a state (Muni 2009, p. 16). When it is provided, moreover, it should be delivered under multilateral auspices or under formal state-to-state agreements (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, pp. 86-87). For these reasons, authoritative analysts argue that India’s approach is better understood as “democracy assistance” or “democratic support” (Cheodon 2015, p. 164). The next section analyses this approach in detail.
India’s Democracy Assistance

India’s support for spreading and consolidating democracy internationally and in South Asia has a distinctive style best assessed in comparison with the better known US and EU models. The first – the US model – blends a “bottom-up” approach of nurturing pro-democratic civil society groups with “top-down” diplomatic, economic, or even military pressure, involving the use of coercive instruments wielded against anti-democratic elements in target states (McFaul 2004; cf. Kopstein 2006). This approach includes a range of activities – funding pro-democracy NGOs directly or through privately-funded foundations, providing education and training programs, organizing visits and study tours for parliamentarians to Washington or other democratic state national capitals, providing legal advice on constitutions and legislation, targeting aid and assistance packages, and running pro-democracy public diplomacy campaigns – and a range of actors, mostly coordinated by the State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) (Epstein, Serafino & Miko 2007). On occasion, sanctions may be applied on states seen to be backsliding from democratic norms and human rights protections, like those used on Venezuela from 2014 (Department of State 2017), or force may be used to restore democratic governments, as in Haiti in 1994-95 or depose authoritarian one, as in Iraq in 2003.

The second – the EU model – is different, involving a “top-down” approach in which attempts are made to diffuse democratic values and norms through a target state by educating and socialising its political elite, by conditionality written into cooperation or accession agreements, by using trade, investment, aid, and assistance as instruments of influence, and by conventional diplomatic persuasion (Manners 2002). These efforts are intertwined with broader human rights and “good governance” programs, which in the first area can involve specific sanctions where rights abuses occur and in the second can involve a range of technical assistance and training initiatives (Young 2009, p. 898). The EU also funds NGOs, but tends to focus on those engaged in rights promotion and protection (Youngs 2001, pp. 361-367). With the exception of the specific cases of states seeking EU membership, the EU does not generally sanction states that fall short of democratic standards or experience anti-democratic coups (Youngs 2001, pp. 356-357).

India’s approach is distinct from these two models. The most obvious difference is the emphasis that it places on acting under UN auspices. Like both the US and EU, India funds NGOs working on democratic issues, but unlike them, it does not do so directly through the MEA or its in-house aid agency, the Development Partnership Administration. Instead, Indian funds are pooled with others’ and distributed through the UNDEF after the consideration of proposals by a UN consultative group and an advisory board made up of representatives of major donors, with final approval given by the Secretary-General (United Nations De-
mocracy Fund 2017b). This arrangement obviates the need for India to use its own agencies for acquitting this task, which are arguably not yet adequate for the task (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, 81), but also allows India to make the argument that such funding of NGOs does not constitute interference in the domestic affairs of target states – an issue about which India is highly sensitive (Jeffery 2015).

Over the ten years (2006-2015) for which there are data, India’s financial contributions to the UNDEF, totalling almost US$31.5m, have helped to fund 66 NGO-led projects across South Asia (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma / Myanmar, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, as well as India) out of a total of 155 projects funded in the Asia-Pacific region and 678 funded worldwide. Over that period, US$16.29m, divided into grants ranging from US$110,000 to US$375,000, was committed to South Asian projects by the UNDEF. The majority are aimed at improving grass-roots participation or processes, targeting women, youth, or the marginalised, in particular, and intended to educate or raise awareness about political rights and institutions. Indian NGOs were the beneficiary of 10 grants, amounting to a little over US$3m, but the remainder of the monies spent in South Asia (over US$13m) went to 56 projects in other regional states, including 9 in Afghanistan, 8 in Nepal, 7 in Bangladesh, and 5 in Burma / Myanmar, or cross-border regional initiatives (United Nations Democracy Fund 2017c).

Where India provides direct aid, it also focuses less on the diffusion of democratic norms to target elites and more on education and technical assistance, sometimes under UN auspices and sometimes bilaterally, within the bounds of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) spelling out the nature of the service to be provided. The work of the India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management (IIDEM), founded in 2011 with support from the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations, illustrates this approach, providing training to electoral officials on administering voter education and registration, particular voting technologies, and different electoral systems. So far, the IIDEM has helped train officials from about fifty countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. Multiple agreements struck between the Electoral Commission of India (ECI) and foreign counterparts fall into the second, involving the provision of particular forms of assistance, from advice on election organization and monitoring to the delivery of electronic voting machines, again mostly working with African partners (Cheodon 2015, pp. 169-170).

In South Asia, India commonly blends this kind of support with bigger packages of aid or loans intended to boost economic development. In Afghanistan, for example, India is estimated to have funded US$2bn-worth of aid since the fall of the Taliban, with the overwhelming majority spent on efforts to strengthen the Afghan economy and restore basic services (Embassy of India, Kabul 2017).
This includes some US$750m spent between 2001 and 2010 on rebuilding hospitals and roads (Faust and Wagner 2010, p. 3; see also Pant 2010, pp. 136-138). Democracy assistance forms only a small part of this wider effort, mostly limited to financing and organising the construction of a new parliament building in Kabul, providing electronic voting machines for elections, including for the 2003 Loya Jirga that considered a new constitution for Afghanistan, and the training of electoral officials. Overall, indeed, India’s financial support for democracy-related projects across South Asia, through the UNDEF or bilateral arrangements, is far out-weighed by its spending on socio-economic development initiatives – its donations of $31.5m to the UNDEF over a decade are eclipsed by its aid budget of US$1.15bn for the single financial year 2015-16 (Bhogal 2016).

In general too, India delivers its democracy assistance only after a transition to democracy has begun. The one possible exception to this rule is Nepal. In that case India did apply sanctions, in the form of an arms embargo and a public withdrawal of diplomatic support from King Gyanendra after his 2005 coup, which helped pressure to negotiate with the Maoist insurgents at war with his regime (Destradi 2012, p. 295). But thereafter India’s role was more ambiguous, and despite its long-running and close involvement in Nepal’s politics, New Delhi allowed the US to play a significant role in helping deliver an agreement between the warring parties, after apparently persuading Washington that it needed to engage the Maoists (Mazumdar & Statz 2015, p. 89; Mohan 2007, pp. 110-111).5 India returned to the fore only after the peace agreement was concluded, when it helped organise a general election in 2008, providing the requisite technical assistance, including voting machines and training for electoral officials (Destradi 2012, p. 300).

India’s delivery of democracy assistance to Burma / Myanmar, by contrast, follows a similar pattern to its work in Afghanistan. After the failed pro-democracy protests of 1988, New Delhi gave support and provided safe haven for the democracy movement in its struggle against the ruling military government. In 1992-93, however, as it launched the so-called “Look East” policy, India began to engage the junta, address security concerns along their shared border, concerned to improve transport links into South East Asia and access to energy resources, and indeed to counter growing Chinese influence in the country (Mohan 2007, p. 112; cf. Bhatia 2015). The BJP-led government that came to power in 1998 deepened this approach, as security cooperation and trade and investment links grew. This alienating pro-democracy elements (Routray 2011, p. 307-308), with New Delhi arguing back that supporting development would help facilitate, over time, a return to democracy (Egreteau 2011). Only after that occurred, with elections held in 2015, did India extend a formal assistance package to help build capacity

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5 On the 2006 peace agreement, see Jeffery 2017.
and upgrade systems in the public service and to provide training for electoral officials, as well as a promise of US$1bn in aid and development programs (Ichihara, Sahoo and Erewan 2016). Narendra Modi’s official visit in early September 2017 also saw the agreement of an MoU between the Election Commission and the Union Election Commission of Myanmar to provide technical assistance and media exchanges (Prime Minister’s Office 2017a).

**Conclusion**

India came relatively late to democracy promotion, ten years after the EU and US, together with a number of significant international institutions, began to invest more heavily in seeking democratic reform and aiding democratic transitions. It did so in a context in which critical voices were growing louder, democracy promotion became associated with military intervention to bring about regime change, and authoritarianism was recovering some its strength in key states, notably in Russia, or extending its power and influence, as with China. Moreover, India did so without a strong domestic consensus, within the foreign policy making elite, in its favour; indeed, many intellectuals, analysts, diplomats and politicians remain highly sceptical about democracy promotion as a set of practices, thinking it inconsistent with the principles of non-interference and non-intervention, and with prudent diplomacy (see especially Puri 2016). The prevailing view, expressed by one senior diplomat in an address to a think tank dialogue in mid-2015, is that while the “promotion of democratic ideals may be in alignment with India’s belief in these principles,” New Delhi is not “in the business of exporting democracy” (Wadhwa 2015).

India has nevertheless chosen to engage in a version of democracy promotion – in democracy assistance – because it has helped smooth the process of closer alignment with the US and because it perceives that further democratization in its own region, and further afield, will likely help its wider effort to manage China’s growing influence. To those ends, India has chosen to take a dual-track approach, supporting multilateral efforts through mechanisms like the UNDEF, and providing mainly technical assistance when requested to existing and transitioning democracies in highly formal frameworks, drawing on the extensive expertise of the ECI, in particular. Whether this approach has paid expected dividends is a moot point: India has clearly not convinced many Western observers that it is anything more than a reluctant democracy promoter; at the same time, the new democracies in which India has been involved in South Asia, notably in Afghanistan, Burma / Myanmar, and Nepal, remain fragile, at best.

There may also be signs that India’s approach is shifting once more under Modi’s government. Praise of democracy as a form of government is prominent in the Prime Minister political rhetoric (see, for example, Prime Minister’s Office 2017b;
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cf. Hall 2017, p. 128), but the funding of democracy assistance has changed under his leadership. Most notably of all, support for some multilateral initiatives has waned – India’s financial support to the UNDEF has declined significantly, with only US$200,000 given in 2014, US$100,000 in 2015, US$50,000 in 2016, and nothing yet reported for 2017 (United Nations Democracy Fund 2017a). In parallel, of course, the Overseas Development Aid is estimated to have grown from about US$1.2bn in 2014-15 to about US$1.4bn in 2016-17, with funds overwhelmingly dedicated to projects in South Asia (Mullen and Arora 2016, p. 2). Set alongside each other these figures are a reminder that, despite more engagement in this area and despite the talk of politicians, Indian investment in development still far outstrips its investment in democratic norms and institutions.

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India’s Evolving Views on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions: The Significance of Legitimacy

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Abstract
The role of legitimacy in India’s approach to the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions (HIs) has not received as much attention as it is due. The following article evaluates India’s evolving views on R2P and HIs through the prism of legitimacy. It also demonstrates why the outcome of an HI whether through the medium of the R2P or otherwise matters as much as motives.

Keywords
Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention, Legitimacy and Emerging Power

Introduction
As a major emerging power, expectations are high for India to perform an active role in armed humanitarian interventions. Given this reality, its role in upholding the rights of civilians and protecting them against atrocities on a colossal scale is undergoing scrutiny. Among the most crucial areas where New Delhi’s attitude and position has been under examination is over the doctrine ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) adopted by the United Nations World Summit in 2005. India’s role in the protection of civilians as an emerging power has received scholarly attention, but few of the analysis have addressed the significance of legitimacy in India’s approach to R2P and humanitarian interventions (Pai 2013, pp. 303-319).

Why and how India’s views on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions (HIs) are a function of global institutional legitimacy and domestic normative legitimacy are the subject of enquiry for this article? This conceptual distinction is important in that it helps clarify why both concepts have underpinned India’s approach to humanitarian interventions. HIs
come in different guises. The most well-known form of HIs are UNPKOs. India’s most consequential contributions, even as an emerging power to global governance have been through UNPKOs. On the other hand, the R2P represents a shift at the extreme end of HIs to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India’s preferred deliberative and consent-based approach to HIs through UNPKOs authorised by the UNSC. This article will show by way of argument and analysis that legitimacy plays an important role, if not exclusively and broadly defines India’s approach to R2P and humanitarian interventions. The different strands of thought among Indian foreign policy elites reflects the values inherent in Indian society.

Most of the Indian debates, particularly non-official on R2P centre on the motives of the intervening state or states as opposed to the outcome of the intervention and this is most evident in its application against Libya. At an official level there is greater attention paid to both the means and ends of HIs. It reveals the ambivalence of India’s attitude to R2P. On the one hand, it extended reluctant support to R2P due to the massive support. Legitimacy has always been a constant and core test for India in HIs. India’s emphasis has often been on consensus, deliberation, and not the alacrity with which the proponents push for the application of R2P.

While motives are necessary, an armed humanitarian intervention can be deemed legitimate only if the outcome of the intervention produces humanitarian benefits for the target population. The debates in India about R2P generally revolve more around the motives, and insufficiently around outcomes of HIs, which tends to parallel Western conduct.

The article is structured as follows: Firstly, it establishes the conceptual basis of legitimacy in both its institutional and normative variants and respectively deals with two cases in which formal institutional and domestic political legitimacy undergirded Indian HIs. The difficulty with most debates and analysis about India’s views on R2P and HIs is that it tends to fixate on the most recent humanitarian crises such in Libya and Syria, overlooking the complexity and nuances undergirding India’s positions historically on HI. Corresponding with institutional legitimacy, I analyse India’s intervention in the Congo in the early 1960s.

In the second case, I analyse the role of domestic normative legitimacy’s functional role in India’s HI in East Pakistan in the early 1970s. This selection of cases enables better and more accurate understanding India’s current approach humanitarian interventions. It provides a sound empirical basis for understanding India’s approach to one variant of HIs as opposed to others. These brief case histories provide illuminative value and explain the present Indian position on R2P and
HIs and the views of its foreign policy elites respectively. This has implications for the extent to which India can contribute to global governance.

The final part explains the concept of R2P and analyses India’s official and non-official views on the doctrine and more generally New Delhi’s approach to HIs. This section devotes attention to R2P’s application to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates, despite institutional legitimacy underwriting the UN-sanctioned intervention in Libya, India abstained from voting for the intercession. It surveys the media, policy community and academic literature on India’s approach to R2P and humanitarian interventions. It demonstrates the differences between competing schools within and outside India.

**Conceptualizing Legitimacy**

Let us begin with institutional legitimacy. Institutional legitimacy implies that institutions are durable, bind actors to a set of rules that prescribe acceptable rules of conduct, roles, constrain activity and shape expectations. Compliance with an international norm can be a function of coercion, self-interest or legitimacy. The scholarship on the first two mechanisms is thorough, yet in regards to legitimacy, the work done thus far is still under-researched most particularly from an empirical standpoint. Legitimacy by definition, as Ian Hurd puts it means “…the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institutions ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution and defined by the ‘actor’s perception of the institution’ irrespective of interests and coercion (Hurd 2007a, p. 7) (Hurd 1999b, p 381). This perception moulds an actor’s conduct. Formal global institutions include the United Nations and its apex political decision-making body, the Security Council is vested with the authorizing power for the use and non-use of military force in response to humanitarian emergencies. Power and legitimacy need not be binary, but can complement each other. Legitimacy is often confused with legality and sometimes exclusively morality. Even legality and morality taken together might not sufficiently define legitimacy (Claude Jr. 1966, p. 369). Rather legitimacy must include a “political dimension” in that “…the process of legitimization is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles” (Claude Jr. 1966, pp. 369–370). The “function of legitimization,” as Claude Jr. observed, “…in the international realm is… conferred upon international political institutions” and this institutional function will be performed most prominently through the political role of the United Nations. This is simply because political leaders are as much concerned about the approval of other states as they are about foreign policy choices that they make independently of external influence (Claude Jr. 1966 p. 375).

Similarly, there is a complex interplay between the legal, ethical and political,
which are not necessarily prioritised over each other, but legitimacy judgments strike a balance between all these three norms (Clarke 2005 p. 220). Constitutionality is the term that corresponds to the political norm, which represents an interaction between power and interests and there is always a political element to legitimacy based judgements (Clarke 2005 p. 207-208). Ian Hurd in a similar vein shows how and why legitimacy performs a fundamental role in underwriting the power of the Council. If Inis Claude Jr., drew attention to the political element of legitimacy and Clarke to the interplay between morality, legality and constitutionality, Hurd brings to the fore the social dimension of legitimacy, symbolized by the authority of the UNSC and respected by the entire UN membership. (Hurd 2002c p. 35-36). Hurd observes:

*The power of the Council [UNSC] wields over the strong comes not from blocking their military adventures (which it is not empowered to do) but rather from the fact that the Council is generally seen as legitimate (Hurd 2003a, pp. 204–205).*

The “high social status” of the Council provides symbolic value in the form of “social capital” which induces compliance on the part of states (Hurd 2002c p. 35). As Hurd shows power needs legitimating authority (Hurd 2002 p. 35). Since there is an absence of world government, the means for the enforcement of contracts and laws between states needs some ordering principle that is independent of self-interest and coercion, which legitimacy furnishes (Hurd 1999 p. 404).

What if institutional legitimacy for undertaking an HI is absent, can domestic normative legitimacy furnish sufficient authority for the initiation and conduct of HIs? Domestic normative legitimacy also provides a basis for understanding of how states respond to humanitarian emergencies in the absence of global institutional legitimacy. As we have seen, the role of institutional legitimacy is very important, but what happens when the institution endorses a norm in principle, but not in practice? Norms are an authoritative standard by which members of a group follow a set of rules that are deemed legitimate in both breadth and depth, which they have internalized, because it is associated with the ‘core values’ of the state and many states. After all, if a State’s Constitution provides and enshrines the protection of liberties of its citizens, particularly the right to life and property, the imperatives to protect these rights become important internally and between states (The Constitution of India, Fundamental Rights, p. 10). The international norm has to have some domestic salience, which may be considered the basis for appropriate intra-state and inter-state conduct. There has to be a ‘cultural match’ between the international norm and domestic norm in that it strikes a chord with domestically shared understandings of ‘beliefs and obligations’ (Cortell and Davis 2000 p. 68–77). Nevertheless, the motives for legitimizing HIs is often unclear as Finnemore observed, ‘…justification does not equal motivation. Humanitarian justifications have been used to disguise baser motives in more than one interven-
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Finnemore goes on to claim that HIs are legitimate only if they are “multilateral” (Finnemore 1996b, p. 15). The politics of the Cold War according to Finnemore, rendered impossible multilateral HIs, yet the post-Cold War period offered more opportunities for HIs (Finnemore 1996b, p. 15). Other scholars concede that calculation of interest is hard to separate from legitimacy and that legitimacy is multi-dimensional when it comes to the exercise of military power for HIs (Hurrell 2006 pp. 15-18). The claim that only multilateralism bequeaths legitimacy for HIs, one might say, is too restrictive and self-serving. Even unilateral humanitarian intervention may be deemed legitimate. As Michael Walzer noted: ‘Multilateralism is no guarantee for anything’ (Walzer 1995 p. 63). Notwithstanding its attractiveness, multilateralism as the only basis for legitimacy for HIs suffers simply because if every member state of the international community were consulted each could indulge in their ‘…self-aggrandizing proposals’ to the point of vetoing collective action. The consequence is likely to be ‘stalemate and inaction’ (Walzer 1995, pp. 62-63). Yet crude coercion for humanitarian ends on the part of great powers also needs legitimizing authority (Hurrell 2006, p. 16). It is also difficult to meet the demanding criterion of exclusively compassionate sentiment and humanity as the rationale for humanitarian intervention, simply because there are very few or literally, no cases where such a test has been met (Wheeler 1997, p.14). A combination of self-interest and humanitarian motives can be a sufficient basis for HI, particularly if there are humanitarian ‘benefits’ (Walzer 1977 pp. 104-108).

Both the legitimating role of institutions and moral agency provided by domestic institutions, Constitution and Indian society have performed an equally important role in determining India’s approach to HIs. R2P, which is a more recent phenomenon, is contested, if not in its totality, but specifically armed intervention that the Third Pillar of the doctrine mandates.

The Congo: The Role of Global Institutional Legitimacy in India’s Approach to Humanitarian Interventions

India has seen formal institutions such as the United Nations bequeathing legitimacy to its contributions to HI in the form United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO). Congo stands as among the most visible examples of New Delhi’s contribution to HIs and demonstrates the significance of institutional legitimacy that undergirded it. In doing so, New Delhi actually shrunk the domestic sovereignty of the Congo through the UN. Gopal, called Indian intervention in the Congo the “…altruistic side of India’s commitments” (Gopal 1984, p.145). For Nehru, supporting the UN in the Congo “…was a personal act of faith…”, according to his biographer (Gopal 1984, p. 146). Mohan noted Indian contribu-
tions to UNPKO was and is ‘...a form of collective intervention by the international system’ (Mohan 2008). Nehru himself called it ‘real internationalism’ despite Indian nationalism as he noted in his *Discovery of India*, which he contrasted with the British Empire and the Commonwealth that subordinated the colonies, including shortly to be independent India ‘...to the extension of a narrow British nationalism’ (Bhagavan 2010a 319-320). The UN would be the legitimating vehicle for this ‘real’ internationalism to ensure peace and justice (Bhagavan 2010a, pp. 319-321). This is significant as the Congo demonstrated India’s internationalism, albeit an anti-colonial variant (O’Malley 2015, p. 973). For Nehru, India was prepared to subordinate to ‘some extent’ its sovereignty to a world organization (Bhagavan 2012a, p.319). Notwithstanding the fact that Nehru could not push his ideals too far lest he not attain them all, he nevertheless observed to Albert Einstein, “All we can do is try our utmost to keep up standards of moral conduct both in our domestic affairs and the international sphere” (Bhagavan 2012b, p. 86). Indian nationalism and the ideals of peace, justice and liberty which helped India attain independence served as a critical wellspring for its internationalism. These conclusions clearly illustrate that for India institutional legitimacy is a very critical facet of its contributions to global peacekeeping missions and HIs. It is these forms of HIs legitimized through formal institutions that have been a more common characteristic of India’s foreign policy than the doctrinal approach to HIs undergirding R2P.

The crisis in the Congo erupted in 1960. Congo was and is a country located in Central Africa and its land mass matched that of Western Europe. It had significant mineral resources, with a small population, at the time, of thirteen million. On 30 June 1960, it gained independence from Belgium. The Belgians were determined to retain their colony. In little less than a fortnight on July 11 following independence the Belgians encouraged Moise Tshombe the Congolese leader, considered by some “to be a black stooge” of the Europeans, to secede the Katanga region where a large number Belgians lived (Gibbs 1993, 164). The Katanga region contributed most to the Congolese economy and revenue (Lemarchand 1962, pp. 405-406). Due to these subversive developments extirpating the Congo’s independence, Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister appealed for international assistance. Then UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Hammarskjold acting with alacrity secured UNSC approval for technical and military assistance until the Congolese forces could act on their own. Nehru was prompt in his appreciation of the UNSG’s decision to get the UNSC to aid the Congo. Despite, the UN’s inadequacies, the Indian government believed the world body was the only ally the Congo had. India did not initially deploy troops to the Congo as New Delhi suspected that the West was trying to shore-up the Congolese dispensation led by Moise Tsombe, Kasavubu and the military general Mobutu. Mobutu accusatorily observed:
Albeit, Mobutu enjoyed the support of American intelligence at the time of Belgian independence in 1960 (Askin and Collins 1993, p. 74). The Kennedy Administration had taken charge of the U.S. government in early 1961 and viewed the Indian position with greater sympathy, than did its predecessor (Gopal 1984, p. 154). The concern from the Indian standpoint was not so much the violation of Congolese sovereignty, but more about whether the UN as an organization and global institution could restore stability and order in the country. India saw the UN as an instrument for legitimizing the intervention. New Delhi sought a clear and unambiguous mandate from the UNSC. Indeed Nehru even rejected Tito’s proposal that African states contributing to the mission be placed under their respective national commands, because it would lead to the fragmentation of the UN force and encourage external armies to support their preferred warring factions (Gopal 1984, p. 153). This would spell further disaster for the country as it would plunge it in to a civil war and wreck the legitimating function of the UN in stabilizing the Congo. Therefore, foreign forces, except under UN Command had to leave the country and allow the Congolese Parliament to convene (Gopal 1984, p. 153).

The central African state from the Indian standpoint had to be free from foreign interference, particularly the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led Western bloc countries, which India believed was actively working to undermine the Congo’s newfound independence. The UNSC had to provide a strong and effective mandate to the UN Secretary General, India would then despatch combat troops. Eventually, the UN did pass a resolution on 21 February 1961 that met Nehru’s demands. American aircraft airlifted Indian combat forces to the Congo. Indeed, the Indian intervention in the Congo occurred at a time of considerable military stress in Sino-Indian relations. Despite this fact, India deployed an entire brigade to the country, which remained during and after the Sino-Indian boundary conflict (Gopal 1984, p. 160). Some have even critically concluded, despite the Indian Army’s pleas for more operationally ready combat troops for the defence of the Sino-Indian frontier, Nehru’s deployment of an elite brigade to distant Congo, reflected his ‘overconfidence’ and misplaced sense of priorities (Vertzberger 1984, 129). Notwithstanding criticism of India’s choices, the foregoing empirical analysis allows us to make a critical inference that India’s HI in the Congo under UN command reflected its solidarity with institutional legitimacy, despite the absence of any direct Indian interests in the Congo. It was executed independently of any Indian self-interest or coercive pressures from third parties.

As of today, India has contributed to 44 UNPKO missions (PMINY). The only
period when India did not contribute to the UNPKO was during the period of 1970-1989 (PMINY). Multilateral humanitarian interventions through the UNPKO have been New Delhi’s most consequential and constant contributions to global order and governance since the inception of the UNKPO in 1948. India has participated in eleven times as many peacekeeping missions as it has undertaken regional HIs. The UN’s peacekeeping office credits ‘UNSC-authorised peacekeeping’ duties for providing ‘…unparalleled legitimacy to any UN peace operation’, which explains India’s extensive involvement, because it is deliberative, consent-based and representative (Background Note, UNPK). From Jawaharlal Nehru to the current Indian government under Narendra Modi, India has been involved in UNPKOs. At present India is contributing to eight ongoing UNPKOs and missions (PMINY).

1971: Indian Regional Humanitarian Intervention – The Role of Domestic Normative Legitimacy

The 1971 war between India and Pakistan broke out because of the civil order in the Bengali dominated Eastern wing of Pakistan collapsed. In March, 1971 the Punjabi dominated Pakistani military regime led by Yahya Khan undertook a massive crackdown in the East, leading to a significant exodus of refugees into India. Unable to bear the burden of hosting approximately eight to ten million refugees and failing to convince and secure the support of the UN and the international community for an intervention, New Delhi by the end of 1971, mounted a massive military offensive (backed by the Soviet Union) to liberate East Pakistan, thereby helping create a new state. The motives behind this Indian intervention, albeit well documented, are often considered mixed, ranging from the humanitarian to the ulterior.

The scholar Ian Hall, for instance, argues that “ulterior” motives animated India’s humanitarian interventions most specifically its intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 due the history strategic rivalry between the two South Asian foes (Hall 2013, p. 90). Nevertheless, he concedes Indian motives were ‘mixed’ (Hall 2013, p. 90). There is nothing unique in Hall’s observation and claim about India’s 1971 intervention. After all, the late K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen of Indian strategists observed preceding India’s overt military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, ‘an opportunity [to vivisect Pakistan] the like of which will never come again’ (Sisson and Rose 1990, p. 149). Self-interest too is a conditionality for legitimacy. Beyond this ulterior motivation, which in any case was only one motive, Hall overlooked in his analysis the level of internal deliberation that occurred prior to India’s intervention in East Pakistan. New Delhi was never militarily in a position to intercede rapidly in East Pakistan or at least the Indian government did not direct the armed services to mobilize such as in the spring of 1971 (Subrahmanyam 1996, p. 89). That apart, military intervention was not India’s first choice of policy
rather a political solution was (Sisson and Rose 1990, p. 153). A political solution that involved some compromise between the two wings leading to a federal Pakistan was certainly something India had sought and deemed feasible (Raghavan 2013, p. 78-79). Further, there were differences within the Indian political and strategic establishments over the merits of the intervention, which stood in sharp contrast to sections of the establishment that supported Subrahmanyan’s view and those that did not (Raghavan 2013 pp. 135-153). Prominent Indira Gandhi Advisor P.N. Haksar, while sympathetic to the Bengali plight was initially leery of Indian intervention on behalf of the East Pakistanis, as it would violate Pakistani sovereignty – a member state of the UN (Bass 2015 p. 238). The Indian government resisted following Subrahmanyan’s prescription for quick intervention (Raghavan 2013, pp. 68-70).

Ironically, American and Indian scholars respectively such as Sumit Ganguly and Eswaran Sridharan temporize about HIs undertaken by the West in general and the U.S. specifically and accuse and critique New Delhi today of indulging in ‘shibboleths’ about sovereignty and opposing humanitarian interventions (Ganguly and Sridharan 2013). In 1971, the United States supported Pakistani sovereignty and did not support Indian intervention. Washington saw Pakistani sovereignty as a right and ironically, India, at one point in the crises considered it important too. Ganguly overlooks the importance of context and choice and their complex interplay. Context in this case is equally about the geopolitics of the Cold War in that Pakistan played a pivotal role in enabling the rapprochement between China and the United States, which induced Washington’s support for Pakistani sovereignty. For India geographic proximity facilitated intervention coupled with considerable domestic legitimacy bequeathed by the Indian public for the intervention and the degree of support within the target state, which in East Pakistan had a popular leader in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League enjoyed significant popularity within the Bengali populace, which only reinforced the legitimacy of India’s intervention (Raghavan 2013 p. 30-32). Briefly, India had a ready local ally, which was pivotal to the success of Indian intervention and gave it more legitimacy. In any case, India’s intervention in the East was not inevitable as Srinath Raghavan’s recent account of the 1971 war demonstrated. Raghavan observes, “...it was the product of conjuncture and contingency, choice and chance” (Raghavan 2013, p. 9).

Even if this is deemed unsatisfactory, as Ganguly suggests in a critique of Raghavan’s work that structural factors as much or were more determinative of the war, the issue of domestic normative legitimacy and the political judgment undergirding it are factors Ganguly underplays (Gangulya 2016 p. 194). He also underestimates in his latest assessment the importance of legitimacy in attitudes towards HIs (Gangulyb 2016, pp 362-372). Respect for sovereignty will remain, if not
exclusively, an abiding commitment in Indian foreign policy conduct involving responses to humanitarian emergencies and R2P specifically. After all, Indian military activism in response to humanitarian emergencies through the 1990s and 2000s was not evident in recent cases within South Asia such as Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Pai 2013 p. 308). The crucial difference between New Delhi’s response to the humanitarian emergencies in these countries and the East Pakistan humanitarian crisis of 1971 was the level of public and parliamentary support for military action. It was more intense in the latter as opposed to the former.

Therefore, the 1971 episode also testifies to why and how India shrunk domestic sovereignty, which in this case was Pakistani sovereignty, when it needed to. Very tellingly, the United Nations did not support India’s case for intervention. As Malone put it accurately:

“…in an age [context] unfamiliar with and unsympathetic towards humanitarian intervention, India’s actions were seen primarily as aimed at dismembering a member state of the UN” (Malone 2011, p. 255).

India just about avoided censure by the UN (Malone 2011, 255). India had no formal institutional legitimacy or collective legitimation to undergird its eventual intervention in East Pakistan (Pai 2013, p. 306). Domestic normative legitimacy furnished a pivotal motive for the intervention.

India’s democratic system actually subverted its initial commitment to respect Pakistani sovereignty, as moral outrage of the Indian public and parliament towards the Pakistani Army’s atrocities was overwhelming leading to military intervention. In contrast to Haksar, Jayaprakash Narayan, a leading opposition leader at the time observed: “…what is happening in Pakistan is surely not an internal matter of that country alone’ (Bass 2015, p. 238). Eventually, as the crisis evolved, Haksar conceded the moral revulsion the atrocities evoked in India compelling the case for intervention and that distant countries could temporize about sovereignty, but India could not view the developments in East Pakistan with ‘calm detachment’ (Bass 2015, p. 239). Even in the case of Subrahmanyan, his case for intervention was not merely driven by opportunism to dismember Pakistan it was justified as much on normative and moral grounds. India’s stance against apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia served as a precedent according to the Indian strategist for intervention to topple a repressive Punjabi dominated minority military regime that did not respect majority rule under Bengalis. In sum, Pakistan was an apartheid state. He saw Indian intervention in East Pakistan as generating pressure against the Rhodesians and South Africans at the UN (Bass 2015, p. 249). Here again we witness the legitimacy and normative force undergirding Subrahmanyan’s case for the HI in East Pakistan. The crucial difference between Subrahmanyan and other members of the Indian establishment was that he was
more emphatic in making the case for decisive and early intervention, because many lives could be saved.

As Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India of the day put it: ‘Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political or other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil’ (Sisson and Rose 1990, p. 152). The Pakistanis for their part believed that they were preserving their sovereignty. India in any case violated article 2 that recognizes the “sovereign equality” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945) of all states of the UN Charter and justifiably so, because its intervention enjoyed domestic political legitimacy borne out of its constitutional values. In any case, India did seek UNSC approval for intervention, only to be denied (Bass 2015, p. 229). Where multilateralism failed unilateralism worked. Ironically, Indian scholars, today, such as Mehta actually see New Delhi’s 1971 intervention in East Pakistan as presaging the adoption of R2P and this doctrine in 1971 was “applied…well” (Mehta 2011, p. 104). This is somewhat quixotic; Mehta has been an opponent or at least a sceptic of R2P (Mehta 2009, p. 231). India, he argued, could not support the R2P doctrine, because it had more pressing challenges at home, and the fractious and contentious nature of its domestic politics makes it improbable for New Delhi to embrace the doctrine (Mehta 2009 p. 209-233). Therefore, New Delhi rather not be distracted by the interventionist demands of the doctrine and therefore needs to privilege sovereignty over intervention (Mehta 2009, 231). The challenge with R2P, which Mehta overlooks, is that it bequeaths “right of intervention” under the auspices of the UN. As the foregoing reveals, India did not see its armed intervention in East Pakistan as a ‘right’ or a ‘doctrine’ of intervention, unlike the proponents of R2P who do. Secondly, the 1971 war was a decisive intervention to be sure, but not ‘timely’ as R2P’s third pillar mandates. The consequence of Mehta’s claim about 1971 as the basis for the contemporary R2P doctrine, even if it is not his intention, brings India under frequent Western pressure to support every military intervention it selectively and possibly frivolously undertakes by invoking R2P. If Mehta can rationalise the 1971 intervention as the foundation for R2P, why is he so resistant to endorsing the doctrine? It also goes against the grain of the evolutionary, complex and gradual approach taken by the Indian state in mounting the 1971 intervention. Indeed, the 1971 intervention was the outgrowth of deliberation and not alacrity and swiftness as the Third Pillar of R2P mandates. As of now, the selective interventions pursued by the West and some non-Western countries have not converged with the selective interventionist preferences of India. On the other hand, Hall’s claim that India’s intervention was driven, partly by ulterior motives is true, yet presumes the West’s interventions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya and Syria were and are driven by exclusively altruistic considerations and high-minded liberal egalitarianism.
Let us take one prominent Western HI partly involving ulterior motives – Bosnia. The Bosnian war started with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1989. This precipitated Western intervention by the mid-1990s. It is important to determine whether it was undertaken for exclusively humane and altruistic reasons. The HI in the erstwhile Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s was ostensibly, undertaken for humanitarian reasons on behalf of hapless and helpless Bosnian Muslims who were the victims of Serb atrocities, particularly in the early stages of the war. This created the impression within the Western press, political establishments, and intelligentsia that the Serbs were the villains and never the victims of Muslim and Croat Catholic atrocities. Indeed, the scholar Samuel P. Huntington, while not completely discounting the moral motives for intervention in Bosnia, called Western and more particularly American involvement on behalf of the Muslims as a classic example of “calculated civilizational realpolitik” (Huntington 1996 p. 289-290). The West and particularly Washington, Huntington observed made common cause on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims backed by Muslim powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia and tacitly Iran in a quest not to antagonize the Turks and the Saudis due to the ‘convergence of interests’ unconnected to the ethno-religious war in Bosnia in the 1990s (Huntington 1996 p. 289-290). India, like many Western powers has been no exception in this regard. Ulterior motivations have found expression in Western HIs as much as Indian regional HIs. Motives are necessary, but insufficient, outcomes matter. The legitimacy of an HI by way of R2P or otherwise can be ascertained only by the humanitarian results it produces for the target population. Indian intervention in 1971 secured Bengali dignity and dismemberment was the only means to achieving it, which Hall refuses to recognise. After all, did the West not dismember Serbia, when it vivisected Kosovo from the latter? On the other hand, most Indian debates on R2P tend to mirror the same about Western motives.

R2P and Libya: Explaining Indian Views on the Doctrine

Briefly, the R2P has three pillars. Pillar I calls for ‘The Protection Responsibilities of the State’ to prevent large-scale atrocities within its borders. Pillar II mandates ‘International assistance and capacity building’ [of the state] and finally Pillar III requires a ‘Timely and decisive [military] response’ to genocide and mass atrocities (UNGA 2009 pp. 10-22). Officially, India supports the first two pillars and not the third. Most recently, India supported, for the first time since the 2005 world Summit that a debate on the normative dimensions be conducted without a vote on the R2P at the UN General Assembly (PMINY 2017). Nevertheless, India made clear respect for sovereignty remains the ‘bedrock’ of ‘international politics’ and political and legal complexities of R2P also need to be examined thoroughly. The current Indian envoy to the UN also underlined the significance of ‘deliberation’ rather than ‘preemptive decision-making’ lest the effort to create
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a ‘just global order’ result in weakening the existing global order (Akbaruddin PMINY). The latter point highlighted the importance of the deep misgivings India had over the haste with which R2P was invoked against Libya in 2011 and UNSCR 1973 resolution passed without the consequences that followed. India only supports military intervention as a last resort (Puri PMINY 2012) (Saran 2014). Even in the case of India’s 1971 intervention, armed force was not the first policy preference for New Delhi, it was only a final recourse occasioned by extreme circumstances. Libya never met the test of mass atrocities and genocide, as was the case in Rwanda or the Balkans in the 1990s (Puri PMINY, 2012). India endorses the Brazilian principle of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RwP) (Puri PMNY).

Within the Indian establishment, non-official including retired diplomats’ views on R2P and HIs are very variable largely reflecting the diverse intellectual strands, ideational positions and values encompassing Indian society. At one end is the anti-colonial school, at the mid-end is the pragmatic-realist school and at the far end is the hard realist school, which sees cynical motivations and double standards behind the West’s interventions in conflicts most recently in Libya by invoking R2P and Syria. However, we must maintain the differences between these schools is not distinct, but largely used as a heuristic device to delineate differences within the Indian polity. To be sure, there is an overlap in the views between these schools, as the succeeding analysis will show.

Let us begin with the anti-colonial school, which occupies the Left of the political spectrum. This school is not out rightly or reflexively opposed to any form of intervention, as long it has been strongly endorsed by the UNSC, enjoys deep and wide multilateral support among member states of the UN and follows considerable deliberation. Therefore, the Left in India places a higher premium on institutional legitimacy, but not one that is dominated and determined by the West. In this regard, R2P specifically came under sharp attack in the wake of the Libyan crisis in 2011 from the Indian left-leaning media. Vijay Prashad noted caustically, “…selectivity is a function of those who continue to exercise their power through the U.N. bodies — which is to say that the West sets the agenda for the use of the R2P doctrine” (Prashad 2013).

To some extent, this is true; because three out of the five UNSC’ permanent members are Western countries, namely the U.S., the United Kingdom and France. The other veto-wielding members being Russia and China. The former’s combined political weight tends to drive the UNSC’s agenda for military intervention for humanitarian reasons or against it. Prashad’s criticism also extended to the sheer arbitrariness with which the UNSC declared the Gaddhafi regime’s crackdown as amounting to genocidal violence (Prashad 2013). On the Libyan crisis in 2011, a leading Leftist foreign policy commentator critically analysed the
West’ precipitate decision to intervene in Libya noting the ‘motive’ was ‘political’ and ‘strategic’ and not humanitarian’ (Varadarajan 2011).

This has some basis, as even prominent figures in the American establishment such as Richard Haas recently concurred that it ‘morphed into regime change’ (Haas 2017 p. 8). R2P legitimised regime change in Libya rather than the protection of Libyan civilians against mass atrocities. Yet as Haas, accurately maintained armed humanitarian interventions are rarely ‘apolitical’ and ‘solely humanitarian’, contrary to Varadarajan’s claim (Haas 2017 p. 6). War, even for humanitarian ends is ‘…a continuation of political intercourse, carried with other means’ (Clausewitz 1984, p. 99). Means can never be separated from their ends (Clausewitz 1984, p. 99). Further, the Indian Left has not fully considered the political dimension’s importance in legitimating an intervention; it is based on a political judgment (Claude Jr. 1966, p. 375). The intervention in Libya also enjoyed UN’ institutional legitimacy and the support of the Arab League. The Left’s opposition was merely because the intervention was driven by major Western powers, ignoring the Arab League’s support for UNSCR 1973. As one noted critic of the Indian Left-leaning elites observed prior to the Libyan crisis, they invariably condemn the West’s interventionist conduct as imperialism and adopt less condemnatory positions in regards to the Eastern imperialism of the Soviet Union and China, because the latter is better than the former (Aiyar 2007).

The emergence of R2P however has sharpened the focus of the Left’ critiques of the doctrine and the West’s motives in general. Yet these Left-oriented commentators’ assertions ignores the selectivity with which India mounted its own HIs at least regionally, because in instances such as New Delhi’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 the test of domestic political legitimacy in the defence of civilians assumed primacy and lacked the formal institutional legitimacy that India has frequently sought and supported extra-regionally. After all, India’s immediate neighbours accuse it of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘imperial’ ambitions too. The Indian Left overlooks that arbitrariness is very subjective and common to a cross-section of states, when it comes to HIs in international politics. Motivations tend to be variable or mixed. Selectivity, as we have seen earlier is something even India has practiced at least regionally. If political motives explain Western intervention in Libya, so it must explain India’s abstention on the Libyan crisis. Notwithstanding New Delhi’s deep reservations to vote in favour of UNSCR 1973, India did not frontally oppose the West and the Arab League. The League’s support for the intervention allowed New Delhi to justify its abstention (Mohan 2011 p. 6). Further, extra-regionally, India at an official level has supported Soviet interventions at a minimum tacitly, if not explicitly. Take the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru actually noted in parliament that the facts about Soviet repression were “obscure”,

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despite a UN resolution condemning Soviet acts as repression and rejected calls for UN-supervised elections in the country (Kissinger 1994a p. 564). The facts were anything, but unclear. New Delhi’s interests vis-à-vis Moscow meant that, it would not antagonize the latter over some tiny and ‘...distant European country’ (Kissinger 1994a p. 564). Further, Russia’s brutal conduct in Chechnya and more recently in the Crimea have not received or evoked the same moral indignation as the West’s conduct from Indian Left-leaning foreign policy elites.

The objections to humanitarian interventions as conceived by the anti-colonial school ignores the role of institutional legitimacy, as Pai observes, ‘The selectivity in the choice of theaters in which to intervene leads to scepticism about the motives of the world’s major powers’ (Pai 2013 p. 308). Therefore, this group has not been consistently committed to legitimacy of the R2P and HIs even when it enjoys institutional support.

The second school can be broadly defined as ‘pragmatic-realist,’ in that power and interests matter, it is also “pragmatic” to the extent it is not cussedly opposed to R2P and humanitarian interventions nor is it obstinately tethered to the concept of sovereignty. Members of this school are realists who are ready to support the West and maintain that India strike balance between its interests and its values. This school does not fixate as much on Western motives for HIs, as it does Indian motives for opposing or remaining neutral in an intervention. Mohan, of the pragmatic school argued accurately, India's record is ‘mixed’ when it comes to supporting humanitarian interventions. New Delhi's abstention from voting for UNSC Resolution 1973 authorising military action to intercede in the Libyan civil war had little to do with the non-aligned status and non-Western identity of India or high principles, but more due to New Delhi’s risk-aversion borne out of its strategic culture (Mohan 2011a p. 7) (Mehta 2011 p. 102). Non-Indian observers, such as Pethiyigoda too have attributed India's resistance or reservations about R2P to cultural motives. These cultural inhibitions towards R2P stem from India's deep traditions of non-violence, pluralism and tolerance (Pethiyagoda 2013 pp.11-13). The first two pillars of R2P blended well with India's notion of pluralism and non-violence respectively (Pethiyagoda 2013, pp. 16-18). The Third Pillar was activated through UNSCR 1973 mandating armed intervention and India's abstention can be explained by its commitment to non-violence (Pethiyagoda 2013, p. 18). On the other hand, Mohan concluded that India abstention rested on cold calculation and the Indian national interest shorn of any ideological biases (Mohan 2011a p. 8). Nevertheless, Mohan's writings predating the Libyan episode largely demonstrate that he is not a reflexive opponent of R2P and HIs, citing particularly examples of India's intervention in 1971 and its armed intervention in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s (Mohan 2008b). Joshi another leading foreign policy commentator saw the Indian abstention on UNSC
1973 as the typical fence sitting that has characterised New Delhi’s foreign policy (Joshi 2011). Joshi went on to lament given the atrocities being committed by the Libyan regime, there was a moral imperative for New Delhi to take a clear position and endorse the intervention. He noted India had a ‘…tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds’ (Joshi 2011).

Others such as the scholar Pant, saw New Delhi’s approach to the Libyan conflict as jarring in that India claimed to be the world’s largest democracy which contrasted favourably with China (Pant 2011). In doing so New Delhi did not consider the gap between its aspirations to play a larger role in global affairs that contributes to peace and stability, and its national interests. Libya served, as is the case with the experts surveyed before about New Delhi’s attitude towards R2P and role as contributor to global security. For Pant, India came out the worst, because much like Joshi, he concludes that since New Delhi was a non-veto wielding member of UNSC at the time, its abstention amounted to an actual disapproval of the Libyan intervention. Which he contrasted unfavourably with the two veto-wielding members, namely Russia and China who abstained. Their non-use of their veto actually amounted to approval (Pant 2011).

Writing in 2015, Mohan contended in the regional context, ‘New Delhi does not have the luxury of treating the principle of non-intervention as absolute’ (Mohan 2015c). Elaborating further, Mohan contended that there were demand and supply side issues in regards to intervention in the subcontinent. In South Asia the supply side issue comes under critical and sharp scrutiny, because of India’s putative ambitions and tendencies to be a regional hegemon and a great power (Mohan 2015c) (Jaganathan and Kurtz 2014 p. 466). This point is necessary, but insufficient, as Mohan argued it was not as simple as New Delhi striving for regional hegemony, but equally a problem of political elites within the smaller neighbours bordering India seeking New Delhi’s intervention when it suits them domestically (Mohan 2015c). The pragmatic school has its merits and strives for some middle ground between intervention and state sovereignty and between values and interests. Yet one of the crucial weaknesses of this school is that many of its members do not consider, fully the importance of neutrality in international politics. It is by any account a legitimate stance in some instances for any state and common to the practice of statecraft. Neutrality is also a political judgment. After all, New Delhi’s neutrality or muted posture was in 2011 equally evident in regards to the crisis in Bahrain, which ran parallel to the humanitarian crisis in Libya, where a minority Sunni ruling clique was brutalizing its Shia majority population. Bahrain is an apartheid state. Similarly, Canada adopted a neutral position before and during the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 (Raghavan 2013 p. 172-176). Is and was Canada entitled to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds and not India? In the case of Pant, more than New Delhi’s
abstention amounting to disapproval of UNSCR 1973, it was more likely irrelevant. After all, the very Western states that participated in military action against the Gaddafi regime circumvented the UNSC, due to the prospect of a Russian veto in 1999 against Serbian atrocities against its Kosovar population. The UNSC cannot prevent military action, despite the threat of a veto, yet performs, notwithstanding Kosovo, a legitimating function. The UNSC can also err in authorising military action under the R2P, as was the case with UNSCR 1973, because the outcome of the intervention produced very little or no humanitarian benefits for the Libyan people. By explaining India’s position on R2P by way of non-violence is simplistic as Pethiyagoda does, because it underestimates the Indian insistence on post-intervention outcomes (Saran 2014).

While Mohan as well as the other experts surveyed in the foregoing are right to contend, that sovereignty is not absolute, nor is intervention. When it comes specifically to HIs, local interests within countries also need to align with any armed Indian humanitarian intervention, which was exactly the case when India intervened in East Pakistan. Moreover, the pragmatic-realist school is also deficient in not considering the fact that the prime “concern” for states is to ask what costs are they prepared to pay for violating the principle of sovereignty in order to service humanitarian goals and “…how much of this is justifiable in terms of the outcomes that such intervention seeks’ (Ayoob 2004, pp. 100-101). Given the painful denouement Libya has experienced following the overthrow of Gaddafi, it is hard to justify support for the intervention. It may have been justifiable had it enjoyed legitimacy and the outcome was stabilizing; thereby reinforcing legitimacy of the intervention, as was the case in 1971 and several other UN and non-UN sanctioned HIs. In the Libyan case, Pillar III of R2P was activated to topple Gaddafi, without the implementation of Pillars I and II that should have followed the overthrow. The Libyan people have suffered the deprivation of the complete humanitarian benefits of R2P robbing the intervention of its legitimacy. After all Mohan conceded that Indian officials in their interactions with him opposed the intervention on prescient grounds that a Somalia-like conflict would ensue with the regime’s departure threatening regional stability (Mohan 2011 p. 8). It is not just the armed intervention for humanitarian reasons that matters, it is equally, the peace that follows, which might not be perfectly democratic, but stabilizing to the extent it puts an end to mass atrocities (Bellamyb 2008 p. 620-621). To be sure, Mohan concedes, that New Delhi cannot be expected to support every single Western resort to force as a litmus test of its commitment to global order and governance. This is particularly true when it has no real institutional stake in determining the conduct of military operations and the political settlement that ensues (Mohan 2011 p. 8). Albeit unlikely, New Delhi might be more favourably disposed to R2P’ Third Pillar in particular if it “was granted a permanent membership in the UNSC…” (Moller 2017, p. 1924). Indeed, it may increase the le-
gitimacy of R2P, if the UNSC were more representative. However, under current conditions, states such as India or Brazil, another emerging power, will not extend comprehensive support for HIs under R2P (Moller 2017, 1924).

Consequently, India, officially at least, will be more selective, also exercise caution, and privilege sovereignty as opposed to completely endorsing R2P in the former French Foreign Minister Kouchner words the ‘doctrine of humanitarian intervention’ (Puri 2016 p. 200-201). Therefore, intervention comes with its conditionality and limits. Sovereignty too is an international institution and a critical ordering and moderating principle in the conduct of inter-state relations (Kissinger 2014 pp. 11-41). Finally, India does not treat sovereignty as an absolute principle; it just emphasises sovereignty when it suits it in the conduct of its foreign policy. It has been more amenable, if not in all instances, to violating sovereignty when it enjoys the institutional legitimacy of the UN. It is evident, this school does not question motives for the pursuit of an armed HI and places a premium on what India should do to support it, but pays scant attention to the costs, risks and humanitarian benefits that must result from an intervention.

Finally, the third school can be classified as ‘hard realist’, because they see the R2P as nothing more than a ruse or a cover for the assertion of Western military power to effect regime change. With the Left, these realists share the view that the R2P is used for effecting regime change and foisting a regime that is pliant to the West’ demands and requirements, rather than protecting civilians from a murderous dictator as was the case with Libya in 2011. They too much like Left-wing sections of the Indian elite are dismayed about the choice of regions where the West chooses to invoke R2P and HIs (Parthasarathy 2011).

This point was reinforced by Sibal, who also went on to contest the necessity and the premise of the NATO-led intervention, while Libya is being subjected to vigorous military action, identical problems in other countries such as Bahrain and Yemen were being ignored. The revolt against Gaddhafi’s rule was supported by external military intervention, whereas in Bahrain for instance, the Shia revolt was being suppressed by external [Western] military assistance. Sibal went on to note that this differential approach was due to the Shia-Sunni power play involving Iran (Sibal 2011).

While not anti-Western, these ‘hard’ realists also prize a level of ‘strategic autonomy’ in the choices India makes on R2P and HIs to the extent that it does not vitiate India’s interests. Yet these realists ignore India too has undertaken regime change at a regional level as it did in 1971 and it has pursued regime restoration as it did in the Maldives in the 1980s. For the “hard” realists, as is the case for “pragmatists” and the Left the problem is the absence of any consideration of legitimacy. Even when they do see ‘some’ legitimacy, intervention is seen as an
opportunistic undertaking by the West (Sibal 2011).

What this misses again is that India too has undertaken at least partly opportunistic and selective HIs regionally and unilaterally borne out of domestic normative legitimacy. The element missing from specifically Indian regional HIs as opposed to Western HIs (except Kosovo), the UN never endorsed them nor did they enjoy significant regional and global support. Moreover, much like the Indian Left, these ‘hard’ realists question motives without fully considering the legitimacy of an intervention is significantly conditioned by its outcome. Sibal’s point is pregnant with the fact that the Arab League and the UNSC endorsed the intervention in Libya. Intervention in Libya was undergirded by institutional legitimacy and multilateral regional support, yet India abstained and exhibited deep scepticism about the entire enterprise. After all, it was also politically necessary, in the case of Syria, for the West to legitimize intervention through the UNSC only to be stymied with a double veto from Russia and China. As we have seen, India too sought the UN’s approval in 1971, only to be denied a multilateral UNSC mandate. Any decision to intervene is as much a political judgment as it is a moral, legal, social and interest-based judgment. Notwithstanding Libya, which was an inappropriate case for the invocation of R2P, certain exceptional cases may merit intervention under the doctrine.

Yet even non-interventionist liberals such as Pratap Mehta, when it comes to interventions, particularly in the Middle East or the Greater Middle East, insist that India has to be circumspect due to ‘sheer economic necessity’ (Mehta 2011b p. 104). India will inevitably tread a cautious path in the region and focus on the defence of its own borders. However, in other contexts, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, it might be more feasible to pursue R2P and HIs whether through UNSC approval or without, as the political, military and economic costs are relatively lower to stop mass atrocities such as in cases like Rwanda (Kuperman 2001 p.4). While some regional contexts may restrict India’s endorsement and application of R2P, others might not. New Delhi may have to reconsider its hidebound attitude towards R2P’s pillar III in such cases. India can endorse the Third Pillar in principle, with the significant qualification that New Delhi emphatically the reserves the right to support its application as it deems necessary.”

**Conclusion**

India stands as an interesting case in assessing the extent to which New Delhi supports humanitarian interventions, but has a mixed record in supporting and executing humanitarian interventions. It also reveals the paradox that inheres in India’s attitude towards humanitarian emergencies. New Delhi’s interventions within its neighbourhood have been rationalized, by invoking the principle of humanitarianism and altruism, at least partially, without an appeal to formal
institutional legitimacy. The opposite tends to be equally true in New Delhi’s conduct toward humanitarian situations extra-regionally, which it seeks to legitimize through the formal institutional mechanism of the UNSC. Opposition or neutrality also animates New Delhi’s attitude towards intervention under the R2P despite collective institutional legitimacy. These are the three faces of legitimacy undergirding India’s attitude towards R2P and HIIs. The first and the third schools may stand vindicated by the R2P’s most prominent application against Libya, but the second school cannot be ignored either, particularly in regional contexts where India can make a contribution not just for post-intervention reconstruction and recovery, but also militarily. All three schools underestimate the significance of legitimacy in India’s approach R2P and HIIs. Indeed, at an official level in India there is greater attention paid to the consequences of invoking R2P, particularly its ‘Third Pillar. UNPKOs have been the constant in India’s approach to HIIs since its inception. Therefore, at an official level, India will look for other ways such as through UNPKOs to contribute to global governance even as a rising power.

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India's Evolving Views on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions: The Significance of Legitimacy
India and Global Trade Governance: Re-Defining Its ‘National’ Interest

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Abstract
This paper considers and explains the shifts and consistencies in India’s engagement with structures of global trade governance beginning from the Uruguay round of trade negotiations in late 1980s. It makes three major arguments. First, that although India has participated actively in global trade negotiations since the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) it was only under the present-day trade governance institution – the World Trade Organization or WTO – that India began to seriously engage with global trade governance. Second, India’s position on global trade negotiations has witnessed a shift over last two decades: from being an obstructionist in the Uruguay Round to a constructive participant in the recent trade negotiations under the Doha Round. However, India’s core concerns especially regarding the protection of its farm sector, food security and discussions on trade in services have often placed it at odds with developed countries. This is largely a result of the prominence of these issues in India’s domestic politics. Lastly, while India maintains certain reservations with regard to global trade in a few sectors, the steady surge of protectionism in the West may force India to assume a leadership position in global trade governance. Liberal trade regimes have supported India’s economic rise and it is in Indian interests to strengthen the multilateral trading system and make it more inclusive, equitable and fair. For this, India needs to broaden its national interests and undertake a coalition-building role in matters of trade governance.

Keywords
India, GATT, WTO, Uruguay Round, Doha Round

Introduction
India is an active and visible participant in international trade negotiations, often positioning itself as a stalwart proponent of the concerns facing developing and least developed countries. The WTO’s Doha Development Round, which started
in 2001, was intended to place the interests and needs of the developing countries at the forefront. Nevertheless, the supposed ‘development round’ is stalled, partly due to a divide between developed and developing countries on the contentious question of opening up domestically sensitive agricultural sectors. India’s contribution to this impasse has been considerable. It has continually championed the protection of its own farm sector, which it says is fundamental to the subsistence of more than 60 percent of the country’s population. It has, however, often expressed these concerns – which emerge from domestic political and economic considerations – in broader terms. These terms frequently reflect a self-image created decades ago as the leader of the “third world”.

This paper will examine shifts and consistencies in India’s positions at various ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization during the Doha Round. For example, during the seventh ministerial conference in Geneva, the Indian commerce minister demanded the elimination of distortionary agricultural subsidies in developed countries, along with more flexibility for developing-country government action to protect domestic agricultural markets. At the ministerial conference in Bali, India used defence of its food subsidy policy as a negotiating chip on a general trade facilitation agreement. Clashes between India and the West have been an important component in the stalling of further efforts to build up global trade governance.

By examining India’s positions during the WTO ministerial conferences held between 1994 and 2016, especially with regard to agriculture, food security, services trade and trade facilitation, this paper seeks to identify if such concerns are motivated primarily by Indian domestic interests or by the common stated concerns of the G-33 group of developing countries. Further, is India’s position at the WTO in line with its own future interests in global governance, or counter-productive? A new political climate in the West pushes additional responsibility for global trade governance on to developing nations, including – perhaps especially – India. This would need India to redefine its national interest more broadly, and take up a similar coalition-building role in global trade governance that it has begun to espouse in other international fora.

Given that there has hardly been any comprehensive examination of the trends in India’s negotiating behaviour during the Uruguay and Doha Round, the paper attempts to analyse the nature, areas of concern, and negotiating strategies of Indian trade negotiators at international trade fora. In this context, Section 1 highlights how India’s participation in multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (formerly GATT) has evolved over time. Beginning with the Uruguay Round, the paper elaborates on the issues of relevant interest to India and negotiating strategies adopted by its ministers during all the ministerial conferences held during the Doha Round (2001-2016). Section 2 discusses
the shifts and consistencies in India’s approach at multilateral trade talks during both the GATT and WTO years. Finally, Section 3 examines a future direction for Indian participation in world trade, and ways for India to take on a leadership role in global trade governance.

India’s Participation in Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the GATT and WTO

Uruguay Round

Prior to the Uruguay Round, which led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, India’s involvement in multilateral trade negotiations remained limited – and, arguably, passive. In pursuit of inward-oriented development policies, along with its reluctance to open its markets to the developed economies, India failed to take advantage of the increase in world exports during the long post-war expansion of 1948-1973.

As a result, India’s share of world exports declined from 2.2 percent in 1948 to 0.5 percent in 1973.\(^1\) However, in later years – beginning in the early 1980s – India began slowly to adopt a policy of greater integration with the world, ending its previous drift towards autarky. This process accelerated in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose centrally planned economy was a key inspiration for India’s post-independence economic policy. Radical policy reforms began following a balance of payments crisis in 1991 – but even before that, a significantly pro-business attitude had crept into the national government during the 1980s in India which brought about a new regime of liberalisation of controls over industrial production, foreign trade and investment.\(^2\)

The eighth and the last round under GATT, the Uruguay Round, was a watershed for the multilateral trading system. For one, developing countries were actively engaged in the design of trade rules. Nearly 100 developing countries participated in negotiations at the beginning of the Uruguay Round – about five times the number of participants in 1947. The scope of trade negotiations in this round also expanded to include new issues such as non-tariff measures, trade in services, intellectual property, and dispute settlement, among others. The most drastic change came with the inclusion of sensitive sectors such as textiles, clothing and agriculture, which hold immense importance for both developed and developing countries.

\(^1\) World exports increased at an average annual rate of 8 percent between 1948 and 1973. For more details see Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003). Also see World Trade Organization 2001.

\(^2\) While the beginning of the “reform period” is usually identified as being 1991, Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) argue that India’s economic growth during the 1980s accelerated due to an attitudinal shift from the post-1980 Indira Gandhi government in favour of private business. This argument is reiterated by Kohli (2006) who asserts that a “rightward drift” in Indian politics – the period of the embrace of state and business, triggered economic growth of India in the 1980s.
Nevertheless – and intriguingly, given the orientation of its present-day economy – India opposed the inclusion of services, investment and intellectual property rights into the negotiating agenda in this round until stalled issues relating to agriculture and textiles were resolved (Srinivasan & Tendulkar 2003, p. 94). A statement by Finance Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh in 1986 – he was later prime minister in 1989 – is revealing of India’s reasons for restricting the demands of developed countries for including new issues in the Uruguay Round. He describes the role of GATT as:

\[ \text{GATT is designed to deal with only trade in merchandise. It cannot be stretched or extended to areas alien to it. GATT is only an agreement and not an organization under the auspices of which disciplines can be developed in such areas. The approaches and disciplines of GATT cannot be transposed to the services sector. The proposal to hold negotiations on services in GATT is, therefore, untenable. (Singh 1986, p. 3).} \]

India eventually acquiesced to the demands of the developed countries to include services and intellectual property in a trade-off for improving market access in areas of comparative advantage for developing countries, particularly textiles and clothing. Moreover, India’s leaders had come to realise that the country could potentially become a source of cost-effective labour services for developed countries (Swamy 1990, p. 4). Thus, in the negotiations over trade in services, India moved from holding a reluctant position to a more constructive one over the period 1986-1990.

Although India participated constructively in the negotiations after undertaking liberalisation reforms in 1991, the focus of discussions remained limited to trade in goods. In the words of Pranab Mukherjee during the ministerial meeting in Marrakesh in 1994, ‘Trade policy cannot be made the arbiter of all concerns: it should be confined to concerns it can address efficiently […]’ (Mukherjee 1994, p. 1).

With the establishment of the WTO, a fundamental change in the working of the multilateral trading system was certainly expected. However, India’s rhetoric did not alter much. India’s unwavering demands for the improvement of non-agriculture market access (in textiles and clothing) through the removal of tariff peaks and escalations, along with the elimination of agriculture subsidies by developed countries, were echoed at every ministerial meeting held during the initial years of the WTO in Singapore (1996) and Geneva (1998).

India was less supportive of the launch of a new round of talks in Seattle in 1999 due to non-implementation of the commitments made in the earlier round (Srinivasan & Tendulkar 2003, p. 88). Moreover, India was of the view that the
global trading system largely reflected the interests of the developed nations and a new round would be no exception. Yet, India agreed to a new round of negotiations, although half-heartedly, in the hope that it would strengthen the multilateral trading system of the WTO by recognizing the existing development deficit amongst countries. And thus the negotiating position of India at the fourth ministerial meeting in Doha (2001) remained extreme, characterising strong opposition to “non-trade” issues. Murasoli Maran, who led the Indian delegation at Doha in 2001 remarked in his opening statement that:

*After the setback at Seattle, all of us want Doha to be a success. Success, however, does not necessarily require over-reaching objectives or launch of a "comprehensive" round [...] Rather than charting a divisive course in unknown waters, let this Conference provide a strong impetus to the on-going negotiations on agriculture and services [...]*. (Maran 2001, p. 1).

The statements of Indian ministers at various WTO ministerial conferences express the country’s established position: that the multilateral trading system should serve the interests of all the signatories, but especially developing and least-developed countries. India has consistently positioned international trade as an instrument for development, which would require a negotiating process that is more inclusive, equitable and fair.

**Doha Development Round**

The Doha Development Round, which began in 2001, is the current round of global trade negotiations. Framed in response to the concerns expressed most vociferously by India, the Doha Round nominally places the needs and interests of the developing countries at the forefront.

India’s influence on the round’s design is suggested in the favourable design of the Doha work programme, which includes discussions on themes and areas that are pivotal to growth and development of the Indian economy. For example, India raised concerns in the Geneva (1998) ministerial conference that it faced difficulties in implementing some of the WTO agreements and decisions due to inadequate financial and human resources. In addition, at Singapore (1996) and Seattle (1999), India firmly refused to entertain any discussion about whether labour issues, in any form, could be brought within the purview of the WTO. Additional Indian concerns regarding greater access in agriculture markets of developed countries, movement of people (Mode 4 in services), among many others, were duly acknowledged in the Doha agenda.³

³ The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Murasoli Maran stated that, ‘the Doha outcome is in conformity with the shared stakeholders’ interests – the interests of agriculture, industry and most importantly, our development’. *India and the WTO*, October-November 2001, pp. 1-2 (Statement by Murasoli Maran, Minister for Commerce and Industry, in the Rajya Sabha on 21 November 2001 and
As India was a vocal opponent of the “Singapore” issues (foreign investment, transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, and competition policy), it was decided in the Doha ministerial conference that any discussions on these issues would be undertaken in the Cancún ministerial conference “only after establishing an explicit consensus on negotiation modalities” (Ministry of Commerce & Industry 2003). These cases of Indian demands being recognised at Doha could conceivably be credited to country’s relentless opposition to the new issues.

However, an alternative, more political explanation cannot be ruled out: the post-9/11 geopolitical environment. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US led to a climate in which solidarity between developing and developed countries was prioritised. This pressured India to deviate from an inflexible position as it did not want to be regarded as an obstructionist in international economic cooperation (Panagariya 2010, p. 113). Consequently, there was an inevitable shift in India’s role in multilateral trade negotiations post the Doha ministerial.

Opinion is divided, however, on the nature, extent and utility of this shift. Anant (2001) criticises India for adopting a ‘flawed rejectionist approach’ to the initial WTO negotiations, arguing that the government had shown an “overall unwillingness to negotiate even in areas where we have distinct trading potential or economic interests.” (He especially mentioned issues of immediate domestic concern such as professional services.) This criticism was echoed, in part, by Mattoo and Subramanian (2003) who say that India’s reactions pertaining to some of the issues (services and new issues per se) were purely defensive, although defensiveness elsewhere might be justifiable.

Narlikar (2007) examines India’s more active position in trade negotiations after Doha ministerial and concludes: ‘The current engagement goes beyond just activism, and suggests that India has learnt to use international institutions proactively and to its advantage’. Debroy and Chakraborty (2006) discuss the changed environment at the fourth ministerial conference at Doha by stating, ‘[...] the former group [developing countries] has become much more vocal at the multilateral trade forums on the protectionist policies of the latter [developed countries].’

The Doha experience renewed India’s enthusiasm for the multilateral trading system and firmed up Indian policymakers’ intentions. It led them to believe that India’s role could be pivotal in preserving the development focus of the work programme in ongoing and future negotiations. In the run-up to the Cancun ministerial, for example, Indian ministers held meetings with stakeholders, including industry associations, state governments, and academic institutions, to gather an
understanding of appropriate negotiating strategies. The issues relevant to India at the Cancún ministerial that emerged from this discussion included: the reduction of agricultural subsidies in developed countries; non-agricultural market access for certain industrial items (especially labour-intensive products); service liberalisation (specifically Mode 1 and Mode 4); the resolution of the deadlock in public health and intellectual property rights concerns; and questions of implementation, among a few others. These largely remain the major concerns of India today, even as the domestic economy’s structure and prospects have vastly altered.

India’s involvement in the Cancún ministerial presented a new and unfamiliar sight to many, as the country advanced its development concerns in trade talks as a coalition. About 20 developing countries, including many African ones, came together and formed a coalition (called then the G-20, and later the G-21) in response to the European Commission (EC) and US text on agriculture trade liberalisation (dated 13 August 2003). Subsequently, an alternative proposal was prepared by Brazil and India, asking for more radical reductions in production subsidies and other domestic support measures provided by developed countries, along with improvement in market access for all products. However, the developed countries did not approve of the G-21 draft, and instead submitted a new proposal known as the Derbez Draft, which developing countries’ negotiators claimed was simply a repackaging of the old EC-US draft paper. Due to a lack of consensus amongst developed and developing countries, especially on the modalities of agriculture trade, the Cancún ministerial collapsed, thereby threatening the accomplishment of the Doha mandate. It should be noted that the G-21 itself was born of geopolitical impulses; the Brasilia Declaration in 2003 between India, Brazil and South Africa, which created the IBSA grouping, was a key impetus (Veiga 2005, p. 111).

Despite failing to achieve any tangible results at Cancún, sentiment in India was positive. Cancún’s failure was seen as providing confidence that the concerns of developing countries could not be ignored in future negotiations. India’s delegation faced heavy criticism during and after the conference, which the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, Arun Jaitley later described thus:

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4 For the detailed list of specific areas of interest to India, see India and the WTO, ‘Jaitley consults all stakeholders’, vol. 5, no. 1, August 2003.
5 In 2003, the G-20 comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. With Egypt and then Kenya’s participation, the group came to be known as the G-21 and then G-22 (temporarily). For details see Narlikar and Tussie (2004).
7 For the detailed proposal, see India and the WTO, ‘India and other developing countries give their response to EC – US farm proposals’, vol. 5, no. 1, August 2003.
8 For details on Derbez Draft see World Trade Organization, document JOB(03)/150/Rev.2 dated 13 September 2003.
I am sure that all would recognise the fact that the intensity of the reaction on issues that have social, economic and political repercussions affecting millions of people would be directly proportional to the extent of the provocation [at Cancún]. (Jaitley 2003).9

It was widely noted in the Indian press that India’s government was at that point going into a national election, and was struggling with agricultural distress given that it had faced several droughts during its tenure. However, India’s negotiating position was carefully positioned as protecting the interests of developing countries in general. This was the narrative put out by India’s ministerial delegation. It was noted, however, that while a strong stance on certain issues relevant to developing and least-developed countries would help in creating a significant place for these countries in the WTO, it would also stall the progress of multilateral negotiations. That continuing deadlock was well captured in the failure of the Seattle and Cancún ministerials.

India recognised this concern, as a stalwart supporter of the multilateral trading system. The new central government started informal discussions amongst members of the G-21 in the following year after the Cancún conference to reconcile contentious issues with developed countries.10 Ahead of the sixth ministerial conference held in Hong Kong in 2005, there were discussions amongst developed and developing countries on the draft text of the July 2004 Framework Agreement, prepared by WTO officials in Geneva. The discussions held at Geneva did not produce any substantial outcome but paved the way for future trade negotiations in Hong Kong. Also, it witnessed rich nations (EU and US) acceding partially to the farm sector demands of the developing countries such as India (Times of India, 4 August 2004).

The establishment of the G-21 helped India to build a robust representation in agriculture trade negotiations at the Hong Kong ministerial conference. Another coalition, the G-33, emerged before this ministerial specifically to advance food security and livelihood interests of the developing countries. The policy focus of this new grouping was more specific than of the G-21: it wished to ensure the realisation of two methods of protecting agricultural production and producers, ‘Special Products’ and the ‘Special Safeguard Mechanism’. Through these coalitions, India succeeded in finding broader support for its position – a position that owed a great deal to the exigencies of domestic politics – on protecting the interests of large rural communities. At Hong Kong, India not just voiced its concerns

10 ‘G-20 meeting was held on 11 and 12 December 2003 in Brasilia to discuss and coordinate positions on proceeding with agricultural negotiations with an aim to achieve progress in the Doha Round’. India and the WTO, ‘G-20 Ministerial Communiqué’, vol. 5, no. 12, December 2003.
but also presented these as a spokesperson for the least-developed countries.¹¹

The issues with the highest priority for India at the Hong Kong ministerial included negotiations on agriculture and services, non-agriculture market access, trade-related intellectual property rights, trade and environment, trade facilitation, and other issues of the Doha mandate.¹² The sixth ministerial was important as it aided in breaking the impasse created on agriculture, services and other issues during earlier trade discussions. The developed world conceded to the demands of the developing economies to eliminate export subsidies by the end of 2013, with substantive reductions planned by 2010. In regard to industrial sector liberalisation, a “less than full reciprocity” principle for developing countries was incorporated in the declaration. A notable change came about in the services sector, with the Hong Kong ministerial declaration freeing the developing countries of any obligation to liberalise it. Kamal Nath, who led the Indian delegation at Hong Kong, appreciated this outcome:

As far as India is concerned, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration finally agreed upon addresses our core concerns and interests and provides us enough negotiating space for future work leading up to modalities. The text has positive development content, which would need to be built upon and fully realized in the next stage of negotiations. (Nath 2005).¹³

It was unanimously agreed to in the ministerial that the modalities for negotiations on agriculture and industrial sector liberalisation would be established by April 2006. However, due to differences between developed and developing countries, this deadline could not be met. While India demanded deeper tariff reductions on agriculture imports into developed countries, the US wanted greater market access for their industrial goods and services (banking and telecommunications in particular) in India and Brazil (Karmakar, Kumar & Debroy 2007, p. 24).

Hong Kong was a turning point in many ways, as the negotiations there reflected both India’s pivotal position and its changing economy. India was slowly becoming a services superpower, including in telecommunications and telecommunications-enabled services provision; and it played a central role in diluting opposition among the larger group of developing countries to “Annex C” of the Hong Kong

¹¹ India lent a voice to the concerns of the least developed countries and ended up with the WTO membership agreeing to five least developed countries’ specific proposals. For details see India and the WTO, ‘Hong Kong Ministerial Secures Our Core Concerns and Interests’, vol. 7, no. 12, December 2005.

¹² For details on issues included in the agenda for Hong Kong ministerial in 2005, see India and the WTO, ‘Towards Hong Kong’, vol. 7, no. 10–11, October–November 2005.

¹³ Statement made by Kamal Nath, Commerce and Industry Minister, in the Lok Sabha on 21 December 2005 on the outcome of the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. For details see India and the WTO, ‘Hong Kong Ministerial secures our core concerns and interests’, vol. 7, no. 12, December 2005.
declaration\textsuperscript{14} that dealt with the accelerated liberalisation of services trade.

It is possible that this activism on India’s part reflected not just the determination that its IT-enabled services would benefit, but also the desire to open up investment in insurance and other similar sectors related to the management of long-term capital. This eventually became a serious point of division between Nath’s Congress Party, which led the governing coalition, and the communists whom the coalition depended on for its parliamentary majority. In fact, Nath’s position at Hong Kong was seen by the communists as a betrayal of the third world, and as “collaboration” with the developed countries (Mukhopadhyay & Bose 2006). Certainly, it was clear that India used its position as a leader of the developing countries to create a declaration that reflected the priorities of its swiftly growing economy – subject to the constraints of domestic politics.

Since India is a firm supporter of a rules-based multilateral trading system, it demanded a resumption of Doha Round trade talks in February 2007. The talks collapsed again as India and the US failed to reach consensus on issues such as agriculture trade liberalisation and non-agriculture market access. Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath was disappointed with the potential impasse, but declared that he was satisfied with his efforts aimed at protecting the interests of the poor and subsistence farmers in the country (Castle & Landler 2008). India was seen as being the sole holdout at the conference, as it insisted on an easier trigger for the special safeguard mechanisms that protected domestic farmers from sudden price changes. The Indian government was going into a general election in which it would rely on farmers’ votes; indeed, a large forgiveness programme for agricultural debt was being simultaneously planned. The failure of the conference allowed Nath to present himself at home as willing to brave international opprobrium in order to protect India’s farmers, which paid political dividends.

The next ministerial conference at Geneva in 2009, however, marked the breakthrough in trade discussions among developing and developed countries. It was a regular conference in the sense that it was not organised to hold negotiation sessions, but rather to review and assess the progress of WTO activities in all member countries. India, with a freshly re-elected government, participated in the meeting with a more constructive agenda, suggesting a way forward in concluding the Doha Round by the end of 2010. The protectionist response in certain quarters to the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008 led unsurprisingly to calls to resist protectionism through reviving multilateral trade talks. If not for the financial crisis, the Doha Round might well have been declared dead. But, as it happened, the Indian government took the lead in re-infusing energy in

\textsuperscript{14} For details on the Draft on Services in the Hong Kong Ministerial Text - Annex C, see World Trade Organization, document WT/MIN(05)/W/3 dated 7 December 2005.
the process, gathering trade ministers from over 30 countries in New Delhi in September 2009 (Indian Express, 5 September 2009, p. 1). This may have been the first time that India pro-actively took the initiative in re-launching global negotiations. It reflected also its increasingly important status at the G-20 grouping formed after the financial crisis in arguing against protectionism, even as world trade stagnated. India had a responsibility not just to the G-33 group of food producers and consumers, but also to the G-20 that now saw itself as running the world economy.

The policy stance adopted by India at Geneva displayed more flexibility than earlier, in order to push for the resumption of trade talks, along with an implicit message to adhere to the Doha development mandate for any negotiations and demands. The new geopolitical environment – in which India was seen as crucial to creating momentum for economic cooperation at a time of crisis – could be seen as underlying its actions at trade negotiations more than its commitment to developing nations generally.

During the eighth ministerial conference in 2011, the then Minister of Commerce, Industry and Textiles, Anand Sharma, expressed concerns about the rising trends of protectionism amongst WTO members thus: ‘We have a peculiar situation where the harbingers of free trade have themselves started looking inwards.’ (Sharma 2011, p. 1). India was steadfast in advocating for full implementation of duty-free, quota-free market access to the least-developed countries, preferably by July 2012. At this ministerial conference, India prioritised calling for services waivers and other concessions for the least developed countries, along with finding ways to move forward on the Doha Development Round. The threat to multilateral trade liberalisation was redefined as not being protectionism, but instead the growing interest in “plurilateral” trade agreements, between large numbers of like-minded countries. This conference, for the first time, saw the BRICS grouping – which had just been formed in April 2011 with the addition of South Africa – meeting to coordinate their positions at WTO negotiations; India, although it continued to be the poorest member of BRICS, and had substantively different interests historically from some of the other BRICS countries, was looking forward, and repositioning itself away from presenting itself solely as the champion of the least developed countries at the WTO.

The Bali ministerial conference held in December 2013 is of specific importance

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15 The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Anand Sharma stated that, ‘Demands for additional market access in developing countries have to be based on the development mandate…’ He further declared that, ‘While we have no problem of engaging in any format to move the negotiations forward, the multilateral process…..has to be basic mode of negotiations’. World Trade Organization, document WT/MIN(09)/ST/35 dated 30 November 2009 (Statement by Anand Sharma, Minister for Commerce and Industry at Seventh Session of the Ministerial Conference held in Geneva from 30 November to 2 December 2009).
to developing and less-developed countries as it took a step forward in addressing their long overdue concerns in areas of agriculture, food security, among others. During this conference, the member countries established consensus on the first ever multilateral agreement on trade facilitation and India sought to aid in the process of consensus. It was perhaps the first time in many years that India did not act primarily as a visible spoiler in multilateral trade talks (Palit 2013, p. 1). However, India stayed focused on pursuing its agricultural agenda and showed particular inflexibility in its stance on food security – but it did not specifically use that inflexibility as a reason to block negotiations elsewhere. Indian negotiators’ clear support of the interests of subsistence farmers at the WTO reflected an emerging internal political consensus; as the country moved towards yet another general election campaign, the government’s food security law had been passed with approval across parties. Protection of farmers’ interests and the prices that they received for their produce was thus redefined as being a question of food security, rather than agricultural protection, reflecting the changing internal debate in India – which no longer saw itself as a country of farmers but as a country of consumers. Minister of Commerce and Industry, Anand Sharma, while backing the Bali Package, noted that ‘[…] without a satisfactory decision on food security, we considered the Bali Package as lacking in horizontal balance […]’ (Sharma 2013).

The Bali Package, although limited in its mandate, was a landmark deal in itself as it reinstated the development focus of the Doha Round. India succeeded in securing an interim solution on the issue of public stockholding of food grains at administered prices (or minimum support prices in case of India). This interim solution is to continue till a permanent solution is sought on this issue, which is slated for discussion at the eleventh ministerial conference in 2017.

Yet, after the change in government in India in 2014, there was a drastic change in India’s attitude towards the Trade Facilitation Agreement that had emerged from Bali. India decided to hold up the signing of the Trade Facilitation Agreement. In particular, India used the Trade Facilitation Agreement as a bargaining chip in defence of the protection of its domestic cereals procurement programme, which would have likely run afoul of public stockholding rules.

India, however, failed to find support for its position; its BRICS partners, for example, did not stand with it in opposing movement on trade facilitation until public stockholding rules were amended. News of India’s decision broke while

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16 Statement by Anand Sharma, Minister of Commerce and Industry in Parliament on the Ninth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Bali.

17 The mandate of the Bali Package is limited in the sense as it included only a few main issues. The Bali Package comprised of the Bali Ministerial Declaration (including post-Bali work), decisions and a declaration on the Doha Round on this set of main issues, and decisions on regular WTO work under the General Council. See ‘Bali Package and November 2014 decisions’, World Trade Organization.
Secretary of State John Kerry was actually in New Delhi for the India-US Strategic and Economic dialogue, and led to a spate of articles and statements questioning the business-friendly credentials of India’s new government. This was seen as a sharp divergence from India’s decade-long move from “obstructive” champion of the developing world to consensus-building emerging power.

Perhaps in response, the 2015 ministerial conference in Nairobi saw an India much more willing to seek consensus. The Nairobi declaration for the first time did not include general reaffirmation of the Doha development agenda – suggesting that the Doha Round was even more dead than in 2008. India was one of the countries that chose to reaffirm the principles underlying Doha, and highlighted in its rhetoric all the issues it had previously insisted on such as public stockholding, special safeguard measure etc. Nonetheless, the conference was ineffectual in all these areas and was viewed by the government’s domestic critics as disproportionately favouring the developed countries who pressed for a termination of the Doha Round and inclusion of new issues in future negotiating mandates.

There was a noticeable change in India’s negotiating position during this ministerial. India’s rhetoric was largely unchanged, but it pressed less at the negotiating table, which resulted in no binding outcomes in agriculture, and which rather pushed the developmental concerns of developing and less-developed countries to the backburner (Kanth 2016, p. 45). Indian ministers’ flexibility in trade negotiations at Nairobi at the stake of its previously-defined interests suggested that definitions of the national interest were slowly changing, perhaps in response to a greater need for foreign investment. For instance, India agreed on export competition without securing a permanent solution on public stockholding or commitments on special safeguard mechanisms.

At Nairobi, India failed, perhaps deliberately, to argue firmly for its agriculture-related concerns. In addition, green room negotiations held amongst only five countries (US, EU, Brazil, China and India), excluding other 159 WTO members, seriously impaired the FIT approach (full participation, inclusivity, transparency) adopted by the WTO during the seventh ministerial conference in Geneva. India did not immediately translate the pre-eminence it gained through its inclusion in the green room talks into any substantial benefits as defined by its pre-stated interests and aims. The Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Nirmala Sitharaman, stressed the importance of agricultural reforms, public stockholding for food security for developing countries, Africa, and other less-developed countries during her statement – but did not demand a permanent solution immediately, as her predecessors might have done in the past.
Table 1: India’s Concerns and Position in various WTO Ministerial Conferences held during the Doha Round, 2001-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>India’s Concerns and Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Ministeral Conference (2001)</td>
<td>Doha</td>
<td>India departs from its protectionist stance, but it opposes the inclusion of any new issues (especially “Singapore” issues) in the WTO mandate. Areas of concern include: elimination of tariff peaks and escalations in export products of developing countries, reduction in agricultural subsidies and any domestic support provided by developed countries, more flexibility to developing countries under the special and differential treatment, negotiations on services especially movement of natural persons across border (Mode 4).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fifth Ministerial Conference (2003)</td>
<td>Cancún</td>
<td>India becomes an active participant in multilateral trade negotiations, voicing concerns of the developing countries as a coalition. Areas of concern include: 1. reduction in agricultural subsidies and non-tariff barriers in industrial products by developed countries, 2. service sector liberalisation (Mode 1 and Mode 4), 3. resolution of impasse in areas of public health and intellectual property rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Ministerial Conference (2005)</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>India becomes a spokesman for the concerns of least-developed countries, the ministerial declaration largely favours Indian interests. Areas of concern include: 4. deeper tariff reduction commitments, and elimination of export subsidies, any trade distorting support by developed countries in agriculture, 5. greater non-agricultural market access (products of export interest to developing countries), 6. less-than full reciprocity in industrial sector for developing countries, 7. progress on services sector negotiations (Mode 1 and Mode 4).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Seventh Ministerial Conference (2009)
**Geneva**
India participates with a constructive agenda post a deadlock created two years earlier and re-launches global trade negotiations. Policy stance is more flexible.
Areas of concern include:
8. significant reduction in domestic support and tariffs on agriculture products by developed countries,
9. ensuring food and livelihood security of farmers and other vulnerable communities in developing and least-developed countries,
10. demand for flexibilities in non-agricultural market access negotiations

### Eighth Ministerial Conference (2011)
**Geneva**
India advocates for concerns of least-developed countries (service waivers and other concessions), and argues against plurilateral trade agreements. Calls for making the multilateral trading system more fair and inclusive. Major concern – to prevent the Doha Round from collapse.

### Ninth Ministerial Conference (2013)
**Bali**
India supports the first ever multilateral agreement on trade facilitation (one of the Singapore issues). However, it remains firm on not compromising with the food security issue.
Areas of concern include:
11. ensuring food and livelihood security for farmers through public stockholding programs,
12. protecting interests of the least-developed countries,
13. special and differential treatment for developing countries.

### Tenth Ministerial Conference (2015)
**Nairobi**
India moderates its negotiating stance; however, the issues of specific concern remain to be centred around agriculture, farmers, special safeguard measures etc. Also, adopts a more open approach towards new issues (export competition), suggesting a change in national interest and priorities.

*Source: Authors’ compilation using India ministerial statements and the WTO Newsletter of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India*

### Shifts and Consistencies in India’s Approach at the WTO
During the GATT years, India was generally considered obstructionist, and noted for its defiance of the principles of reciprocity that remain at the core of the treaty (Narlikar 2006, p. 62). Given that India followed an inward-oriented development policy, aimed at promoting self-sufficiency, India demanded special and favourable treatment exempting itself from reciprocating any tariff reductions by the industrialised countries. It, however, framed this in terms of a general responsibility towards less developed countries – a framing which in fact led to the development of the Doha development round, even as India’s own economy began to look structurally different.
Views diverge on whether India’s defensive stance at the GATT negotiations produced counterproductive outcomes. Srinivasan (2003) argues that India’s resolve on non-reciprocity and differential treatment made little sense in policy terms, as it imposed high costs on the economy. He further states that the only rational and logical way to recognise the disparities in levels of development amongst member states is through longer phase-in periods for the same commitments. On the contrary, Narlikar (2006) observes, ‘Its [India’s] proactive interests in the GATT were limited. As a result, its strategy of minimal involvement in reciprocal bargaining in the GATT had few costs’. Baru (2013) endorses this view: ‘Since India’s economic strategy was based on import substitution and export pessimism, planners did not consider its defensive approach to GATT and lack of interest in carving out a larger share of the world market as counterproductive’. Following the beginning of the liberalisation period in 1991, India made a shift to a more open economy, however, the nature of multilateral engagement initially continued to be the same (Mattoo & Subramanian 2003, p. 327).

Despite India pursuing a tough and defensive negotiating style at the GATT and the WTO, the behaviour of trade negotiators has shown considerable consistency across the interest areas over time, especially in terms of rhetorical emphases. The major stated areas of concern to India in all ministerial conferences have been agriculture, food security, services, trade facilitation and the protection of rural livelihoods. Indian ministers have time and again through their statements indicated the heavy political weight attached at home to the farm sector and subsistence farmers. This public stance is shaped largely by domestic interests: Agriculture and food security is a major concern of the Indian government. This concern about protecting the farm sector is shared by other developing countries, which led to the formation of the G-21 and G-33 groupings. Notably, the consequent failure to liberalise agricultural trade prevents Indian farmers from exploiting the potential comparative advantage in products such as rice, sugar, dairy products, among others (Mattoo & Subramanian 2003, p. 340).

However, there have been some noticeable shifts in India’s approach in case of a few issue areas such as services and trade facilitation. Initially, during the Uruguay Round, India strongly opposed the inclusion of trade in services in the WTO mandate. With the launch of the Doha Round and the altering structure of India’s domestic economy, a change in negotiating position on services trade is clearly visible. India became more forthcoming in the services negotiations post-2005 by liberalising more sectors, including some domestically sensitive sectors, with an aim to receive greater access to developed countries’ markets – particularly in Mode 1 and Mode 4 services (Chanda & Gopalan 2007, p. 175). These were seen by some as a betrayal of its earlier alliances in the developing world.

The introduction of negotiations on trade facilitation was also opposed by India
when they were first suggested as part of the ‘Singapore issues’ in 1996. India nonetheless became interested in discussing trade facilitation issues in the Cancún ministerial conference in 2003, after the introduction of a National Manufacturing Policy (which subsequently became ‘Make in India’) that recognised the importance of slashing transaction costs for improving India’s global trade competitiveness.

Towards a New Position on Global Trade Governance

The 2016 election in the United States heralded a new political climate in the West that is significantly less enthused about the benefits of globalisation – and about multilateral trade deals. US President Donald Trump has specifically argued that he loves the word “reciprocity” when it comes to such deals, which pushes against the principle of development-oriented multilateralism at the heart of the Doha Round.

Thus, just as concerns about galloping protectionism after the 2008 financial crisis concerns forced India to take a more pro-active role on global trade governance, India clearly has an incentive to restate the benefits of trade multilateralism. This would be in keeping with not just its post-2008 positioning, but also the broad thrust of its past negotiations. Trade multilateralism is in India’s interest, as a country seeking to expand its share of world trade from a measly 2 per cent; but it can also be framed as being in the interest of a broader set of countries. This tendency, to seek to represent group interests that reflect India’s own domestic priorities, has been a feature of the Indian approach to global trade governance in the past.

In other discussions over the norms and rules of global governance, such as the administration of the internet or climate change negotiations, India has not-so-subtly moved in the five years before 2017 towards being a consensus-builder rather than a conscientious objector. In each case, this is recognition of the reality that its own position has changed, as have its own interests. A similar shift might well be underway in trade negotiations, but needs to be made more explicit.

In other words, India needs to stop presenting itself as an agriculture-focused nation when its expressed domestic priorities are to move away to being a more traditional manufacturing and entrepreneurship-based economy. While millions of Indians continue to depend on the agricultural sector for their livelihoods, reform of domestic supply chains and the growth of non-farm rural employment suggests that the time is ripe for modernisation of the sector. The government has begun to consider moving towards forms of support for the rural poor that do not involve excessive public procurement, such as direct income support or even basic incomes, as outlined in the 2017 Economic Survey. Many farmers rightly com-
plain that the interests of the urban consumer determine trade policy in any case – export restrictions are placed on agricultural commodities when world prices are high, in order to control urban food inflation. A strong argument that agricultural protectionism in fact exist to defend India’s farmers is thus no longer sustainable. Given the government’s intention to increase access to skills and to entrepreneurship through such programmes as Skill India, Startup India, and the MUDRA loan scheme, it is clear that efforts are underway to create alternative sources of livelihood. India’s priorities when it comes to global trade must reflect the existing and planned changes to its domestic economy – rather than adapting to changed realities only with a lag, as has been the case in the past.

The Indian national interest thus needs to be redefined more broadly. Given its national priorities and its development trajectory, India increasingly has more in common with Asian countries that seek to open up export markets, attract investment, reduce transaction costs and improve competitiveness, than with primary goods producers. It will have to take up at the WTO the sort of coalition-building role that it has owned in other spheres of global governance. In doing so, its legacy as a leader of the developing world need not be seen as a hindrance; as this paper has argued, at each stage, the primacy was given to Indian national interests and political compulsions as much as to its broader rhetorical positioning on North-South issues.

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Abstract

One of the key issues debated today in assessing India’s rise is its role in global and regional governance. This paper attempts to assess India’s changing approach towards regionalism and argues that unlike the Nehruvian approach that overlooked South Asia in region building efforts, the new regional approach gives equal emphasis to South Asia regionalism and the wider Indo-Pacific regionalism. The paper asserts that India’s new leadership role in region building stems from its own self-interest as well as the interests of the wider region. The paper also examines the main factors driving India’s new regional approach and the strategic challenges in evolving an effective role in regional governance.

Keywords

Regionalism, India, Regional Governance, SAARC, BIMSTEC

Introduction

India is today a member of several trans-regional, regional and sub-regional groupings. As India rises, there is recognition that for its own interests it needs to consider the wider regional as well as global interests. On the one hand, India today sees global and regional multilateral mechanisms as platforms to engage with the outside world to meet the expectations from a rising power. On the other hand, India needs global and regional multilateral organisations to meet its own rising aspirations. A ‘new narrative’ in world politics of the twenty-first century is the ‘power shift’ from the West to the East. Though some scholars continue to challenge the notion that there is a major power shift underway (Cox 2012). At the core of this new narrative is the rise of China and India. Recent years have increasingly seen the inability of existing global institutions effectively managing
international crises. Within this context, a continuing debate is the role of rising powers in global governance and their impact on world politics (Mahbubani & Chesterman 2010; Kahler 2014).

Like other rising powers, India’s ‘willingness’ and ‘ability’ to take on greater international responsibilities is debated (Acharya 2011). However, there are some instances where India has been playing an active contributing role in global governance in issue areas such as climate change and multilateral trade negotiations (Narlikar 2017; Saran 2012). The paradox of India’s rise is that while there is a clear positive trend in its role in global governance, regional governance remains locked in geopolitics. South Asia is a region where despite the existence of a pan-South Asian organisation SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) for over three decades, it is yet to implement a single all SAARC project. The South Asia Satellite launched in May 2017 is case in point. The failure of SAARC framework meant that India’s ability to contribute to regional governance has been severely limited, if not completely closed. As India’s strategic interests widens in South Asia and beyond, it finds itself in direct geopolitical competition with a rising China whose interests and influence has been rapidly growing in these regions.

This paper assesses India’s approach towards regionalism in South Asia and beyond. The paper first looks at regionalism in the South Asian context and attempts to locate India’s approach towards regionalism. In so doing, it maps out India’s changing perceptions of the utility of regional and sub-regional institutions. It identifies the key differences between the Nehruvian approach and Delhi’s new regional approach. The paper also argues that unlike the past, New Delhi today views joining and building regional and sub-regional institutions as an important way of advancing its foreign policy interests. Further, it argues that while addressing increasing Chinese influence in the immediate and wider region is one factor driving India’s changing perceptions of regional institutions, New Delhi also increasingly views its involvement in regional and sub-regional institutions as a vital instrument to further its interests independent of China’s actions. Finally, the paper concludes with a few observations as well as challenges.

**Regionalism - The Concept**

The concept of ‘region’ differs from discipline to discipline. However, whether it is in comparative politics or international relations most scholars agree that regions are socially constructed. As Hettne (2005, p.544) put it: ‘…all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested.’ Because regions are constructed, the most important aspect to understand region depends on how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of ‘regionness’ (Hettne 2005, p. 544). Furthermore, in this fast changing world increasingly driven and shaped
by technology, some observers anticipate that the idea of ‘region’ may undergo radical changes and in the near future the world may have ‘virtual regions’ where people with shared interest or belief from different parts of the world come together to form forums using technology (Jarrar 2016). Even so, in the narrower definition of region, the element of ‘geographic proximity’ is seen as essential (Behr & Jokeia 2011). South Asia as a region lacks clarity of a geographical ‘vision’ (Michael 2013, p. 15) i.e. where South Asia begins and where it ends. In recent years, the emphasis on the elements of regions have been shifting from geography to ‘political and ideational character of regions’ (Behr & Jokeia 2011, p. 4). South Asia has been atypical when seen from this perspective. It emerged from a region “characterised by political disharmony and strategic schism”, unlike other regionalism projects where “…politico-strategic harmony [forms] a vital factor in stimulating and facilitating close and extensive cooperative linkages, including those in security and strategic areas” (Muni 1985 pp. 391-92; Tiwari 1985). The idea of a regional grouping in South Asia emerged from within a diverse set of interests among its member states. These political and strategic divergences continue to affect SAARC even today after three decades of its existence. Given this characteristic, South Asia has been a ‘formal’ region rather than a ‘real’ region. The existence of SAARC as the basis to define South Asia as a ‘region’ is but notional because of the lack of shared strategic interests among its member-states.

From the regional security perspective, the ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’ (RSCT) of the Copenhagen School (Buzan & Waever 2003) explains that the rivalry between India and Pakistan defines South Asia security complex. This ‘pattern’ of South Asian security dynamics has not changed, but with its rise, India’s security interests has expanded beyond the confines South Asia. India’s own interests to safeguard its interests in its neighbourhood and to reach out to nations in the Indo-Pacific region, on the one hand and China’s growing strategic entry in South Asia, on the other has reinforced the strategic rivalry between India and China both in the subcontinent as well as in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Hence, there is a growing tendency of India finding itself in the ‘Asian supercomplex’. It is within this strategic context that India’s perceptions towards regional and subregional institutions have been evolving.

From the ‘narrow focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances’ that existed up until the 1970s, the concept of ‘regionalism’ has undergone drastic changes. By the mid-1980s, a worldwide phenomenon emerged which came to be known as the ‘new regionalism’ (Fawcett 1995). Analysing the new phenomenon, Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, p. 3) noted that in contrary to the ‘old regionalism’ that emerged in the context of the Cold War politics, major structural changes in the global system including multipolarity caused the emergence of the new regionalism. Identifying the basic characteristics of the new regionalism, Hettne
and Söderbaum (1998) argue that the new regionalism is ‘comprehensive’, ‘multifaceted’ and ‘multidimensional’ and unlike the old regionalism it involves ‘more spontaneous processes’ that often emerge ‘from below’ and from within the region itself.’ In the new regionalism, the level and process of regionalisation takes place at interregional, interstate as well as subnational (subregional) levels. Moreover, the new regionalism is ‘extroverted’ rather than ‘introverted’ and thus supports ‘open regionalism’ (Hettne & Söderbaum 1998).

India’s Evolving Regional Approach

The bipolar politics greatly shaped India’s approach towards regionalism in the post-independence period. India was not averse to the idea of regionalism per se, but the notion of ‘region’ for the Indian leadership then was much broader that encompasses the entire Asian continent. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru actively initiated and participated in several political conferences involving nations from South and Southeast Asia in the 1940s and 1950s including the Asian Relations Conference that was held in New Delhi in 1947, the Colombo Conference in 1954 and the Bandung Asian-African Conference of 1955. The broad contours that guided India’s early regional initiatives revolved around a couple of ideas—to promote cooperation among Asian and African nations and to contribute to world peace (Michael 2013, p.52). However, lack of defining a geographical scope or ‘regional clarity’ and objection to any form of ‘collective security’ meant that these initial efforts could not materialised into regional institutions ((Michael 2013, p.50-53). Moreover, India’s approach towards an Asian regionalism was politically oriented and ideologically driven, with economic cooperation figuring marginally (Michael 2013, p. 49). In his idealistic vision of building Asian unity and solidarity, Nehru:

at times inadvertently displayed a tendency to take the smaller neighbours for granted. …Nehru seldom thought in terms of assiduously building a community with the smaller immediate neighbours. If at all, he thought that such a community would be encompassed within the broader goal of Asian solidarity (Muni 2003, p. 187).

In Nehru’s vision of building region, the assumption was that the South Asian neighbours would join India in its efforts to construct an Asian regionalism. Even when Nehru called for a ‘South Asia Federation’, his notion of ‘South Asia’ involved Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq and Myanmar with only the last country sharing land boundary with India. Furthermore, Nehru’s active involvement in region building in Asia met with challenges with long terms implications. The negative attitude of smaller countries towards India’s efforts to regionalism meant that India was averse to take the leading role in building regionalism (Mohan 2016).
Even as India remained wary of the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia, by the late 1970s the need for a regional forum was felt and the thinking gained momentum. India showed initial hesitation for two reasons. First, India was concerned that a regional organisation may give the smaller neighbours to ‘gang up’ against it. This would have direct impact on its approach in dealing with its immediate neighbours negating its most preferred approach of bilateralism and open room for ‘regionalising’ bilateral issues. Second, India was also wary of majority decision-making being institutionalised. It felt this might affect its ‘freedom in foreign affairs’ (Dash 2008, p. 87). As voices grew among the smaller neighbours for the establishment of SAARC, India decided to join the regional grouping after ensuring that ‘unanimity on decisions at all levels, exclusion of bilateral and contentious issues, and unanimous approval for external assistance or intervention’ form the basic principles of the regional forum (Dash 2008, p. 87). The birth of SAARC marked a new chapter of regionalism in South Asia. It was the first regional organisation represented by seven countries of the region.

Sharing close historical, cultural, and geographical ties with all nations of South Asia, the region remains critical for India’s internal stability and development as well as in reaching out to the outside world. New Delhi also has its own self-interest to make the SAARC project work. The reason for this is not so much India’s belief in the future of SAARC but, more importantly, because a ‘dead SAARC at India’s behest will only make India’s neighbourhood policy more difficult and its international image more unpalatable’ (Muni 2003, p. 188). The roots of the new thinking could be found in the “Gujral Doctrine” that, in essence, sought to accommodate India’s smaller neighbours with good faith and trust without seeking reciprocity. In the past, one of the reasons why India was not keen about SAARC resulted from its belief that ‘India is unlikely to accrue substantial economic benefits from any SAARC arrangements’ (Dash 2008, p. 199). A key principle that guided India’s new regional approach since the 1990s was the notion of ‘collective prosperity’. Even as collective regional prosperity began to emerge in speeches of Indian leaders, political differences within SAARC remained an obstruction. An important dimension of ‘new regionalism’ is the ‘bottom-up approach’. The idea of sub-regional approach opened up new ways to build regionalism in South Asia. Some have described this as ‘sub-regionalism approach to regional integration in South Asia’ and ‘SAARC takes the road to sub-regionalism.’ This approach allowed New Delhi to circumvent the SAARC mechanism while addressed the much-needed collaboration with those neighbours willing to push for regional integration in South Asia.

The first such ‘collaborative sub-regionalism’ was experimented with South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) in 1997 involving four SAARC nations (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) with the aim to enhance ‘regional solidar-
ity and promoting overall development within SAARC’ with an emphasis on project-based development.\footnote{See The 9th SAARC Summit Declaration issued on 14 May 1997} In 2000, the South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme in the SAGQ was launched with assistance from Asian Development Bank (ADB) with six priority sectors that included transport, energy and power, tourism, environment, trade, investment, and private sector cooperation, and information and communication technology (Palit & Islam 2010). During this period, India also supported and participated in promoting other sub-regional and regional forums outside the SAARC framework. In the same year SAGQ was launched, India became a founding member of The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) involving South and Southeast Asia nations (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand). BIMSTEC’s key objective was to initiate cooperation among the littorals of the Bay of Bengal with particular focus on commerce, investment, technology, tourism, human resource development, agriculture, fisheries, transport and communication, textiles, leather.

By the turn of the century, India further pushed its eastward drive when it set up another sub-regional grouping with the mainland Southeast Asian nations. In 2000, India along with five of the Mekong nations (Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) established the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC). The MGC emphasised cooperation in the field of tourism, culture, education, and transportation linkages. In the same year, India and South Africa together launched the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) along with Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Yemen, Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique. The IOR-ARC’s main objectives were to promote sustainable growth and balanced development; economic cooperation for shared and mutual benefits and remove impediments and lower barriers towards a freer and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment, and technology among the member-states. These initiatives suggest that India recognised the benefits of cooperation in maintaining good relations with its neighbours. As Muni (2003, p. 186) observed:

*The Indian policy makers came to accept with various degrees of candour that India has a greater responsibility to work for the evolution of constructive and cooperative neighbourhood relationships, not only because it is big, but also because it is more resourceful. Furthermore, India would, perhaps, reap greater advantages in its overall foreign policy initiatives, if it enjoy a greater support and understanding of its neighbours and its efforts and attention is not unduly trapped within the South Asian region.*

However, the reorientation of India’s regional approach that began in the early
1990s, particularly with the launch of the ‘Look East’ policy followed by the ‘Gujral Doctrine’, took strategic dimensions only in the mid-2000s. By the turn of 20th century, the stakes for New Delhi to recalibrate its regional policy became even more urgent owing to developments both within India as well as in the neighbourhood, both having direct implications on India’s regional diplomacy. Two strategic factors, in particular, have significantly shaped India’s new regional approach (Yhome 2015). Domestically, the process of economic reforms that began in the 1990s led the country witness phenomenal economic growth. To sustain the new economic growth trajectory, one of the key concerns has been to ensure regional instability so that it does not hamper its growth (Saran 2006; Menon 2007; Mohan 2011). Another strategic factor relates to the China factor. As China’s increases its presence and influence in South Asia and beyond, the concern of losing influence in the region to China also grew larger in New Delhi’s regional calculations (Mohan 2007).

If the Gujral Doctrine emphasised the need for India to be more generous to its smaller neighbours as the bigger neighbour, the ‘Manmohan Singh Doctrine’ stressed the idea of sharing India’s rise with its neighbours with the hope that the region’s economy is tied to India’s and that instability in the neighbourhood does not adversely affect India’s growth. Taking the new regional approach forward in building an integrated neighbourhood, in 2007 India announced that as the largest country in SAARC it would open its market to the Least Developed Countries without insisting on reciprocity and further reduced the sensitive list in respect of these countries. India also strengthened its engagements with sub-regional groupings. For instance, membership in the sub-regional forum BIMSTEC was not only expanded to include Nepal and Bhutan in 2004 but also the forum decided to set up a permanent secretariat, and Dhaka was finalised as the location at the third BIMSTEC Summit in 2011. India also began to push for physical connectivity with its neighbours both to integrate the region with its economy as well as to tie these economies to its own. An important policy calibration has been to open up its frontiers to its neighbours for border trade. The need to push for SAARC regional connectivity, urgently, was also seen in the context of China’s growing involvement in trans-national connectivity in the region.

As part of the new thinking on regionalism of the 1990s, the realisation of deep interdependence in the security realm among South Asian nations where India cannot insulate itself also pushed New Delhi to reframe its regional security approach. This thinking allowed India to see itself as a regional leader as well as collaborate with neighbours in ensuring regional order and stability. A bilateral exercise launched in 1992 between India and the US, the Malabar, began as a familiarisation exercise between the navies of the two countries acquired greater geopolitical content by the mid-2000s involving interoperability exercises and...
with participation from more countries, though it revert back to the bilateral exercise following protest from China. The Indian Navy also began hosting the Milan exercise in 1995 with South and Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Singapore) with the aim to foster closer cooperation among navies of countries in the Indian Ocean region. An important initiative of the Indian Navy, part of India’s defence diplomacy with the Indian Ocean littorals, was the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Launched in 2008, the IONS aims ‘to increase maritime cooperation among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region…. [to help] preserve peaceful relations between nations, and thus is critical to building an effective maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean Region and is also fundamental to [the region’s] collective prosperity.’ With navies from 36 Indian Ocean littoral countries from South Asia, West Asia, East Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia, the IONS ‘seeks to increase maritime cooperation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues.’

With growing concerns over China’s rapidly expanding footprints in the Indian Ocean region and increasing non-traditional security threats, India also launched maritime cooperation with neighbouring Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 2011. A tripartite maritime security cooperation was signed in July 2013 with the aim to buttress maritime cooperation to secure sea routes in the Indian Ocean. Recognising the need for wider participation on the emerging issues of the Indian Ocean, New Delhi took the lead in creating new platforms for exchange of views among the IOR littorals. Giving a renewed push to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), at its 13th meeting of the Council of Ministers in Perth, Australia in November 2013, Indian External Affairs Minister announced New Delhi’s plans to host the Track 1.5 Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) to bring together scholars, experts and policy-makers from the Indian Ocean regional grouping to exchanges views. Similarly, India hosted the first Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean (TDIO) in November 2013 involving Australia, Indonesia and India. In the Indo-Pacific region, India’s role in shaping the emerging economic architecture of the region further opened up when its became a member of the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit (EAS) that emerged as a forum ‘for strategic dialogue and cooperation on political, security and economic issues of common regional concern and plays an important role in the regional architecture.’ India endorsed all the six priority areas of regional cooperation within the framework of the EAS that include environment and energy, education, finance, global health

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2 The MALABAR 2007 included participation of naval vessels from Japan, Australia and Singapore apart from India and the US.
4 See official website of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) at http://ions.gov.in/about_ions
issues and pandemic diseases, natural disaster management, and ASEAN Connectivity. Importantly, in 2012, ASEAN and the six FTA Partners of ASEAN, which includes India, launched the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and India has been actively participating in the RCEP negotiations.

Coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave a renewed push to the efforts towards an integrated neighbourhood by launching the ‘Neighbourhood First’ approach towards South Asia and demonstrated greater political will to shape the emerging security and economic dynamics in the wider Indo-Pacific region through the ‘Act East’ policy (Bhatnagar & Passi 2016). In the South Asia context, new hopes was raised of the revival of SAARC when Prime Minister Modi invited SAARC leaders to his swearing-in ceremony and after his speech at the 18th SAARC held in Kathmandu (Sidhu & Mehta 2014). A couple of recent developments suggest that India is willing to push for regional integration in South Asia. When Pakistan expressed its reservations on the SAARC-Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) during the Kathmandu Summit in 2014, India along with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal initiated a sub-regional initiative to enhance connectivity and signed the BBIN-MVA in 2015. In another initiative, India has shown generosity to its neighbours with its ‘gift’ of the South Asia satellite that can be used by neighbours for communication purposes. Here again, Pakistan is the only country that have opted itself out of the project. Speaking about the satellite, Prime Minister Modi said that his government’s motto is not limited to only India but extended in the ‘global context’ and that the ‘capacities of the satellite and the facilities it provides will go a long way in addressing South Asia’s economic and development priorities’ (ENS 1 May 2017). After the launch of the satellite on 5 May 2017, Prime Minister Modi said ‘the advanced space technology [was] for the cause of growth and prosperity of our brothers and sisters in South Asia…. With this launch, we have started a journey to build the most advanced frontier of our partnership’ (ENS 7 May 2017).

At the sub-regional level, the Modi government further strengthened groupings such as the BIMSTEC, the SESEC/BBIN and the MGC as part of the Act East policy with the aim to accelerate the integration process in the region. For instance, India pledged to contribute 32 per cent of the annual expenditure on BIMSTEC’s permanent secretariat in Dhaka. Similarly, during the eighth MGC Senior officials’ Meeting held in New Delhi on 7 April 2017, India offered 15 more scholarships to the Mekong countries together with existing scholarships. Another development that underlines India’s eastward drive at the sub-regional level is the expansion of the SASEC programme of the ADB to include Myanmar as its seventh member. The inclusion of Myanmar is seeing as ‘key to realizing greater connectivity and stronger trade and economic relations between the SASEC sub-region and the countries of East and Southeast Asia’ (PIB 1 April
In the Indian Ocean region, the Modi government has taken major policy initiatives to promote collective action and integrated maritime security coordination. Prime Minister Modi’s vision of the Indian Ocean region was outlined in 2015 in the acronym SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). At the commissioning of Indian-made patrol vessel Barracuda that India exported to Mauritius, Prime Minister Modi said: ‘Our goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other’s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation’ (PIB 2017b). Prime Minister Modi sketch out India’s ambitions of strengthening regional mechanisms for maritime cooperation and sought the involvement of ‘Mauritius, Seychelles and other nations in the region’ to join the India–Sri Lanka–Maldives trilateral initiative. As part of this initiative, the Indian government have set up the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) with the sole purpose ‘to track ships in real time and to assess threats at sea’. India has been in talks with several countries in the Indian Ocean region to enter in data-sharing agreement on white shipping. This ambition took concrete shape with signing of agreements with island-nations (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles) in the Indian Ocean and with the installation of Coastal Surveillance Radar System that are to provide IMAC with real-time data (Saint-Mézard 2016). India has also been strengthening closer security ties with the key players in the Indo-Pacific region. This could be seen in the expansion of the Malabar exercise as it acquired a trilateral status with the inclusion of Japan and the setting up of the Japan–India–Australia trilateral in 2015 (Lang 2015).

**Differences Between the Nehruvian Approach and Delhi’s New Regional Approach**

The above discussion lays out the evolution of India’s approach to regional multilateral organisation. As noted earlier, ‘regions’ are constructed and re-constructed. Interestingly, the ideas of the current Indian leadership in the construction of an ‘Indo-Pacific region’ is similar to Nehru’s vision of constructing an Asian community in the post-independence period. This commonality however signify a continuing ‘uncertainty about geographical scope’ (Michael 2013, p. 50). Beyond this lack of ‘regional geographical clarity’, there are significant differences between the Nehruvian approach and the current regional approach of India. First, in the early years of its independence, India envisioned a much broader regionalism overlooking South Asia. In the current thinking, equal emphasis is given to both the two constructs (South Asia and Indo-Pacific). India’s present two-pronged strategy in pushing regionalism are: On the one hand, India is building South Asia regionalism through a “bottom-up” approach with innovative ideas such as
sub-regionalism. Given its centrality in South Asia, there is a considered opinion that regionalism cannot grow without India's active support. Unlike the first wave of regionalism, the current Indian regionalism efforts is not only aware of South Asia's critical position in achieving its global ambitions but also constructing a wider regionalism encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean is inevitable as India's strategic interests expands beyond its backyard.

Second, as noted earlier, the Nerhuvian approach of building regionalism was largely political and ideological in nature driven by the 'common anti-colonial sentiment' among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Contrary to this, the new Indian regional approach is driven by strategic interests. Several ideas, concepts and principles have been driving and guiding India's new regional approach. The first idea is ‘intertwined destiny.’ The idea that India is willing to give its immediate neighbours a stake in its own prosperity has become a priority in its neighbourhood policy for some time. This notion is driven by the logic that India's immediate neighbourhood is a prerequisite for it to achieve regional and global ambitions. A crisis-ridden neighbourhood would keep India preoccupied. Furthermore, the urgency for India to reset its neighbourhood policy has been shaped by China's growing economic presence and influence in India's sub-continental neighbourhood. Failing to integrate the sub-continent with its economy would increase the potential of South Asian nations to look towards China to fulfil their developmental needs with long-term strategic implications for India (Gulati 2015).

Third, in the first wave of Indian regionalism, New Delhi was against any ‘collective defence’ pact. In the current approach, new concept has been employed that allows India to enter into regional security arrangements. The concept of ‘cooperative security’ emphasises peaceful means to dealing with conflicts through negotiations and confidence-building measures (Mohan 2006, p. 352). Importantly, cooperative security is ‘premised on the assumption that states will act in their own self-interest’ (Mohan 2006, p. 353). India recognises that an unstable South Asia could guarantee neither its economic development nor its security. In this sense, as in the economic realm, the need to engage the region in security is based on its own self-interest. Encouraged by signs of cooperative security between India and Pakistan soon after their respective nuclear tests in the late 1990s when both agreed to avoid nuclear war, there was hope of a beginning for ‘a cooperative security regime’ in South Asia was taking shape (Mohan 2006, p. 352). However, such hope were dash in the context of continued hostilities and tensions between India and Pakistan. By the turn of the century, New Delhi was determined to explore new ways to make the concept relevant where opportunities exist, even if that means minus Pakistan. As discussed above, India has precisely taken forward the idea of building maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
BIMSTEC: India’s Road to Regionalism

With the regional grouping SAARC making little headway, the idea of sub-regionalism to push for regional integration has become the prime driver of India’s regional integration building in South Asia and beyond. This could be seen both in the economic field as well as in the security domain. The BIMSTEC is a classic example of the incremental approach to regionalism. The unique position of the seven-member BIMSTEC presents itself fittingly in New Delhi’s diplomatic calculus. The strategic salience of the BIMSTEC for India can be ascertained when seen through India’s sub-regions (Yhome 2017). The BIMSTEC connects three important sub-regions of India — Nepal and Bhutan in the Himalayan sub-region; Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal sub-region; and Myanmar and Thailand in the Mekong sub-region. BIMSTEC is the only forum that brings together India’s strategic peripheries (South, East and North) under one single grouping. Furthermore, it also keeps geopolitical concerns at bay as regional players such as China and Pakistan are not members of BIMSTEC. The BIMSTEC is also at the centre of New Delhi’s engagements with other various regional and sub-regional groupings in India’s eastern neighbourhood with its members often are also members of other regional and sub-regional groupings in their respective regions and sub-regions. For instance, Myanmar and Thailand are members of ASEAN and Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) while Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are members of SAARC and BBIN. Bangladesh and Myanmar are also members of the four-member sub-regional BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) forum along with India and China. The progress of BIMSTEC, therefore, could help regional integration of the entire north-eastern Indian Ocean region with the Bay of Bengal at the centre.

A recent event that demonstrates the centrality of BIMSTEC in India’s regional approach is the Modi government’s initiative to invite BIMSTEC leaders to the BRICS outreach summit held in India in October 2016 (Yhome 2016). Various factors explain New Delhi’s decision. First, amid New Delhi’s efforts to isolate Islamabad, inviting SAARC leaders would have defeated the purpose. Much has changed in India’s regional diplomacy since Prime Minister Modi invited SAARC leaders to his swearing-in ceremony in 2014. Second, while Delhi has the option of inviting leaders of the sub-regional BBIN initiative, this would have left out other neighbours including Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Delhi could have also looked further east and invited leaders from the Mekong countries under the auspices of MGC or even the nations of ASEAN under India-ASEAN partnership. However, then questions could be raised as to why New Delhi overlooked its immediate neighbours. Moreover, India-ASEAN partnership and the MGC are forums involving only India and Southeast Asian nations without membership from other South Asian nations. Inviting BIMSTEC leaders to the BRICS Summit also subtly demonstrates that the sub-regions represented in the BIMSTEC
India’s Evolving Approach to Regionalism: SAARC and Beyond

form India’s traditional backward where its primacy should to be respected.

India’s strategic interests in these sub-regions have been growing over the recent years both as a result of India’s own domestic interests as well as because of enhanced Chinese influence and presence in these geo-strategic sub-regions. The China factor has emerged as a major area of geopolitical concern in India’s engagements with the nations in these sub-regions. Islamabad’s unwillingness to be part of regional cooperation where India is involved was clearly demonstrated with its opposition to the SAARC-MVA and the South Asia satellite. The prospect for bilateral and regional cooperation along India’s western border remains limited with no signs of improving ties with its arch-rival Pakistan, even though India made significant efforts from 2003-2007 and then in 2011-2013 to enhance connectivity and give a fillip to bilateral trade. Delhi’s strategic spaces to manoeuvre and its ability to take its regional diplomacy to a new level, particularly the ‘Act East’ policy will largely depend on its engagements with its eastern neighbourhood. BIMSTEC along with other regional and sub-regional forums where India is a member are platforms to achieve these objectives.

**Implications and Challenges**

If China is the factor pushing India to play a more active role in the region, the question is, would India undertake regional initiatives in the absence of the China factor. One may argue that the urgency to recalibrated its regional approach would have been missing without China in its regional calculus. But at the same time, there is no denying the fact that India has been increasingly taking regional initiatives for its own self-interest and the wider regional interests, particularly in areas such as the maritime domain. Even as India’s sheds off its traditional inhibitions to shape regional governance, several issues continue to pose challenges to India’s role as a regional leader. Traditional issues in South Asia such as territorial disputes (particularly the Kashmir dispute), regional rivalry with Pakistan (which is likely to increase as a result of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project), and lack of trust with its smaller neighbours. In the wider Indo-Pacific region, China’s growing military and economic power is and will remain a major challenge as the two compete for leadership in the Indo-Pacific region.

India is increasingly taking the lead to improve regional governance in key areas including socio-economic development, maritime, energy, water, cyber, space and security. In any community building project the people of the region are the most significant component. India’s various capacity-building efforts in South Asia, the Mekong region, and in the island nations of the Indian Ocean contributes to good regional governance. Sustainable development and management has been at the core of India’s cooperation at the regional and sub-regional groupings and this will have implications on regional recourses such as water and energy. The
necessity to adopt such an approach in regional cooperation will only grow with issues such as climate change, rise in sea-level, energy scarcity, food security, natural disasters, etc. likely to force countries to work together to shape the emerging ‘development regionalism’ narrative in the region.

Perhaps, India’s role in regional maritime security governance is the most visible and significant in recent years. Not only is India providing new ideas and initiatives in shaping the discourse on regional maritime security, but also its peaceful settlement of maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh has demonstrated the country’s respect for international norms in sea governance. The initiatives to strengthen a new maritime order in the Indian Ocean region by creating mechanisms both with its immediate neighbours such as the Sri Lanka and Maldives but also with other regional and extra-regional players will have long-term implications for the evolving dynamics of the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s initiatives have been laying the ground for the emergence of ‘security regionalism’ in the maritime domain. India is beginning to demonstrate that it has the intent and the capability to maintain a stable regional order at sea. In fact, several analysts argue that India is beginning to take up leadership role particularly in regional maritime governance. Examining India’s role in the emerging maritime governance in the Indian Ocean, an analyst commented that the IONS is ‘an important initiative aimed at enhancing naval interoperability, the sharing of information and capacity building’ (Schöttli, 2014, p.4). The observer further commented that the IONS has been ‘a consultative mechanism [in tackling] the issue of asymmetric threats and common transnational maritime concerns’. A recent analysis on India’s ‘Act East’ policy observes that ‘…an interesting dimension of the ‘Act East’ policy may lie in [the] fact that it has openly acknowledged India’s security responsibilities… [and that India’s recent maritime] initiatives reflect a nascent positioning as a net security provider, or at least an attempt to progress along that line’ (Saint-Mézard 2016, p. 188). India’s regional cooperation efforts in tackling non-traditional security threats such as cyber-crime, natural disasters, food security, climate change, counter-terrorism, etc. suggest that India is increasing its role in regional security dynamics in South Asia and beyond.

**Conclusion**

Drawing from the above discussion, this paper concludes with a few observations. First, India has begun to take leadership role in shaping and building regionalism in South Asia and beyond. India’s regionalism and sub-regionalism efforts have paid dividends primarily because of improvements in bilateral relations with some neighbouring countries. This is evident from the fact that in its eastern borders where India has improved its bilateral relations with countries such as Bangladesh and Dhaka’s own changing perceptions of Islamabad, has enabled sub-re-
regionalism projects to make progress, while in its western border, the protracted conflictual relationship with Pakistan has failed to open up such opportunity. Second, like most rising powers, India’s self-interest is the key driver in its regional cooperative initiatives. Third, New Delhi is finding innovative ways of creating alternative mechanisms to address the much-needed regional governance. Fourth, India is today actively contributing to shaping the regional order and there is a continuity in the country’s foreign policy since the early 1990s. A broad consensus has emerged on India’s approach towards regionalism in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. In building ‘security regionalism’, India has employed various policy instruments at its disposals. Naval diplomacy has been the most active both in South Asia and in the Indo-Pacific region. In building ‘development regionalism’, New Delhi has employed both economic diplomacy and ‘techno diplomacy’ to reach out to the region. India’s idea of building regionalism is governed by an incremental approach and this fits in well with sub-regional initiatives to achieve regional integration. In the political domain, India’s regional stability efforts is still a work in progress.

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Article

Competing Imperatives of Global Governance and National Interests within BRICS: An Indian Perspective

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Abstract
This paper revisits India’s contribution to institution building efforts in BRICS to suggest India’s keen interest in leveraging BRICS for fulfilling its national objectives on domestic economic growth and global governance. However, we note that multiple competing imperatives of global governance and national interests within BRICS lead to asymmetric gains among members. BRICS suffers from weak cooperation in global trade, technology and environmental regimes. This paper explores positions of BRICS members on selected trade issues in the WTO in areas like agriculture and NAMA to identify divergent national interests. We elaborate that the ITA, a plurilateral agreement under the WTO, has allegedly brought differential gains to India and China (with China gaining many times more than India in export performance). Faced with differential gains in sector specific economic performance and intra-BRICS competition, BRICS seeks greater coordination in its economic policies and global governance approaches.

Keywords
BRICS, WTO, Global Governance, Information Technology Agreement, New Development Bank, BRICS Credit Rating Agency

Introduction
India along with four large emerging economies Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa represent the shifting centre of gravity of the world economy (O’Neill 2001 and 2011; NDB ,2017; Baracuhy, 2012). At the turn of the century, these economies triggered awe for their rapid pace of expansion of their economies led
by China. The economic recession of the last years of the previous decade slowed global growth, but BRICS showed substantial resilience. India has become the fastest growing large economy globally. While growth in China seems to be stabilising and Brazil, Russia and South Africa facing contraction due to falling commodity prices globally, India, is slated to maintain its average high economic growth rate.

In this decade, BRICS increasingly institutionalised its cooperation platforms at the level of ministers and officials (in the form of annual dialogue processes and committees) across a comprehensive array of issues, culminating into Annual Summits of BRICS Heads of Governments. BRICS has also encouraged deeper track two academic engagements and people to people linkages through annual forums for civil society organisations, youth forums and forums in diverse areas of culture and sports. BRICS institution building efforts and formalised mechanisms of cooperation have played important role in strengthening BRICS partnership so far. Apart from the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the introduction of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), BRICS has also adopted the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership. India has played an important role in proposing and in working with other members towards creating alternate institutions of global finance and for better coordination of macroeconomic management globally to prevent and respond to future crisis. BRICS has successfully launched the New Development Bank and has proposed creation of a BRICS Credit Rating Agency. To cater to future needs in development and sustainability BRICS has established an Agriculture Research Platform. We observe that, India offered ideas and support for the creation of such institutions in BRICS to fulfil the following objectives: 1) collectively influence global financial architecture; 2) create alternate financial institutions based on principles of equality; 3) create sector specific collaboration platforms on development and security; and 4) to use such platforms to leverage the BRICS advantage for domestic economic growth. In this regard, we would discuss three specific institution building efforts in BRICS.

However, unlike in the case of institution building and institutional approaches in sector specific cooperation, BRICS countries are confronting challenges in context of their approach to global governance, which has so far focused primarily on global financial architecture with much less coordination and coherence in approaches on global trade, technology and environmental regimes.¹ The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership statement pays less substantive attention to

¹ In Summit Declarations, however, the BRICS have repeatedly expressed their collective aspiration to help build a more open, cooperative, equitable and efficient world order (NDB, 2017). The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership statement pays less substantive attention to outstanding issues under the multilateral trade negotiations or other specific themes of global economic governance that have multilateral significance.
outstanding issues under multilateral trade negotiations or other specific themes of global economic governance that have multilateral significance. This, we presume, would result in partial gains for its members. We see BRICS as incomplete, or even faltering on issues that relate to wider and comprehensive dimensions of cooperation on global economic governance at a time when such a strategy is imminently required to fortify the space for economic growth in BRICS and in the South. Further, questions have been raised in academic forums on the willingness and maturity of BRICS to deliver on the foundational idea of multipolarity and enhanced commitment for creating mutual space for leadership and role in the world order. The fact that BRICS could emerge is also attributed to gradual integration with the world economy, favourable structural transformation and productivity growth, and the ability to meaningfully leverage the opportunities of internationalisation keeping in mind issues of sectoral competitiveness.2

Overtime, BRICS countries have demonstrated significant leadership on trade multilateralism, managing capital flows etc. to the extent that these countries see opportunities in globalisation. Member countries in BRICS, nevertheless, have to create space for manoeuvrability to overcome situations when their economic interests are not aligned. For example, India faces challenge of leading a coordinated approach on market access, excess capacity, technology transfer, industrial development and other sector specific issues as actions by China are adversely affecting its own national policy making space.

BRICS experience with the WTO offers deep understanding of the diversity of national interests prevalent in BRICS. To begin with, we note, while IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) were original signatories of the GATT-WTO, both China and Russia are more recent entrants suggesting difference in timelines, readiness, perception and preference for globalisation in BRICS. At the same time, despite late entry in the WTO, it is evident that China could leverage opportunities in external sector engagements much more than the other BRICS members because of reasons ranging from comparative advantages to domestic capacities. In this paper we elaborate issues of negotiations within WTO that capture convergence and divergence of economic interests in BRICS. In addition, we specifically highlight the Information Technology Agreement (1997), a plurilateral agreement under the WTO which has allegedly brought differential gains to India and China (with China gaining many times more than India in export performance). China, India and Russia are signatories to this agreement among BRICS members. Faced with differential gains in sector specific economic performance and intra-BRICS competition, BRICS seeks greater coordination in its economic policies and global governance approaches. It is in this light that we wish to present India's engagement with the BRICS and possible directions

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2 For elaborate discussion see de Vries et al (2012); McMillan and Rodrik (2011); Jacobs and Rossem (2013)
of future cooperation.

In this paper, we discuss issues pertaining to BRICS institution building efforts on finance and formal mechanisms of sectoral cooperation vis-a-vis its approach on global governance on international trade to suggest that the impact of, so far impressive dialogue and cooperation process among the largest emerging economies can only be felt if these translate into deeper alliances on negotiating platforms governing trade, technology and environment globally. This would positively influence economic growth in member states including that of India and would prevent weakening of the BRICS partnership. The priorities set by the dominant economies on several fronts do not overlap with those of fellow economies within BRICS. India is facing this challenge at this point be that in the realm of excess capacity, non-tariff barriers or even in the sectoral agreements like the information technology agreement (ITA). While China has outperformed the developing world in manufacturing, other BRICS countries continue to remain selectively competitive across some sectors within the manufacturing industry. As high technology constitutes the major share of manufacturing exports, China based on its large ICT exports has generated maximum value added in manufacturing in BRICS.

While sectoral competitiveness in high technology industry in BRICS across fields remain intact or improving, BRICS countries await more meaningful engagement and coordinated approach on multilateral agreements governing international trade with implication for industrial development, technology transfers and environmental sustainability. Forging BRICS alliance on these fronts would significantly shape international environment that could facilitate economic growth in BRICS. It may be interesting to note that India, Brazil and South Africa have often aligned at the WTO as part of broader alliances to influence the ongoing Doha Round and there are opportunities of future cooperation. However, the fact that China followed by Russia are more recent players in the WTO one may speculate on the strength and history of collaboration among BRICS as a group at the WTO.

After the Introductory Section I, in Section II we present three BRICS institutional initiatives that reflect the multifaceted nature of the partnership and indicate the interests and contributions of India. In Section III we present BRICS approach on multilateralism and the possibilities of divergences based on national interests. We refer to the history of collaborations among BRICS countries at the WTO to draw necessary insights. In Section IV, we highlight the prevailing differences in the level of industrial development across BRICS, particularly in high value sectors like electronics that may be to a large extent attributable to the information technology agreement (ITA) of the WTO. We discuss BRICS response to the ITA to draw lessons on how global governance and national inter-
ests counteract leading to weakening of BRICS partnership. In the Concluding Section V, we summarize on why collective partnerships in BRICS should deliver in confronting challenges of global governance as well as protect national interests of its members.

**Institution Building in BRICS and India’s Objectives**

*The New Development Bank as the Flag Bearer of the BRICS Promise*

The first thoughts on the possibility of creation of an alternate multilateral financing institution in BRICS emerged at the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2012. The idea was mooted by India to pursue a BRICS led South-South Development Bank mainly funded and managed by BRICS countries to recycle surpluses into investment in developing countries for infrastructure and sustainable development projects (Agarwal, 2015). Following the report of the finance ministers it was agreed to establish a New Development Bank by BRICS at the 5th Summit in Durban (South Africa) in 2013 and the institution was formally established at the 6th Summit in Fortaleza (Brazil) in 2014. This institution, beyond its objective and mandate has become symbolic of the BRICS partnership itself. This institutionalises the first step towards the original BRICS ambition of alternate financial architecture and brilliantly reflects in its design a unique but operational model of multi-polarity promoting meaningful multilateral cooperation. The institution, it is hoped, would follow alternate institutional framework and non-conditional financing norms in contrast to practices at Bretton Woods Institutions.

The Fortaleza declaration suggests the following: “the Bank shall have an initial authorized capital of US$ 100 billion. The initial subscribed capital shall be US$ 50 billion, equally shared among founding members. The first chair of the Board of Governors shall be from Russia. The first chair of the Board of Directors shall be from Brazil. The first President of the Bank shall be from India. The headquarters of the Bank shall be located in Shanghai. The New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre shall be established in South Africa concurrently with the headquarters.” The NDB has mainstreamed sustainability and infrastructure in its agenda which reflects political commitment from BRICS on rigorously pursuing sustainable development globally. As some of the leading world powers have reversed their contributions on sustainability and the developed world as a group is increasingly noncommittal on sharing resources for global public goods (based on principles of common but differentiated responsibility) the utility of BRICS cooperation on sustainability and development is undeniable.

**BRICS Credit Rating Agency and India’s Genuine Interests**

A prominent development on institution building in BRICS, following earlier
successes like the creation of the NDB, and emanating from the Indian presidency of BRICS in 2016 (Goa Declaration) was the proposal to set up an independent BRICS Credit Rating Agency. India has been keen on making BRICS more receptive to alternative ideas in pursuit of evidence based policy making. This initiative is probably unique in terms of its genesis compared to initiatives under several other regional groupings and global alliances. As explained, BRICS has a foremost ambition of creating alternate institutions that could restore balance in global governance. Global Credit Rating Agencies, a few in number and hugely influential, are West dominated private organisations with clear methodological biases against emerging countries. Emerging macroeconomic strengths and longer term outlook of emerging nations are systematically discounted in such assessments. This has adversely affected resource flows to emerging countries including BRICS.

We note that the importance of Credit Rating Agencies is twofold: one, they assess the credit quality of individuals, companies and banks and second, international accords emerging from the Basel process recognise and instruct banks to follow assessments by these agencies on credit risks. Lower credit ratings would therefore increase the cost of institutionalised borrowing. For BRICS in particular, many a time sovereign ratings have lacked consistency both in terms of the criteria and assessments. India’s relative low score on such ratings despite political and economic stability and ever improving macroeconomic fundamentals have been a cause of concern. India’s keen efforts to formalise a BRICS credit rating process, as we observe, is also possibly inspired by the fact that bond markets offer alternative sources of finance and have been an effective tool in some developing countries. The BRICS countries with mature capital markets have the potential to leverage local currency bond markets aided by informed, balanced and neutral credit ratings. The ability of the NDB to utilize bond markets in BRICS would be severely compromised with downgraded sovereign credit ratings of these countries. During its presidency, India hosted a meeting of BRICS officials to deliberate on strengthening bond markets in BRICS, wherein the possibility of a common BRICS bond market was also explored.

**BRICS Agriculture Research Platform and India’s Credible Leadership on Development**

While BRICS efforts on cooperation in financial coordination is acknowledged, the group is often criticized for being selective on development challenges and having failed to exploit opportunities of cooperation across broad areas of sustainable development to meet future needs. India’s own development challenges and experience coupled with its consistent posture at various global fora on such issues

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3 “Financing the SDGs” by Rathin Roy; Business Standard, 6 October 2017
4 Dash (2017) and Government of India (2009)
prompted it to mainstream development issues in BRICS and also offer futuristic ideas on cooperation. The Prime Minister of India Mr Narendra Modi proposed the creation of a BRICS Agricultural Research Centre at the 7th BRICS Summit at Ufa, Russia in 2015. Acknowledging strengths with individual BRICS countries in the field of agriculture and agriculture research, he had put forward this vision of BRICS collaboration not only to support future needs in BRICS but also in the developing world. This may also be seen in the light of the fact that BRICS countries are leading producers, consumers and exporters of agricultural products including in horticulture, fisheries and other animal products. Accordingly, all BRICS countries at the 8th Summit in Goa, India agreed to the establishment of the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform. We note that the Goa declaration emphasised substantially on issues around agriculture, food security, and malnutrition; and has highlighted the importance of agricultural productivity, sustainable management and trade. However, BRICS focus on cooperation in science, technology and innovation has been discernible all through. The establishment of BRICS Agriculture Research Platform falls at the intersection of BRICS approach on agriculture and its efforts to build collaborations in Science and Technology. Subsequently, the coordination centre of the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform has been located in New Delhi, India at the National Agricultural Science Complex. Through this India is expected to make meaningful contribution to this initiative.

**BRICS at the WTO Possibilities beyond National Interests?**

At the WTO, free trade is primarily understood in terms of reduction in tariff barriers. Distortions and inefficiencies in world trade due to policy regimes in countries (in areas like subsidies and IPR) remained contentious, with developed countries seriously hurting interests of developing countries in areas of significant concern to them like agriculture exports, food security, livelihood and public health. Such divergences brought down confidence among members and the developing countries demanded a course correction. The developing countries faced dual challenges in the form of adverse posturing of the developed countries as well as biased technical specifications that went into determining the level of distortions. To address these issues a new round of negotiations was launched in 2001 that came to be known as the Doha Development Round, which remains inconclusive till date.

However, what remained outside the mainstream thinking, even for review, let alone renegotiations is the impact of WTO on trade and production capabilities of developing countries for deepening industrialisation as the world transits from the so called third to the fourth industrial revolution. The early industrialised countries adopted suitable strategies to aid their industrialisation process. Independent strategies on these counts are much less feasible under the WTO regime.
(Lall 2000; Rodrik, 2004; Chang, 2009; Singh, 2016). The narrow window of special and differential treatment, which is in any case challenged by developed countries in negotiations and the ad-hoc approach under non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, is clearly insufficient to serve the purpose. While, industry led to value creation in the early industrialised economies, the negative influence of global trade regimes on industrial capabilities of some developing and emerging countries would seriously hamper their long term growth prospects. BRICS cannot be an exception.

The WTO regime remains complex. There are attempts to widen the scope and coverage, ignoring the long term concerns of developing counties. The WTO has been successful to pull through negotiations on issues beyond the Doha Round in areas like Trade Facilitation, however, to the satisfaction of large segments of the developing world as they see new opportunities of integration. In the run up to the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017, BRICS members are split on some of the new issues, taking offensive or defensive postures depending on their national interest and sector specific competitiveness. India seeks greater cooperation in BRICS in influencing the outcomes. BRICS has time and again called for early completion of the Doha Round, but coordination has been waning. The challenges have multiplied with rising regionalism. BRICS countries competing in such arrangements has led to further weakening of BRICS cooperation in upholding multilateralism and taking common positions on trade issues that affect industrial development in their countries. As some major economies of the world recede to trade protectionism, beyond rhetoric, BRICS is well positioned to champion trade multilateralism on their own terms that would foster competitiveness across sectors including in agriculture and industry. However, this requires intent and credible action on part of the BRICS.

Individual members of BRICS have greatly influenced trade multilateralism in the WTO in the last decade, and there is a chance that these countries can start from where they left. Of course, in terms of export interests and domestic priorities BRICS may substantially differ on some counts, but as already explained opportunities of industrial development, value chains, innovations and wealth creation could be very similar. The axis of cooperation among BICS (Russia joined the WTO as recently as 2011) can be traced to the initial years of the Doha Round, with agriculture as the pivot on most instances.

At the WTO, Brazil, India, South Africa and to some extent China started working together as part of the broad G20 alliance to hammer out issues in agriculture. While the uncertainty continued through the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, in 2006 India and Brazil were exclusively selected to be part of G4 along with the US and the EU to renegotiate and salvage the Doha Round, before the talks failed in 2007 (Ray and Saha, 2009). The fact that Brazil and India were selected sepa-
rately is attributable to the fact that India’s and Brazil’s interests in agriculture are divergent based on the fact that Brazil is an aggressive player as a major exporter in agriculture. This is also the reason that India has collaborated more closely with the G33 group of developing countries in agriculture which included China, while Brazil with the Cairns group led by Australia. While some coordination among BICS was visible, China’s position on agriculture negotiations as part of recently acceded members (RAMs) group in seeking longer timelines of implementation and other flexibilities suggests its defensive posture not too different in spirit from that of India. In an encouraging development, in July 2017, India and China jointly submitted a proposal to the WTO calling for the elimination, by developed countries, of the most trade-distorting form of farm subsidies, known in WTO parlance as Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) or ‘Amber Box’ support as a prerequisite for consideration of other reforms in domestic support negotiations. On NAMA, the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) partnership has remained strong with significant convergence with China on specific issues like non-tariff barriers (NTBs). It may be important to note that the NAMA 11 group for tariff negotiations in the Doha Round has been led by South Africa. China, driven by its manufacturing prowess and related competitiveness has been offensive in its offers on tariff liberalisation. The advanced industrialised countries introduced what is known as the Swiss Formula that would set uniform rules on tariff reduction. Argentina, Brazil and India proposed an alternative formula, known as the Argentina–Brazil–India (ABI) Formula. The ABI formula adjusted for country specific average tariffs unlike fixed coefficients used in the case of the Swiss Formula in the spirit of less than full reciprocity. China while agreeing to the ABI concept proposed its own formula (Thorstensen and Oliveira, 2014). This leads us to believe that on industrial tariffs and market access the BICS posture at the WTO has never been aligned with that of the early industrialised countries led by the US, EU and Japan.

Ever increasing bilateralism/regionalism within the global trading order has made way for plurilateralism that have much wider scale and scope; and may be seen as efforts to expand buy-ins to bring on board tariff and non-tariff issues that are extremely difficult to negotiate under the framework of the WTO. The projects of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are plurilateral or mega-regional trade negotiations that have confronted diverse fortunes in recent times. While TPP having failed in its previous form and

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TTIP held up, it is only RCEP that carries some promise of reaching the desired goal. However, given firm postures of the BRICS at the WTO, TPP led by the US and TTIP (between the EU and the US) were specifically designed to keep BRICS out of the purview of such trade deals. The RCEP, however, sees China and India fighting each other not only for influence but also for maximising gains. The structure and export competiveness of sectors including services varies greatly between the two countries and chances of cooperation are minimal.

Global Trade Architecture and Unequal Gains: India vis-à-vis China in the context of ITA

The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA) was concluded by 29 participants at the Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO in December 1996 (the number of ratifying countries currently stands at 82 representing 97 percent of world trade in such products). In doing so, ITA proactively sought enhanced market access for information and communication technology (ICT) products by eliminating tariffs for such products (with commitments of MFN nature). The applied rates in most cases were much lower than the bound rates. ITA is credited for expanding trade in ICT products phenomenally. Exports in the products covered by the ITA tripled from US$ 549 billion in 1996 to approximately US$ 1.7 trillion in 2015 (WTO 2017). China remains the world’s top exporter of all main categories of ICT goods. China is also the top importer of ICT goods, accounting for 18 per cent of world imports and 34 per cent of all electronic component imports, including re-imports from Hong Kong (China) (UNCTAD, 2014).

While, India joined ITA in 1997 itself, China did so in 2003 after its accession into the WTO in 2001. The other two prominent BRICS members Brazil and South Africa are yet to join ITA. Russia joined ITA as part of its accession to the WTO. China’s export of IT products was way behind countries like the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, and South Korea in 1996 (Table 1). However, China overtook the United States to become the world’s leading exporter of ICT goods such as mobile phones, laptop computers and digital cameras. China’s import of ICT products was very low when compared with US, UK, Germany, South Korea and Japan till 2005. China’s import of ICT products have risen after 2005 and stands higher than that of US and other developed countries like Germany, Japan, and UK. Economies in East and South East Asia remain among the only net exporters of ICT goods. The growth of China’s export of information technology goods was fastest during 2005-10. On the other hand growth of US exports of ICT products has slowed down compared to 1996-2000. India’s performance has somewhat picked up from very low levels. Also, export of ICT products has seen a relative decline in UK, Germany and Japan in recent years.
Table 1: Exports of Information Technology Products of Selected Countries (USD Billion)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>14.46</td>
<td>40.29</td>
<td>213.64</td>
<td>450.86</td>
<td>639.63</td>
<td>585.14</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>20.42</td>
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<td>199.01</td>
<td>355.46</td>
<td>479.28</td>
<td>461.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>50.80</td>
<td>67.02</td>
<td>115.02</td>
<td>116.09</td>
<td>118.50</td>
<td>121.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50.68</td>
<td>70.70</td>
<td>107.53</td>
<td>114.18</td>
<td>114.10</td>
<td>115.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>4.89</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<td>12.99</td>
<td>26.03</td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>39.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>104.50</td>
<td>141.68</td>
<td>144.76</td>
<td>145.51</td>
<td>105.12</td>
<td>112.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>49.13</td>
<td>70.76</td>
<td>79.80</td>
<td>88.32</td>
<td>96.70</td>
<td>94.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>28.37</td>
<td>55.14</td>
<td>87.95</td>
<td>113.48</td>
<td>141.10</td>
<td>134.95</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>37.39</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>59.22</td>
<td>79.51</td>
<td>89.38</td>
<td>88.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>43.94</td>
<td>59.15</td>
<td>60.53</td>
<td>32.57</td>
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<td>29.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47.66</td>
<td>76.04</td>
<td>69.98</td>
<td>57.96</td>
<td>58.71</td>
<td>54.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>134.20</td>
<td>201.41</td>
<td>170.12</td>
<td>184.42</td>
<td>200.99</td>
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<td>148.94</td>
<td>234.86</td>
<td>237.43</td>
<td>278.18</td>
<td>351.63</td>
<td>351.69</td>
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on ITA Product List (Attachment A, Sections 1 and 2) in HS 1996 from WITS Online

However, the US has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the ITA. Not only did US exports in particular product categories like semiconductor increase (US presently holds 50 percent market share in semiconductors globally) after ITA was adopted by the signatories, ITA also provided a big push to the expansion of Global Production Networks (GPNs) of US ICT companies (Ernst, 2014). US Multinational Companies (MNCs) were increasingly investing in manufacturing in low cost countries like China. EU and Japan have been ahead in manufacturing and innovations of ICT products and are aggressive players in the ITA.

Portugal–Perez et al. (2009) suggests that discussions on extension of the ITA, which included coverage of more electronic products, to non-tariff measures — including standards, began shortly after the ITA was signed in 1996. In 2000, the Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Committee) agreed on its “Non-Tariff Measures Work Programme”. In September 2008 the EU submitted a proposal to review and initiate negotiations to update the ITA. On non-tariff barriers it proposed, “...agreement on substantive provisions concerning the recognition of internationally agreed standards and of methods of conformity assessment, in order to avoid multiple
testing and enable greater economies of scale without compromising on product safety”. Deliberations and workshops on NTMs were conducted on a regular basis. The negotiation was strongly focused on “for each area of certification: one global product, one global standard, one global test and one global certificate.”

In June 2012, six ITA participants (United States, European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei and Costa Rica) initiated an informal process towards launching negotiations for the expansion of the product coverage of the ITA. This process led to the establishment of a technical working group which met informally in Geneva, outside of the formal framework of the WTO ITA Committee. The US stressed that ITA 2 is a top priority and EU announced consensus on product coverage. Japan has been keen on extending such provisions to regional trade deals. Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Montenegro, Singapore, Colombia, Australia and Hong Kong, China also supported the early conclusion of ITA 2. While Korea was close to ratifying such changes, China was firm on its stand of protecting domestic interests even as it saw merit in ITA 2. ITA 2 has been much less appealing to BRICS other than China leading to their non-participation in ITA 2. This clearly flows from the fact that for these four countries exports of ITA products (with expansion) as a share of global exports in this category is negligible (0.1-0.4 percent). While these countries have increasing import bills on ITA products, India tops the list. Among the ITA members who are not party to ITA expansion India ranks second after Jordan in having a relatively high MFN applied tariff on ITA expansion products. Brazil and South Africa, on average maintains less than 10 percent MFN applied tariff on original ITA products (which is much lower for South Africa).

At the WTO’s Tenth Ministerial Conference, in Nairobi (16 December 2015), 53 members representing major exporters of information technology products, endorsed the timetable for implementing the landmark deal to eliminate tariffs on the 201 IT products. The declaration established that the first set of tariff cuts (65 percent of tariff lines) were to be implemented on 1 July 2016 and the second set no later than 1 July 2017, with successive reductions taking place on 1 July 2018 and effective elimination no later than 1 July 2019. On 1 November 2016, WTO’s ITA Committee announced majority of participants (18 of the 24, who originally represented the 53 countries under ITA 2) have implemented their tariff commitments, and others were on track to do so.

We have already highlighted, of the BRICS only China, India and the Russian Federation are party to ITA, specifically ITA 1. The fact that Brazil and South Af-

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7 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/ita_08may15_e.htm
8 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_ita_e.htm
9 Refer WTO (2017)
10 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ita_20apr16_e.htm
rhea have not been participating in such negotiations suggests perceived discrepancies between domestic priorities and external sector gains. Such considerations have to be noted in order to understand, convergences and divergences in BRICS in the context of industrial strategy as well as the broader developmental context that links industrial development not only with value addition but also with economic opportunities of the domestic industry (and livelihoods). In BRICS, China has outperformed the rest in ICT trade. Policymakers in countries that are part of ITA yet with a limited manufacturing base in electronics and equipments blame it on the ITA. Cheaper imports have contributed to the decline of the domestic electronics and equipments industry. This has been the case with India (Joseph 2013; Ernst 2014). The experience with regard to ITA 1, definitely has led India to take very cautious stance on ITA 2, despite being one of the first participants in ITA 1. Strategy to promote domestic manufacturing in this segment is being sought in countries like India and Brazil, however with perceptible differences in approach.

The ITA 2 negotiations suggest adjustments on ITA 1 product list specifically to address issues of multiple uses on one hand and technology convergence on the other. While new classification has been adopted, obsolete products have been dropped. China, has thus far been able to integrate with the value chain of global production of ICT goods and gain in terms of value of manufacturing and exports. However, often the Chinese value addition in such products have been low due to overspecialisation in downstream activities and highly fragmented production networks. One possible indication has been China’s lagging performance in technologically advanced subcategory like semiconductors. China has adopted sectoral strategies to develop its semiconductor manufacturing sector. ITA 2 was hence viewed with suspicion in terms of its product coverage and there were demands of sensitive lists. While, the work on non-tariff measures (NTMs) is ongoing at the WTO with regard to issues like regulation, standards, conformity, e-labelling, transparency etc. country positions are not in the public domain. The Geneva based international think-tank the South Centre in one of the publications in 2013 highlighted that NTBs – in the form of national standards and regulations or international standards – have been the most significant barriers that developing country products face in accessing the ITA markets, whether or not these countries are part of the ITA. Consensus building in BRICS on such intricate issues on industrial strategy concerning policy space and market access is far from reality.11

**Concluding Remarks**

India has played an increasingly important role in contributing to a new narrative

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11 Chaturvedi (2015)
led by the BRICS in creating new institutional mechanisms that reflect the 21st Century reality of emergence of the South. BRICS has strengthened avenues and governance architecture on global finance, capital and investment. Moreover, while promoting collective economic interests, BRICS has gone beyond the narrow focus of intra-BRICS trade. In doing so it has also avoided rhetorically supporting multilateralism and has not gone into the specifics in terms of forming coalitions on negotiations. However, with collective partnerships, BRICS may clearly be delivering in terms of consensus on economic, trade and investment issues that may foster growth across economies.

The new institutional mechanisms that India actively sought namely, New Development Bank, BRICS Rating Agency and BRICS Agriculture Research platform are some efforts which bring forward an extremely important message. The message is of BRICS contribution to a new responsible and responsive global order with due prominence to inclusive multilateralism. It would be important to see how far the current disposition should be viewed as a building block for wider global governance. Till the time, when multilateralism remained pivot to global trade, there was still scope for multifaceted partnerships and coalitions and we have elaborated how BRICS often collaborated on issues of mutual interest and in reigning skewed gains favouring other dominant economies.

However, under present realities possibilities about fading away of such partnerships have multiplied significantly. We see very divergent interests in terms of countries forming regional agreements and with some countries collaborating on mega-regional trade arrangements driving wedge into the consensus arrived under the multilateral fora. Efforts to take advantage of legal options to push for numerous sectoral trade and other agreements and seal deals on non-trade issues impacting trade are on. Needless to mention, such agreements are meant to favour the dominant economies in the balance. It would be a testing time for BRICS to demonstrate willingness to work on such issues in the spirit of cooperation and consensus. Would BRICS members be able to overcome their narrow national interests and continue to contribute through alternate institutions, is an issue that would determine wider relevance of BRICS in the days to come. The experience of working together and striking coalitions on specific issues at the WTO provides important lessons and ready reference to each other’s domestic interests and external outlook.

Moving forward would not be easy. Capabilities and institutions are often highlighted as major strengths of BRICS countries. However, domestic capabilities are rendered inadequate in the face of major discriminations and overriding harmonisations in the world economy. While intra-BRICS trade is dominated by trade flows from China (we have shown the case of ICT goods), and is often perceived to be a challenge by other members, market access in third countries re-
mains an important consideration. It remains a difficult question on how BRICS can address such issues and work towards meaningful partnerships and coalitions. As pointed out in the beginning, in the absence of concrete actions in this direction, BRICS as a group might seriously fall short of fulfilling its own expectations. It would also be a disappointment for countries like India, whose own national interests would also be adversely affected if BRICS as a group does not respond to wider global governance expectations.

Bio

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Sachin Chaturvedi is Director General and Professor at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), a New Delhi-based autonomous Think-Tank. He was Global Justice Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International Affairs at Yale University and a Visiting Professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, apart from other prestigious academic appointments, memberships of professional bodies and advisory councils. He is an eminent international scholar on development cooperation policies, South-South cooperation, trade, innovation, biotechnology development and global governance. He has immensely contributed to shaping the contemporary narrative on the Global South, covering the role and roadmap of BRICS partnership.

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India and Global Discourse on State-sponsored Terrorism

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Abstract
India has had modest success in its efforts to internationally isolate Pakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism. More effective in this regard has been Pakistan’s own duplicity vis-à-vis the West. Indian discourse has not resonated abroad because it relies too heavily on respect for vague global norms rather than adherence to specific national interests, which are more easily comprehended by foreign governments. New Delhi’s previous failures to respond militarily to cross border terrorist attacks have been interpreted as weakness by both Pakistan and the wider international community. The Modi government has launched efforts to correct this historical deficiency. However, it needs to be supported by an intellectual assault upon the Pakistani Deep State, launched via academic and journalistic commentators.

Keywords
Terrorism, Pakistan, ISI, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Propaganda

Introduction
This article takes a critical view of New Delhi’s efforts to mobilize international support against state-sponsored terrorism. It focuses on cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and the role of the Pakistani intelligence community, army and civilian establishment in facilitating this. While acknowledging that American views specifically, and Western perceptions more generally, have become less favourable to Islamabad since 9/11, the article suggests that India can take limited credit for this. More than Indian discourse, the reason for the shift lies in Pakistan’s duplicity vis-à-vis American efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Having Osama Bin Laden discovered in Abbottabad did not help either. The article offers a grim assessment of possibilities for global counterterrorism cooperation.

The time of writing (November 2017) marks nine years since a squad of ten jihadists, with the approval of the Pakistani intelligence and army leadership, sailed
from Karachi to Mumbai and killed 166 people (Kiessling 2016, p. 214). The organization that dispatched these jihadists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, has not faced any justice. Rather, it is acquiring a political façade. It wishes to ensure that in the event of more Mumbai-style operations, it can claim public legitimacy through participation in electoral processes. Meanwhile, the international community has failed to hold Pakistan accountable for hosting cross border terrorism. Although 25 of the victims in Mumbai were foreigners, with British and American nationals specifically targeted, the episode has been trivialized in international discourse as an Indo-Pakistani spat.

Even worse, the US and UK governments tried for a while to convince New Delhi that it shared a common objective with Islamabad in defeating terrorism. They urged that, as the larger power, India should be magnanimous and make the first move towards resuming dialogue. Their deceptive wordplay obscured the fact that Pakistan's strategy for combating domestic terrorism has been to deflect it outward to India and Afghanistan. The West also chose to forget that Indo-Pakistani relations were exceptionally positive on the eve of the Mumbai carnage, and thus the attack was doubly traumatic for India. Later, suspicions arose that Pakistani intelligence had taken advantage of this cordiality. Islamabad may have deliberately ensured that visiting Indian security officials were taken on a sightseeing tour beyond telecommunication coverage just prior to the attack. Thus, as the jihadist onslaught unfolded in Mumbai and the city police struggled to improvise a response, top officials with the mandate to coordinate a national-level effort were being held incommunicado in Pakistan (Zee News 2016).

The Mumbai attack and its unsatisfactory aftermath provide a snapshot of what is wrong with India’s efforts to fight terrorism through global governance processes. Reliance on foreign policy activism to rally moral outrage against a rogue state like Pakistan fails when that state has nuclear weapons, a clear propaganda line that terrorism is a byproduct of territorial disputes, and an economic and military patron in China. Not incidentally, the Chinese patron also wields a binding veto in the UN Security Council, ensuring that all India’s efforts to sanction Pakistan will come to naught. Taking these points as the building blocks of its argument, the present article will proceed as follows. First, it will outline the nature of terrorism facing India, specifically the issue of state-sponsorship. Then it will explain why Indian efforts to dissuade Pakistan through non-violent means have only yielded very poor results. Finally, the article will conclude with the suggestion that a more militarily offensive posture against Pakistan needs to be adopted, with the job of diplomats and scholars being to create a discursive space that emphasizes the necessity of such an approach. For this, they must painstakingly catalogue the trajectory by which Pakistani terrorism has managed to flourish in South Asia.
The Nature of Terrorism: Non-State versus State-Sponsored

9/11 had a beneficial side-effect in that it forced the West to recognize that mass casualty terrorist movements do not arise from impoverishment and bad governance alone. During the 1990s, a racist undertone pervaded thinking in Washington that if a country persistently experienced terrorism, it was that country’s own fault. Such views radiated outwards to encompass much of Western discourse, given the United States’ leading role as a discourse shaper. The irony was that the US itself had been a victim of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East, notably in Lebanon in the early 1980s. But the incidents that focused its attention on such terrorism were just that – incidents, which could be isolated in time and space and which did not threaten American civilians on the US mainland. So the US took an exceptionalist view, seeing terrorism either as a specifically American problem or no problem at all. A degree of empathy was felt for kindred nations overseas – those with a shared European ancestry, and which loosely belonged to the Western ie., Judeo-Christian civilization. Unfortunately, India ‘fell in between the cracks’ of this worldview because it was not a prosperous, ethnically white country. There was at the time, no sizeable Indian diaspora with the requisite political heft to lobby on behalf of New Delhi. Furthermore, the exigencies of superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union dictated that alliances be struck with unsavoury regimes. Thus, American officials overlooked Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism in India’s Punjab province and did not share information on this subject for fear of implicating Islamabad (Raman 2007, p. 153 and Badhwar 1984). All its talk about democracy promotion did not stop Washington from allowing a ‘friendly’ military dictatorship to sponsor terrorism against a ‘hostile’ elected government. Not for nothing have Pakistani officials since remarked at American hypocrisy for criticizing in the 2000s what had been quietly tolerated in the 1980s.

But while the post 2001 international system became more sensitive to the threat from terrorism, it was the specific interpretation of that threat which was problematic for India. Groups such as Al Qaeda were truly stateless entities, but organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba were not. They were bureaucratized, hierarchical structures with a territorial headquarters (usually located in Pakistani Punjab), recruitment centres that advertised in urban localities, and weapon training facilities co-located with Pakistani army installations. Such realities did not stop George W. Bush from describing LeT in December 2001 in the following words: ‘Lashkar-e-Tayiba is an extremist group based in Kashmir. LAT [sic] is a stateless sponsor of terrorism, and it hopes to destroy relations between Pakistan and India and to undermine Pakistani’s President Musharraf. To achieve its purpose, LAT has committed acts of terrorism inside both India and Pakistan’ (Outlook.com 2001). Actually, as the American scholar C. Christine Fair later observed, LeT has been favoured and protected by the Pakistani security establishment precisely because it never struck inside Pakistan. The ease with which the US president
Prem Mahadevan

distorted facts to morally equate both victim and sponsor of terrorism was hardly surprising. He could be equally misleading with his own citizens. An example was when he told American radio-listeners in February 2003 that Iraqi intelligence had strong operational ties with Al Qaeda (Kumar 2006, p. 56). The US establishment has long been aware of state-sponsored terrorism, but just not when Indian lives are mainly the ones at stake.

This indifference has been a constant factor that limited the effectiveness of Indian counterterrorism. In 1993, the US impeded investigations into the Mumbai (then Bombay) bombings after Indian authorities uncovered evidence linking Pakistani ordnance stores to the explosive material used. The Central Intelligence Agency asked for the evidence to be handed over, ostensibly to allow an independent investigation of Pakistan's role, and then 'accidentally' destroyed it (Raman 2003). Fifteen years later, the CIA allowed one of its sources, David Headley, to reconnoiter targets in Mumbai on behalf of LeT. It hoped that by allowing Headley to gain credibility with Pakistani jihadists, he would uncover clues that might locate Osama Bin Laden. Headley's arrest a full year after the 2008 Mumbai attack was not prompted by a desire to deliver justice for the victims. Rather, it was triggered by knowledge that Indian intelligence agencies had finally identified him as a LeT operative and would ask for his extradition or even worse, arrest him when he travelled again to India (Levy and Scott-Clark 2013, p. 58).1 To ensure that its own double-dealing remained secret for as long as possible, the CIA had Headley arrested in the US on terrorism charges. Thereafter, Indian investigators' access to him was limited to carefully tutored meetings during which he revealed just enough about Pakistani officialdom's complicity in the attack to make Islamabad uncomfortable. The CIA calculated that, by blackmailing Pakistan with the prospect of even more incriminating disclosures about its role in the Mumbai attack, it could extort cooperation with regard to US efforts to combat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Indian lives were thus bargaining chips for Washington, which only hardened its stance towards Islamabad following the 2011 discovery of Osama Bin Laden a mere stone's throw from the Pakistani military academy.

India has made international cooperation the cornerstone of its efforts to combat Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. This is a cardinal mistake. The history of counterterrorism suggests that all states, regardless of public pronouncements to the contrary, will strike deals with foreign terrorists in order to keep their own citizens safe from attack. Only with regard to domestic terrorism, of which there is hardly any in the West that merits policy or media attention, is the tough rhetoric matched by operational reality. For international terrorism, the rules are different. This can be demonstrated by three historical examples:

1 The information about Headley being arrested to prevent him falling into Indian hands was provided to the author of this paper by a senior Indian intelligence officer, who is a reliable source as far as the author is concerned.
Switzerland clandestinely negotiated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1970, providing diplomatic support in exchange for the PLO not attacking Swiss interests. The avowedly neutral Swiss entered into this Faustian bargain just as the Palestinians were focusing their attacks on civil aviation. Perhaps as a direct consequence of these secret talks, an investigation into the bombing of a Swissair flight to Israel, in which 47 people died, suddenly went cold. Nobody was brought to justice despite the perpetrator being identified (Geiser 2016).

The CIA recruited the mastermind of the 1972 Munich Massacre, Ali Hassan Salameh, as an ‘agent of influence’. In exchange for ensuring that Palestinian terrorists did not hit Americans, Salameh brokered American support for the idea of eventual Palestinian statehood. To the Israeli Mossad, the CIA-PLO deal was an infuriating obstacle to counterterrorism efforts. The US agency made clear that it would regard any public disclosure of the deal as ‘an unfriendly act’. Mossad was left to plan assassination attempts against Salameh in political isolation, knowing that he was protected by Israel’s most valuable ally (Markham 1983 and Bird 2014).

In 1985 the US got a taste of similar medicine from the French. Upon being informed that Imad Mughniyeh, chief of Hizballah’s special operations, was in Paris, the French moved to detain him. Except, they did not. Instead they discreetly negotiated with Mughniyeh – a terrorist mastermind wanted by both Israeli and US Intelligence – for the protection of French nationals in Lebanon. Then they turned him loose and claimed he escaped from their surveillance. The CIA and Mossad could only fume at such perfidy, especially since Mughniyeh had practically invented the concept of vehicle-borne suicide bombing (Los Angeles Times, 1986).

Similar experiences have bedeviled Indian efforts to forge an international consensus against terrorism. Officials in New Delhi allege that any intelligence shared by Langley and London only becomes specific when it concerns a threat to American or British interests (Nanjappa 2014). For the rest of the time, counterterrorist liaison is a Western exercise in contact-building within the Indian security establishment, with vague assessments being shared. These have little actionable value and often reiterate what was conveyed earlier, building up a deceptively large paper trail which can serve as ‘insurance’ in the event of another massive attack from Pakistan. Perhaps no ‘friendly’ country has been as perfidious as the UK. Three examples illustrate this point. First, after the Mumbai attack, the then British Foreign Secretary publicly drew a link between the atrocity and the status of Kashmir. In so doing, he gave the attack a veneer of retrospective legitimacy (Nelson 2009). Not even the Pakistani government had attempted this, since Islamabad was loath to associate Kashmir’s so-called ‘indigenous freedom
struggle’ with a high-profile terrorist incident. From the perspective of the British foreign office, killings by Pakistani jihadists were attributable to Indian domestic policy, rather than to Pakistani foreign policy. Second, in summer 2015 the British foreign intelligence service MI6 brokered an information-sharing pact between the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Afghan intelligence. The pact called for mutual non-cooperation with ‘hostile foreign agencies’ – a phrasing that was widely perceived as applying to India (Bagchi 2015). Considering that relations between Afghan and Pakistani intelligence officials had long been frigid, the abrupt turn-around from Kabul was associated with hidden British pressure. Lastly, in summer 2015, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that Pakistan’s Muttahida Quami Movement, a political party associated with high-intensity crime and urban violence in Karachi, had received Indian funding. This allegation was made at almost the same time as the Afghan-Pakistani intelligence pact, leading some Indian observers to question if the UK was leveraging its dominance of international media services to airbrush Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism and project India as being equally culpable of killing civilians through covert operations (Sareen 2015 and Noor 2015). According to Indian security officials, the British security establishment is desperate to retain ISI goodwill in collecting intelligence on terrorist plots directed against the UK. For this reason, MI6 is prepared to represent Pakistani interests within the British foreign policy establishment, and damage India’s.

Cables released by Wikileaks reveal that diplomats from the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, acting as a cabal, met during the 2008 Mumbai attacks to craft a common response. They decided to offer sympathy to India in the hope that this would mollify New Delhi and convince it not to respond militarily against Pakistan (Walsh 2010 and Wikileaks 2008). Apparently, they assessed that Indian political elite was so desperate for a charitable gesture that it would forego vengeance for its murdered citizens. They were right. In such a context, it is hardly surprising that India has been unable to unilaterally steer international discourse in a direction that would dissuade Pakistan from cross border terrorism. By depending on the US and the UK to be its interlocutors with the larger Western community of wealthy, democratic and industrialized nations, New Delhi has made itself a permanent hostage to the goodwill of others. The next section of this paper shall explain where this infantile need for parental support comes from, and why it has failed to deliver the results that India hoped for.

2017 is neither 1947 nor 1971

The Indian political and foreign policy establishments (both of which are, not coincidentally, devoid of serving military officials) have an obsession with projecting India as a ‘moral’ power (Sullivan 2014, pp. 643-645). This is a legacy of the independence struggle against colonialism. Caught up with a narrative that India
harnessed a unique type of ‘spiritually’ pure energy through non-violent protests against the British Raj, and that these led to the Raj’s demise (the crippling effect of World War II being merely a footnote), Indian foreign policy has since 1947 been one of exemplary sufferance calculated to arouse bystanders’ sympathy. Just as stoically absorbing lathi (baton) blows from policemen in front of the world’s press was meant to de-legitimize the colonial regime, so too does India hope that non-violent agitation about Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism will generate transformative results. Not reacting militarily to covert transgressions, whether the 1993 Mumbai blasts or the 2008 raid on the same city, has been part of a larger attempt to project India as a ‘mature’ power that does not use its superior strength to take revenge on a troublesome neighbour. It is also an attempt to widen civil-military cleavages within Pakistan, by projecting the phenomenon of terrorism as originating from a rogue military and intelligence apparatus, but not civilian leaders or the Pakistani people as a whole.

Restraint has not really delivered results. Since high-impact attacks by Pakistan-based terrorists are rare (outside of Jammu & Kashmir), the international community has little memory of India’s forbearance and even less appreciation for it. New Delhi’s failure to respond militarily is seen as weakness. According to residues of the Darwinian logic once favoured by Anglo-Saxon apologists for empire, the weak suffer only because they must. Inaction is also perceived as a sign of the relative cheapness of Indian lives, since neither India’s government nor society care enough about cross border terrorism to risk a war over it. In this context, why should the international community take a stand against Pakistan?

Meanwhile, no irreparable rifts have appeared between Pakistani civilian and military leaders that may be exploited to India’s benefit. Although an argument can be made that at a general level, suspicion between politicians and army leaders leaves Pakistan weakened, this does not have much relevance for the specific problem of cross border terrorism. Indeed, it complicates the problem by allowing Western governments to lobby New Delhi to remain militarily passive, on the spurious grounds that any attack on Pakistan would undermine that country’s progress towards ‘democracy’.

Thus, whatever statements of support are made by foreign governments following a terrorist incident in India, are fleeting expressions of diplomatic courtesy. Instead of generating soft power through showcasing its magnanimity towards a rogue neighbor, India has exposed a ‘soft vulnerability’. As Jacques Hymans points out, ‘soft power is the ability to make others do what you want on the basis on how they see you’, whereas ‘soft vulnerability is the fate of seeing others doing what you don’t want on the basis of how they see you’ [original emphasis] (Hymans 2009, p. 259). Its stoicisin the face of repeated Pakistani attacks has trapped India into a disadvantageous behavioural pattern because it allows the
West to cite past examples of Indian inaction and urge that the same be continued. In effect, Pakistan gets away with murder – literally – due to India’s refusal to break out of a self-imposed Stockholm Syndrome. Confused perspectives within Indian society only reinforce this sense of drift. When the December 2014 attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar took place, thousands of Indians held candlelight vigils in solidarity with the victims. Presumably, none cared that Pakistani civil society has never held a comparable show of support for Indian victims of cross border terrorism. Or that even Western societies were essentially unmoved by the spectacle of Pakistani schoolchildren being killed. Basically, Indians showed more compassion for Pakistanis than did that country’s own long-standing donors and partners, such as China or the Gulf Arab states. In such a situation, it is hardly surprising that neutral countries see no reason to assume an activist posture on state-sponsored terrorism.

There are other problems as well. India wishes to selectively internationalize its conflict with Pakistan by bringing the issue of state-sponsored terrorism before the United Nations but keeping Kashmir off the agenda. On the face of it, it has grounds for doing so: Pakistan, like all member states of the UN, is bound by Security Council Resolution 1267 to take action against terrorists based on its soil. (It has neither done so nor has any intention to.) India on the other hand, can cite the 1972 Shimla Agreement that the Kashmir issue will be resolved bilaterally. So in legal terms, there is no contradiction in India’s effort to emphasize cross border terrorism internationally and talk about Kashmir bilaterally.

Unfortunately for New Delhi, its previous experiences with both the UN system and the individual P5 powers of the Security Council (except Russia) have shown that principle gives way to expediency. India’s complaint about Pakistani aggression in Kashmir in 1947-48 was transformed by British skullduggery into a territorial dispute. Aware that it had already risked Arab wrath by permitting the creation of Israel, Whitehall did not want to further jeopardize the UK’s energy security by souring relations with the Islamic community of nations over Kashmir (Ankit 2013, pp. 29-30). Thus, it helped legitimize Pakistan’s duplicity of covertly pushing irregular fighters into the mountain kingdom. From this precedent, the Pakistani army drew the correct conclusion that in the event of future acts of cross border aggression, it could count on foreign powers to remain strictly neutral while simultaneously urging a synchronized bilateral de-escalation. This pragmatic but blatantly unprincipled combination would work to India’s disadvantage, provided Pakistan always struck first.

The only occasion when India comprehensively defeated Pakistan was when it cast the first stone. Victory in Bangladesh happened not because India waited for a crisis to develop before responding. Rather, it patiently steered events in a direction that worked to the strategic disadvantage of Pakistan. For several years
prior to the Pakistani army crackdown of March 1971, Indian intelligence agencies built up contacts with East Bengali separatists. When the military regime in Islamabad annulled the results of its own electoral process in December 1970 and disenfranchised the population of East Pakistan (55% of the total population), it created fertile grounds for a revolt. When it further worsened the situation by launching a genocidal counterinsurgency operation, it violated basic Anglo-Saxon norms about respecting human rights. Coming at a time when memories of the Second World War were still fresh, these two events (annulment of elections and the March 1971 crackdown) gave Indian diplomats an easy time of isolating Pakistan internationally. The Research and Analysis Wing’s newly created psychological warfare division performed stellar work in highlighting the human tragedy of the Pakistani civil war, thus preparing the grounds for India’s military action to be widely (if somewhat reluctantly) perceived as a necessary humanitarian intervention (Raman 2007, p. 12).

Unfortunately, there has not been another case where India has had a sufficiently decisive leadership as with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, nor an equally well-articulated case for taking military action. Spectacular terrorist incidents like the 1993 blasts and 2008 armed raid simply did not last long enough for international opinion to be mobilized and shaped in a manner that built up a clear picture of Pakistani state culpability and demanded action. Furthermore, neutral governments have been understandably wary of being instrumentalized in an ongoing geopolitical rivalry. The fact that no Western country has experienced cross border terrorism of a state-sponsored nature is a huge disadvantage for India’s messaging campaign. Within Europe or North America, there is no rogue state that funds and trains its citizens to attack a neighbouring state. Even the ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine is not really a ‘Western’ affair because it is happening between two countries that are outside NATO and the European Union. Thus it is portrayed in EU/NATO discussions as primarily a bilateral fight between Kyiv and Moscow, much like the 2008 Mumbai attack has been reduced to an Indo-Pakistani tiff.

Western policymakers simply cannot (or will not) make the cognitive connection between their policy concerns with terrorism and those of Indian counterparts. As far as they are concerned, state-sponsored terrorism was a yesteryear phenomenon, a sporadic byproduct of superpower tensions during the Cold War. It did not kill large numbers of people, thus allowing it to be eclipsed by larger ethnonationalist movements such as Palestinian nationhood. Meanwhile, non-state terrorism such as Irish irredentism or Basque separatism could be contained through inter-governmental cooperation. Path dependency has maintained this paradigm. Thus, the default setting of neutral foreign governments has been to unimaginatively advise New Delhi to ‘work together’ with Pakistan to defeat cross border terrorism.
The unique nature of India’s terrorist problem, which is both of a cross border and state-sponsored variety, means that its closest fellow-victim is Israel. Having experienced terrorist attacks (both non-state and state-sponsored) for decades, Israel is a logical partner for counterterrorism cooperation. However, Israel is routinely criticized for excessive use of force against Palestinians and an occupation policy that sometimes is overtly racist. To be compared with Israel, especially in connection with Kashmir, would not do India much good. Thus, New Delhi is left struggling to find an entry point into international discourse on terrorism, which has already calcified along certain predetermined lines based on the (rather limited and tame) experiences of Western powers.

This leads to another problem: the limited penetration of Indian media into the international market, as well as the low academic rankings of Indian universities. Both mean that non-governmental instruments for discourse-shaping cannot be effectively used to highlight the challenges that Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism poses to global governance more generally. The Indian television audience overseas is overwhelmingly limited to lower-middle class members of the diaspora, many of whom struggle to make a decent living in high-wage economies where their immigrant status is an unstated disadvantage. They have little ability to influence the foreign policies of their host countries, with the US being a partial exception due to exceptionally successful profiles of Indian immigrants there. As for native-born foreign audiences, New Delhi has no equivalent of RT (formerly Russia Today) which serves as an effective tool of Kremlin propaganda overseas. Although its credibility has taken a hit with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, RT still has an impact on domestic politics in the West. An intelligence study on alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election focused for about half its length on RT (Rutenberg 2017). If India were likewise able to insert its own perspectives into the international news landscape, it could steer opinions towards greater hostility vis-à-vis Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

One way to do this would be to leverage India’s large English-literate middle class into becoming a niche supplier of inexpensive talent for digital journalism and book publishing. The Kremlin does not only rely on RT to spread its worldview, but also on printing presses such as Evropa Publishers (which brings out academic literature on political science and history, that conforms to the official Russian line on world events – see Belousov 2012, p. 65). Numerous reports have noted the existence of ‘troll factories’ in Russia, which saturate Western social media networks with disinformation and build up fringe debates to the point where they enter into mainstream narratives (Chen 2015). With its penchant for avoiding totalitarian methods of message control and propaganda, democratic India may be averse to such underhanded methods. But in the absence of necessary techniques to take charge of its own image management, India cedes the initiative
to Western journalists who are hardly its friends.

Western and Indian reporters have noted that the mainstream media in the West, led by the BBC, has a pronounced Indophobic bias (Gautier 2017, Thakur 2016 and Dutta 2015). Part of the reason why reports about Pakistani involvement in terrorism are accompanied by words like ‘alleged’ or ‘India accuses/Pakistan denies’ is because India does not have China’s ruthless censorship policy, wherein those who write unfavourable articles about the country have their visas revoked and are kicked out. For all the antipathy which China arouses among sections of the US defence establishment, Beijing knows how to control international commentary about itself and its blatantly illegal sea-grabs in the South China Sea. India, despite showing superhuman restraint after each terrorist provocation, is merely reduced to being another disputant alongside Pakistan whenever a cross border attack occurs. This can be changed by promoting the Indian broadcast media industry and print journalism to internationally respected standards of sophistication, and by cultural attunement with foreign audiences (through hiring Western journalism graduates for instance, whose jobs would depend on compliance with reporting guidelines set by Indian editors). It can also be changed by raising the academic rankings of Indian universities in the social sciences and inviting foreign scholars for research visits on jihadist terrorism and irregular warfare. India needs to develop a civilian-led tradition of War and Strategic Studies, which is nominally independent of government control but whose scholars openly argue the Indian case against Pakistan. For this, necessary investment in international journal subscriptions, travel budgets for academic conferences and research visits, and closer ties with foreign universities, must happen.

**Conclusion**

A June 2016 article in the *New York Times* explored the phenomenon of victim-blaming. It cited psychological studies that found that when narratives focus on generating sympathy for a victim, they actually have the opposite effect. Observers who are fed such a narrative assume that certain characteristics unique to that victim made him/her an easy (and quasi-legitimate) target for misfortune. This bias persists even when the misfortune has been deliberately caused by a clearly identified perpetrator. However, when fed a narrative that focuses on the perpetrator, observers tend to judge the latter more harshly (Niemi and Young 2016). Put simply, the studies found that it is easier to manufacture criticism of a perpetrator than to generate sympathy for a victim. With this principle in mind, India must reboot its information warfare strategy as concerns Pakistan.

The thrust of Indian diplomacy, both at the level of government officials interacting with foreign counterparts, and professional groups such as academic and journalistic networks, must be to investigate and expose Pakistan as a rogue state that
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sponsors cross border terrorism to externalize its domestic failures. Internationally peer-reviewed articles on Pakistani civil-military relations, drug-trafficking, Islamist politics, Baluch separatism and violent crime in Karachi, must be authored. These must be inserted into academic networks for aggressive dissemination to European and North American scholars researching on South Asia. Likewise, books on Indian strategic affairs must be published with leading Western presses. Western academics must be encouraged to publish with Indian journals, whose standards of review need to be raised to the point where their international credibility is sufficiently alluring for early-career scholars from Anglo-American and European universities. This is would be a lengthy process unfolding over several years.

Most importantly, there needs to be a clear effort to link the territory of Pakistan with the notion of terrorist safe havens. This can happen after more surgical strikes such as those which occurred on 29 September 2016 against terrorist launch pads in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Through 'propaganda of the deed', New Delhi can generate media headlines about Pakistan’s role in fomenting terrorism. Merely relying on semantics at the UN will not be enough for the purpose. Western news agencies operate on the credo that ‘if it bleeds, it leads’. To ensure that Islamabad is shamed beyond redemption for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks, India must be prepared to shed some of its own blood, while ensuring that even more Pakistani blood is shed in the process. And it must do this as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself. As this paper has argued, the only time when India has totally defeated Pakistan was when it went on the offensive. Indian diplomats, scholars and journalists need to start building up a case for cross border strikes on the Pakistani army and its jihadist proxies, as a matter of priority. Then, when the next Mumbai-type attack occurs, India will be ready to do what is needed.

‘To some extent, the government of Narendra Modi has already been moving in this direction. During 2016-17, India chalked up two big successes in its fight against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, both of which are consistent with its efforts to strengthen global governance. First, at the level of policy discourse, it has focused on the role of the Pakistani ‘Deep State’ in promoting terrorism (Chaudhury 2017). This is a major innovation, as it emphasizes the role of specific state security institutions in terrorist incidents, without implicating the entire administrative machinery of Pakistan. Thus it maintains the (contrived) narrative that Pakistani civilian leaders want ‘peace’ while a hawkish military-intelligence establishment wants to play spoiler. It can be viewed as a psychological warfare tool within Modi government’s ‘offensive defence’ doctrine, which aims to protect Indian citizens far more rigorously than previous governments have.

Ever since the 2011 Arab Revolts in the Middle East and North Africa, Western scholarship has become aware of hidden dynamics within autocratic and semi-
democratic political systems, that allow jihadists to receive funding, arms and manpower through covert government sources. By leveraging this discourse, India has demonstrated that it cannot easily be equated with Pakistan, since Indian democracy is widely recognized as being among the most stable in Asia. Highlighting the role of the Pakistani Deep State in sponsoring sectarian terrorism domestically (through Sunni supremacist groups) could strengthen New Delhi’s efforts to shape academic and policy debates. The Pakistani media is an excellent source of information on linkages between sectarian terrorists and government officials. For decades, this reservoir of data has not been effectively used to embarrass Islamabad, despite its obvious potential to vindicate Indian claims about the roguish nature of Pakistan’s security services.

By funding academic research on Pakistani domestic politics, New Delhi can gradually influence scholarly debates in the West. Indian researchers may be able to showcase their superior understanding of Islamabad’s unstated insecurities, by citing Pakistani counterparts to prove their point. This was the strategy used by West Germany to delegitimize the East German regime during the Cold War, and it proved very effective (Bytwerk 1999, p. 407). India has thus far managed to convert the wave of Islamophobia that swept through Western countries following the 2014 rise of the ‘Islamic State/Daesh’ into a strategic asset via-a-vis Pakistan. Much of the hostility that the administration of US President Donald Trump has shown towards Islamabad stems from a nativist, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant backlash among white Americans. So, Pakistan is being called out for supporting terrorism much as Saudi Arabia’s connection with the 9/11 hijackers is being put under belated scrutiny – as a sign of US impatience with duplicitous ‘allies’. But if it persists with riding this wave of racist sentiment, New Delhi cannot get very far as the same nativist instinct among Americans can also turn upon Indians. Indeed, it already has to some degree, as US protectionism in the high-skilled labour market has demonstrated. Therefore, New Delhi must rely on classic techniques of information warfare, including the weaponization of academic literature in political science and international relations/area studies.

The second success enjoyed by New Delhi in recent times has been its successful conduct of surgical strikes in PoK. As referred to above, the strikes established a ‘cause-and-effect’ relationship, showing that New Delhi would not wait anymore for Pakistan to conduct farcical ‘investigations’ into a cross border terrorist attack, as Islamabad did with Mumbai (2008) and Pathankot (2016). Indian special forces humiliated the Pakistani army and demonstrated that nuclear deterrence will not stave off the consequences of another Mumbai-style attack. More important than Islamabad’s denial of the strikes – a reflection of its delusionary mindset – was the fact that foreign governments did not criticize India. This marked a drastic improvement in India’s international standing from the 1990s, when it
would be urged to show restraint no matter how vigorously it had been provoked by Pakistan. Even during the 1999 Kargil Crisis, Washington initially attempted to persuade New Delhi to agree to a synchronized de-escalation on an ‘as is’ basis (Bommakanti 2011, p. 288). The US proposal, if accepted would have left Pakistan in possession of territory on India’s side of the Line of Control. New Delhi rightly rejected such a preposterous notion, and seeing Indian determination, Washington thereafter pressured an increasingly desperate Pakistan to restore the status quo ante. A decade later, after the Mumbai attack, the US continued with its even-handed treatment of India and Pakistan, despite American officials admitting to Pakistani sponsorship of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan. Only in recent years, with India having been repeatedly hit with small terrorist attacks not just in Kashmir but also in Punjab, and having borne these with stoicism, has a clear pattern been established that India is indeed a passive victim.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s tumultuous relationship with the US has marred its international reputation. The European Union, as an Atlanticist body, has followed the American lead in softly nudging Pakistan to behave like a civilized state and stop supporting militants in neighbouring countries. This concern has been largely motivated by self-interest amid fears that a destabilized Afghanistan could once again become a refuge for international terrorists including Al Qaeda. But mere fact that the US, EU, and even the BRICS (the latter grouping includes China) are prepared to call Pakistan-based terrorist groups an international security concern represents a minor victory for India. The real battle however, is not diplomatic but military. As the Modi government underscored in September 2016, Indian patience has its limits. The surgical strikes showed that as long as the threat of a nuclear war does not loom large over South Asia, Western powers and even China are prepared to treat Indo-Pakistani border clashes as an unavoidable reality. This has finally created political space for a large Indian response, should the Pakistani Deep State use jihadists to attack an Indian city again.

Bio

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